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Abstract 
By studying the internationalization process of four Norwegian SMEs involved in a 
governmental-backed internationalization support program, this case study aims at uncovering 
how SMEs identify, evaluate and mitigate risks in the internationalization process. This is a topic 
of high relevance for managers, policy-makers and researches. Each group will be addressed in 
this abstract. 
The risk assessments made during the course of the internationalization process is found be of a 
muddling-through nature, with no real separation between risk identification and risk evaluation 
processes, and both processes are found to be interlinked and cyclical. Resource scarcity is found 
to be a highly influential factor, making the firms consider only a subset of what is perceived to 
be feasible entry modes in the risk identification phase. Further, only a subset of risk factors - 
identified as key risk factors - are thoroughly evaluated. When evaluating the overall risk level, 
risk is assessed in terms of potential loss associated with a market entry failure and evaluated 
against a risk tolerance frontier – determined by the firm’s ability to handle a financial loss. The 
risk mitigation efforts are dominated by a trade-off between the perceived necessary 
commitment for successful entry, and the desire to commit minimal resources.  
For managers, the most important contribution of this study is how small firms can handle the 
significant resource demands of an internationalization process, and how small firm 
internationalization is vastly different from large firm internationalization. The reductionist 
approach pursued by the case firms limits the complexity and resource demands of the 
internationalization process, and this is further reduced by third-parties which provide relevant 
information, experience and decision-making support. The case study also illustrates the 
applicability of muddling-through processes in risk assessment– yielding an alternative to larger 
firms’ more formal and structured processes. 
For policy makers, the case study accentuates the vital role of government-backed 
internationalization programs for small firm internationalization. The internationalization 
programs are found to both motivate and facilitate the internationalization process of the case 
firms. In the function as facilitator, the programs reduce both resource- and psychological 
barriers by providing information, network referrals and financial support. The role as motivator 
is directly linked to the program’s ability to reduce internationalization barriers, by allowing firms 
that are initially reluctant to engage in international activities to discover that international 
expansion is an achievable goal. The fact that two out of four case firms never would have 
considered their current foreign market expansion unless contacted by the internationalization 
program, should give an incentive for continuation of these programs. 
For researchers, the case study illustrates how research on risk in the internationalization process 
has been neglected. The current research streams focus on pattern explanation of small firm 
internationalization following successful entry, rather than how small firms actually identify, 
evaluate and mitigate risk during this process. This indicates a need for internationalization 
process models to more accurately describe the risk assessment process conducted by 
practitioners in small, internationalizing firms. In order to understand the role of risk in the 
internationalization process, the models should be developed based on empirical research on 
how uncertainty affects resource commitment at market entry and managerial decision-making. 
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Sammendrag 
Målet med dette casestudiet er å avdekke hvordan fire små norske bedrifter som deltar i et statlig 
støtteprogram for internasjonalisering identifiserer, evaluerer og forsøker å redusere risiko i 
internasjonaliseringsprosessen. Dette er et emne som er høyst relevant for både bedriftsledere, 
forskere og myndigheter, og hver målgruppe blir adressert i sammendraget.  
Risikovurderingene som gjøres i internasjonaliseringsprosessen er av en mindre strukturert art. 
Det skilles ikke mellom prosesser for risikoidentifisering og risikoevaluering, og disse framstår 
som tett sammenbundet og sykliske av natur. Videre påvirker ressursknapphet selskapenes 
risikovurdering ved at kun en delmengde av mulige inngangsmetoder vurderes. Kun et utvalg av 
risikofaktorer blir vurdert, nærmere bestemt faktorene som blir ansett å ha størst 
påvirkningskraft på selskapenes operasjoner. Risiko måles i form av potensielt tap ved mislykket 
markedsinngang og vurderes mot en risikogrense som bestemmes av bedriftens evne til å tåle 
økonomisk tap.  Forsøk på å redusere risiko i internasjonaliseringsprosessen blir sterkt påvirket 
av en avveining mellom det som vurderes som påkrevd ressursallokering for vellykket 
markedsinngang, og et ønske om å redusere ressursallokering så mye som mulig.  
For bedriftsledere er det viktigste bidraget fra denne oppgaven hvordan små selskaper kan 
håndtere betydelige ressurskrav i internasjonaliseringsprosessen, og hvordan små selskapers 
internasjonaliseringsprosess er tydelig annerledes enn større selskapers prosesser. Fokus på kun 
et utvalg av mulige inngangsstrategier og risikofaktorer reduserer kompleksitet og påkrevd 
ressursallokering, det samme gjør støtte fra tredjeparter i form av relevant informasjon, 
erfaringsdeling og beslutningsstøtte. Studien gir dermed støtte til at en mindre strukturert 
risikovurderingsprosess kan være hensiktsmessig for små selskaper.  
Studien er relevant for myndigheter fordi den illustrerer hvordan myndighetsorganer kan ha en 
viktig rolle i internasjonaliseringsprosessen til små selskaper. Myndighetsledede 
internasjonaliseringsprogrammer motiverer og fasiliterer internasjonal satsing. Programmene 
fasiliterer internasjonaliseringsprosessen ved å redusere ressurs- og psykologiske barrierer til 
internasjonal satsing ved å bidra med informasjon, kontakter og finansiell støtte til bedriftene. 
Rollen som motivator for internasjonal aktivitet er direkte knyttet til positive effekten 
programmene har på selskapenes internasjonale satsing, ved at bedrifter som i utgangspunktet 
ikke vurderer internasjonal satsing gjennom fasilitering fra internasjonaliseringsprogrammet 
finner at dette er oppnåelig. At to av selskapene i casestudiet ikke ville vurdert 
internasjonalisering hvis de ikke ble kontaktet av myndighetsprogrammet, indikerer en støtte til 
at tilsvarende programmer bør videreføres.   
Oppgaven er relevant for forskere ved at den avdekker at det i for liten grad er forsket på risiko i 
internasjonaliseringsprosessen. Det har vært mer fokus på å forklare gjennomførte 
internasjonaliseringsprosesser enn å vurdere hvordan små selskaper faktisk identifiserer, 
evaluerer og forsøker å redusere risiko underveis i prosessen. Dette vitner om et behov for å 
utvikle internajonaliseringsmodeller som mer nøyaktig beskriver risikovurderingsprosessen i små 
selskaper. For å bedre forstå hvordan risiko påvirker internasjonaliseringsprosessen bør slike 
modeller utvikles basert på empiriske studier av hvordan opplevd usikkerhet påvirker 
ressursallokering ved markedsinngang og beslutningstaking i prosessen. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
European small and medium sized enterprises1 (SMEs) are increasingly involved in international 
trade. The European Commission (2010) finds that more than 40 % of European SMEs are 
involved in an international relationship – ranging from exporting, importing and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) to subcontracting activities. The trend of increased cross-border activity of 
SMEs (European Commission 2010) is important to the Norwegian economy, where 99.5 % of 
the companies have fewer than 100 employees (NHD 2011) and 65 % the value creation 
originates from companies with fewer than 250 employees (NHD 2011). Further, export 
activities2 – independent of firm size – constituted nearly a quarter of the Norwegian gross 
domestic product (GDP) in 2010 (SSB 2011). Successful internationalization of small firms is 
therefore an important part of a sustainable Norwegian economy.   
This master thesis follows four Norwegian SMEs in the Norwegian oil and gas (O&G) industry 
in their attempt to enter the Brazilian petroleum sector. Following a global trend of increased 
cross-border activity (Ghemawat 2011), Norwegian suppliers are active in O&G fields all over 
the world - including Southeast Asia, Western Africa, and the Americas – and increasingly so. 
The turnover from Norwegian suppliers’ international sales increased with nearly 25 % from 
2007 to 2009, reaching a total of NOK 118 billion in 2009 (Fjose, Jakobsen & Espelien 2010). 
Sales from operators and suppliers3 in the O&G sector account for 15 % of the aggregated 
Norwegian exports, after discounting for direct O&G sales (Sasson & Blomgren 2011), making 
the O&G sector important to the Norwegian economy and an intereresting context for studying 
small firm internationalization.  
Brazil is currently the world’s 11th largest oil producer, but is expected to be among the top five 
in 2020. This is largely due to the discovery of the pre-salt oil fields in 2007 (The Economist 
2011b) and the state controlled Brazilian oil firm Petrobras’ ambitious investment plans. 
Conservative estimates put the size of the pre-salt oil fields a little below the size of all oil fields in 
the North Sea, and Petrobras has announced investments of USD 224 billion in the period from 
2011 to 2015 (Petrobras 2011), mostly in E&P activities4. As a majority of products and services 
exported by Norwegian O&G suppliers are related to these early phase activities (Fjose, Jakobsen 
& Espelien 2010), the Brazilian petroleum sector is a particularly attractive market. Reflecting 
this, there are currently more than 120 Norwegians companies engaged in O&G related activities 
in Brazil – of which a majority entered the Brazilian market after 2007 (oilinfo.no 2011).   
Risk in the Internationalization Process 
International business is inherently risky because of the uncertainties related to operating in 
unknown markets, and the fact that such uncertainties may affect firm performance (Miller 1993; 
Oviatt, Shrader & McDougall 2004). As several researchers have pointed out, political, economic, 
                                                 
1 Enterprises that have up to 250 employees (European Commission 2009) 
2 Excluding the value of the oil and gas export 
3 We follow Sasson and Blomgren’s (2011) division of actors in the oil and gas industry into operators (holding 
production licences) and suppliers (providing oil and gas specific services). 
4 Exploration and production (E&P) involves searching for petroleum resources and development and building of 
infrastructure for oil and gas production 
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legal and social uncertainties in the environment increase the risk of losing profits or firm assets 
(Boyacigiller 1990; Ghoshal 1987; Miller & Bromiley 1990; Wiseman & Bromiley 1996). 
Researchers further argue that a firm’s strategic objective is to align the organization to such an 
uncertain environment (Figueira-de-Lemos, Johanson & Vahlne 2011; Miller 1992), an alignment 
that will ultimately decide the firm’s risk exposure (Miller 1992). Consequently, the process of 
identifying, evaluating and mitigating risk is a vital part of the strategy process of Norwegian 
SMEs trying to enter the Brazilian petroleum market. 
 
Several of the proposed sources of uncertainty are present in the Brazilian business environment. 
In general market assessments, Ruchir Sharma (2012) – head of Emerging Markets and Global 
Macro at Morgan Stanley Investment Management - and The Economist (2009b) describe the 
Brazilian business environment as an environment with significant government interventions, 
bureaucracy and underdeveloped market supporting institutions. Reflecting this, Brazil is 
currently ranked 126th on the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business index (World Bank 2012).   
 
The fact that Aker Solutions reported a NOK 500 million loss in relation to their Brazilian 
business operations in the third quarter of 2011 (Aker Solutions 2011), provides an example of 
how challenging the Brazilian business environment can be. The loss has been attributed to the 
attempt of running their operations from their Norwegian headquarters, failure to consider 
experiential data in tenders, the challenge of meeting local content regulations and overly 
ambitious project plans (TU.no 2011, 2012). When asked how the situation unfolded, the 
company admitted it ‘had been sleeping in class’ (TU.no 2012). None of Aker Solutions mistakes 
discriminates on company size; further stressing how a thorough risk assessment is a vital 
component of any entry strategy. 
1.2 Research Questions 
This thesis is a case study of risk management in the internationalization process of SMEs 
participating in an Innovasjon Norge-led Navigator project (Appendix 11.1). Based on empirical 
data collected through interviews with employees directly involved in the respective firms’ 
internationalization process, the study searches to answer the following research questions: 
1) How do managers of Norwegian SMEs identify risk factors? 
2) How are the identified risks evaluated and sought mitigated?  
 
The appropriate unit of analysis is guided by the scope of the Navigator project and the time 
limitations of a master thesis. The scope of the study is therefore the SMEs from the time an idea 
of a possible international venture is considered until the idea is concretized, market research has 
been performed, different business models have been evaluated, and visits have been made to the 
target country. The study does not aim to develop a model, but aims at describing important 
factors in the risk identification, evaluation and mitigation processes of the selected case firms. 
1.3 Relevance to Managers, Researchers and Policy Makers 
For managers, risk assessment is only one of the considerations that need to be made when 
considering foreign expansion. This is illustrated by Cavusgil et al. (2008), who identified six 
variables in need for managerial attention prior to international expansion; firm goals and objectives, 
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resources and capabilities available to the firm, unique conditions in the target country, risks inherent in the 
foreign venture, the nature and extent of the competition and characteristics of the product and service 
offering. The idiosyncratic nature of risk (Baird & Thomas 1985; Oviatt, Shrader & McDougall 
2004; Shrader et al. 2000) makes risk assessment a highly complex endeavor, requiring significant 
resources of an often time-constrained management team. However, given the myriad of tasks 
the management team is engaged in during an internationalization process, the amount of 
resources contributed to risk assessment must necessarily be a trade-off. In order to weight the 
trade-off between risk assessment and other vital tasks, knowledge of how the 
internationalization process unfolds in comparable firms can provide important inputs. 
For researchers, the topic of risk in the internationalization process seems to have received little 
attention during the last decade. Despite the fact that several holistic frameworks have been 
developed for identifying, evaluating and mitigating risk in the internationalization process - e.g. 
by Oviatt, Shrader and McDougall (2004) - no such frameworks has been thoroughly tested or 
accepted by the research community or practitioners. While we do not aim at developing a new 
model, we seek to address the suitability of the proposed risk models in the context of SMEs 
entering an unknown market. The nature of the target market and firm size might affect both the 
sources of risk and the mitigation strategies used to manage the risk of market entry. Both aspects 
are areas of interest for researchers, as the risk management models are generic in nature and few 
researchers have sought to understand risk assessments in SMEs' entry evaluations and later 
pursued entry strategies. 
For policy makers, there is an obvious interest in facilitating the internationalization efforts of 
Norwegian firms. O&G related services are one of Norway’s most important exports, and the 
number of international sales is an indication of the international competitiveness of Norwegian 
O&G suppliers. According to Fjose, Jakobsen and Espelien (2010), and Sasson and Blomgren 
(2011), Norwegian O&G suppliers are already highly competitive – possessing unique knowledge 
and competences gained from experience on the Norwegian Continental Shelf. In order for the 
O&G suppliers to remain internationally competitive, and secure the future of an important 
Norwegian industry, Norwegian policy must facilitate the internationalization efforts of 
Norwegian firms. This in turn creates a need for knowledge concerning the internationalization 
process of such firms, and how they identify, evaluate and mitigate risk. 
1.4 Structure of Study 
The thesis is structured to best answer the above outlined research questions, and largely follows 
the sequence of a traditional research process. An introductory part outlines the background of 
the study, research questions and objectives, before a theoretical background presents relevant 
theory and key concepts for studying risk in the internationalization process. The theoretical 
background is followed by an outline and evaluation of the study’s methodological approach. The 
following empirical background section is divided in to two parts – (1) important characteristics 
of the Brazilian petroleum market, and (2) case firm presentations. The subsequent empirical data 
analysis identifies cross-case patterns, before a discussion links the findings from the empirical 
data analysis with the theoretical background. After presenting implications for managers and 
policy makers, the study’s limitations as well as implications for further research are outlined. A 
final conclusion summarizes the findings from the discussion and provides a clear answer to the 
research questions.   
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2 Theoretical Background 
The theoretical background is centered around the topic of risk, and starts with a definition of 
the word risk used in this paper. Following the risk definition, two contrasting explanatory 
models of the internationalization process are compared to provide a background for the topic of 
risk within the international business literature. From a focus on internationalization theories, 
focus is shifted to risk models presented in the international business literature, and the 
uncertainties which determine the level of risk a firm is exposed to in its business environment. 
The last sections of the theoretical background are focused directly on the research questions, 
treating risk identification, evaluation and mitigation. Propositions for expected case firm 
behavior are presented in each section, and revisited in the discussion of the empirical findings.  
2.1 Risk Definition 
The Oxford dictionary (Soanes, Hawker & Elliott 2006) defines the word 'risk'( Figure 1) 
according to a downside perspective 
(Miller 1992), meaning that the focus is 
put on potentially negative effects on an 
entity in a particular situation. However, 
studying the definitions of risk in 
different dictionaries will illustrate that 
there is a wide range of definitions. The 
same is also true within different 
research streams treating the topic of 
risk, and there is no single agreed definition of risk - a point emphasized by several researchers 
(Aven & Renn 2010; Fischhoff, Watson & Hope 1984; Miller & Reuer 1996).  
The definition of risk chosen in this study aims to be close to how real life managers, the 
practitioners of international business, view risk. In a study of managerial perspectives on risk, 
March and Shapira (1987) argue that managers "see risk in ways that are both less precise and different 
from risk as it appears in decision theory" (March & Shapira 1987, p. 1407). In decision theory, 
uncertainty and risk have been defined in terms of probabilities of decision outcomes and 
probability distributions (Bromiley, Miller & Rau 2005). In particular, March and Shapira found 
three deviations from decision theory that also differ from a wider range of risk definitions. First, 
managers associate risk with negative outcomes and do not treat uncertainty of positive outcomes 
as an important aspect of risk. Second, managers recognize the uncertainty aspect of risk but 
prefer to define risk in terms of amount to lose rather than a probability distribution. Third, there 
is little desire to reduce risk to a single quantifiable construct, although quantities are used in 
discussing risk and precision is sought in estimating risk. These findings support a downside 
perspective of risk, which several researchers (Baird & Thomas 1985; March & Shapira 1987; 
Miller & Reuer 1996) find more managerial relevant than variance and probability distribution 
concepts. Grounded in the discussion above, we choose a downside perspective on risk, applying 
the following definition of risk throughout the study: 
"Risk reflects the degree of uncertainty and potential loss associated with the outcomes that may follow from a 
given behavior or set of behaviors" (Forlani & Mullins 2000, p. 309) 
Figure 1 - Risk definition in the Oxford dictionary 
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Following Forlani and Mullin’s (2000) definition of risk, a change in the level of uncertainty or 
the potential for loss alters a firm’s risk exposure. An important implication of Forlani and 
Mullin’s definition is that the level of risk can be altered by firm behavior. Thus, managers 
operating in an uncertain business environment have the opportunity to alter the degree to which 
firms are exposed to risk, by employing risk mitigation strategies. Hence, coping with uncertainty 
is a key managerial activity (Thompson 1967).  
2.2 Two Contrasting Views on the Internationalization Process 
In order to set the topic of risk into an internationalization context, two prominent models for 
explaining firm behavior in the internationalization process are compared. The stages models 
represent the gradual internationalization viewpoint, while the born global and international new 
venture perspectives represent the early internationalization viewpoint. Comparing two models of 
the internationalization process contributes to creative tension (Autio 2005), and is an 
acknowledgement of the inability of any existing theory to fully explain firm internationalization 
(Crick & Spence 2005; Rialp, Rialp & Knight 2005). The comparison is done with focus on how 
the internationalization process is explained, and the role of risk in this process. 
 
Figure 2 - Gradual vs. Early Internationals 
To represent the stages models, we have chosen to focus solely on the Uppsala model (Johanson 
& Vahlne 1977). This model holds a dominant position in the field of international business 
(Aspelund & Moen 2010), and the differences between the different stages models are semantic 
rather than substantive concerning the nature of the internationalization process (Andersen 1993; 
Bell 1995). 
The field of early internationalization is newer and more fragmented than that of the stages 
models, reflected in the lack of consensus on a term describing firms internationalizing soon after 
inception. Among other terms, the firms have been classified as born globals (Knight 1997; Rennie 
1993), international new ventures (McDougall, Shane & Oviatt 1994), early internationalizing firms (Rialp, 
Rialp & Knight 2005) and instant exporters (McAuley 1999). The definitions of the various firm 
types are nevertheless similar, all emphasizing early international sales to multiple foreign 
countries. We follow Rialp et al.’s (2005) example of referring to such firms as early 
internationalizing firms, or ‘early internationals’ for brevity sake, as the definitions are so similar. 
Due to the newness of the field, and lack of a generally accepted model, focus will be on 
similarities in the early internationals literature rather than one specific model. 
We acknowledge the debate concerning whether the early international internationalization 
process can be explained by the Uppsala model (Bell 1995; Madsen & Servais 1997; Oviatt & 
McDougall 1994). However, this discussion is outside the scope of this study and we rather seek 
to exploit the contrasting views on the internationalization process as both models fit the case 
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firms; SMEs, some quite young,  with resource limitations and various levels of international 
experience. 
2.2.1  Gradual Internationals 
The Uppsala model of the internationalization process was developed as a response to empirical 
observations that contradicted the idea of firms choosing to enter markets by an optimal mode 
determined by cost and risk analyses of market characteristics and firm resources (Johanson & 
Vahlne 2009). The empirical observations of the export behavior of Swedish firms by Johansson, 
Vahlne and colleagues at the Uppsala University indicated that firms did not find optimal entry 
modes through rigid analysis (Johanson & Vahlne 2009). Rather, the firms began 
internationalization by ad hoc exporting and internationalization was seen as a product of a series 
of incremental decisions – often following an establishment chain (Johanson & Vahlne 1977). 
This establishment chain predicted that the ad hoc exporting would be followed by more 
formalized market entries through agents, sales subsidiaries and in some cases production. From 
these empirical observations, a model of the internationalization process was built. 
 
Figure 3 - Uppsala Model's Internationalization Mechanism (adapted from Johanson & Vahlne (1977)) 
Johanson and Vahlne’s (1977) Uppsala model suggests an internationalization process consisting 
of state and change variables mutually affecting each other in a causal cycle (see Figure 3). It is 
assumed that the slow and incremental internationalization pattern is a result of a lack of market 
knowledge and a propensity for uncertainty avoidance (Johanson & Wiedersheim-Paul 1975), 
with foreign operations being the best source of foreign market knowledge (Johanson & Vahlne 
1977). The two researchers argue that the state variables of current market commitment and 
market knowledge will be an important influence on the change variables of current business 
activities and new commitment decisions (and the latter two will in turn influence market 
commitment and market knowledge). The internationalization process of firms is therefore 
closely tied to the firm's risk perception, which is reduced through "incremental decision-making and 
learning about foreign markets and operations” (Johanson & Vahlne 1977, p. 306). 
Johansson and Vahlne (1977) define risk (R) as the product of market commitment (C) and 
market uncertainty (U). From this definition, it is evident that the risk level is elevated by an 
increase in commitment and/or an increase in the level of uncertainty. In relation to the risk 
definition, Johansson and Vahlne (1977) introduce the concept of a maximum tolerable market 
risk deciding the outcome of commitment decisions. In their view, scale-increasing commitments 
will be made as long as the current market risk is below the maximum, while uncertainty-reducing 
commitments are made when the threshold is breached. This is illustrated in Figure 4 (next page) 
where a firm might start with a risk exposure of R0, and increases commitment with ∆R until the 
firm reaches the maximum tolerable risk frontier. As the state-change relationship indicates, the 
increased commitment will lead to increased market knowledge – lowering the uncertainty at the 
given commitment level and eventually leading the firm to increase their commitment until the 
risk frontier is reached again. In a later paper, Figueira-de-Lemos, Johanson and Vahlne (2011) 
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revisit the risk model and separate between contingent uncertainty (can be reduced) and pure 
uncertainty (unchangeable) – implying that there will always be a level of uncertainty and 
therefore also risk in the internationalization process.  
 
Figure 4 - Risk mediating the gradual internationalization process. Adapted from Figueira-de-Lemos et al. (2011) 
While the model originally focused only on the focal firm, Johansson and Vahlne have since 
recognized that "markets are networks of relationships (…) [and that] relationships offer potential for learning, 
and for building trust and commitment" (Johanson & Vahlne 2009, pp. 1411-2). In relation to this, they 
introduce the concept of ‘liability of outsidership’ (Johanson & Vahlne 2009, p. 1411) to describe the 
liability of not being a member of industry firm networks in a given market. It is also important 
to note that Johansson and Vahlne (1977) introduced three exceptions from their model of the 
internationalization process; (1) firms with very large resources, (2) stable and homogenous 
market conditions, and (3) firms with much experience from other markets with similar 
conditions. 
2.2.2 Early Internationals 
Despite the stature of the Uppsala model, several studies have questioned the model's fit to a 
certain group of firms internationalizing soon after establishment (Bell 1995; Moen & Servais 
2002; Oviatt & McDougall 1994). These firms seem to contradict the gradual internationalization 
efforts depicted in the Uppsala model by internationalizing soon after inception (Bell 1995; 
Oviatt & McDougall 1994) - following internationalization as an intended strategy from inception 
rather than ad hoc exporting (Crick & Jones 2000; Oviatt, Shrader & McDougall 2005).  
While Oviatt and McDougall (2005) argue that early internationals have existed for centuries, 
using the British East India Company as an example, other researchers have pointed towards a 
trend of an increasing number of early internationals in the latest decades (Knight & Cavusgil 
2004). Researchers have attempted to identify facilitating factors of early internationalization 
among small, young firms (Autio 2005; Knight & Cavusgil 2004; Madsen & Servais 1997; Zahra 
2005), and the results can be summarized by two factors; globalization of markets and 
technological advances. The globalization of markets have led to opportunities of global 
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sourcing, production and marketing, as well as a homogenization of buyer preferences across 
countries (Knight & Cavusgil 2004; Madsen & Servais 1997). Technological advances have 
enabled small scale economics, lowered the cost of transportation and communication, and 
improved access to market information (Knight & Cavusgil 2004; Madsen & Servais 1997). As 
Knight and Cavusgil (2004) emphasize, these external trends facilitate early internationalization, 
but are insufficient to explain the influence of internal firm factors. 
In relation to the firms' internal environment, Crick and Spence (2005) emphasize the importance 
of the manager or management team in smaller sized firms. They recognize that management 
characteristics drive organizational strategy and that management enthusiasm and desire for 
foreign expansion results in increased international activity. Typical management characteristics in 
early internationals include earlier international experience (Rialp, Rialp & Knight 2005), a global 
vision (McDougall, Shane & Oviatt 1994) and a higher risk-taking propensity (McDougall, Shane 
& Oviatt 1994). While acknowledging that third party involvement can substitute for managerial 
experience, Crick and Jones (2000) find that the managerial background affects the speed of 
internationalization in addition to the desire to internationalize - where international business 
experience enhances speed, a technical background is likely to reduce it.  
Although the managerial background affects both the motivation for and speed of firm 
internationalization, some early internationals also seem to have a need perspective on 
internationalization. The reason for regarding internationalization as a necessity can be threefold. 
First, internationalization can be a prerequisite for competing in some industries, due to small 
domestic markets (Aspelund, Madsen & Moen 2007; Crick & Jones 2000; Moen & Servais 2002) 
and high costs of operation and/or R&D (McDougall & Oviatt 1996). Second, the need for 
internationalization might arise as a response to short time windows of opportunity in technology 
intensive industries, where rapid and/or broad market penetration is necessary to capitalize on 
investments (Aspelund, Madsen & Moen 2007). Oviatt and McDougall (2005) support this view 
in recognizing that as competitors in knowledge-intensive industries try to uncover or produce 
equifinal alternative knowledge, new ventures must be international from inception or face a 
disadvantage compared to already international organizations. Third, a fear of inertia due to path-
dependence on domestic operations might lead to early internationalization (McDougall, Shane & 
Oviatt 1994), as it might be difficult to change strategic direction when international expansion 
becomes necessary.  
Early internationals can, as most new businesses, generally experience resource scarcity 
(Aspelund, Madsen & Moen 2007; Knight & Cavusgil 2004; McDougall, Shane & Oviatt 1994). 
This resource scarcity has several effects on the internationalization pattern of early 
internationals. First, early internationals tend to internalize fewer resources essential to their 
survival and thus rely on hybrid structures for controlling vital assets - introducing the risk of 
possible partner opportunism (McDougall, Shane & Oviatt 1994). Second, early internationals 
tend to choose lower commitment entry modes when possible to overcome resource scarcity and 
handle risk (Aspelund, Madsen & Moen 2007), although high commitment entry modes such as 
FDI is found to improve new venture performance in the long term (Zahra, Ireland & Hitt 
2000). Citing Burgel and Murray (2000) and Crick and Jones (2000), Aspelund et al. (2007) point 
out that demands for customization and support will influence INVs’ entry mode, for example 
requiring firms to commit resources to establish customer support programs. Thirdly, Aspelund 
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et al. (2007) emphasize that resource scarcity makes early internationals vulnerable to competition 
from large players and demands of global physical presence - leading to a focus on market niches 
where competition from global players is less intense, but with significant profit potentials. 
The research on early internationals has not treated the term of risk as thoroughly as Johansson 
and Vahlne's (1977) commitment decision model. However, several sources of risk have been 
identified. The risk of opportunism from partners in hybrid structures has been introduced 
earlier, but Zahra (2005) presents three usual types of liabilities in a review of the last ten years 
ofINV research. The first is newness and inexperience, introducing a limited access to resources 
and existing networks. The second is size, which limits the resource slack and thus the ability to 
withstand income disruptions. Lastly, the liability of foreignness increases barriers to entry, as 
lacking customer and supplier links makes it difficult for firms to gain customer acceptance. 
Oviatt and McDougall (2005) also recognize this last liability, stating that "(…) a firm conducting 
transactions in a foreign country has certain disadvantages vis-à-vis indigenous firms, such as governmentally 
instituted barriers to trade and an incomplete understanding of laws, language, and business practices in foreign 
countries" (Oviatt & McDougall 2005, p. 35). 
2.3 Risk Models 
Decisions regarding risk acceptance, for example in an internationalization process, are normally 
made by weighing risks against benefits (Vlek & Stallen 1980). However, the difficulty of defining 
and measuring the environment’s influence on the firm is likely to complicate the evaluation of 
prospective risks and rewards (Palmer & Wiseman 1999). An analytical approach to the risk 
factors that the firms face – for example by using risk models - might reduce the risk of inability to 
align the organization to a changing environment (Milliken 1987). Several researchers (Baird & 
Thomas 1985; Miller 1992, 1998) argue that categorization of risk sources will highlight eventual 
links between factors of uncertainty and firm performance, making the firm able to outline and 
implement strategies that address specific risk factors. Risk models can therefore be analytical 
tools used to take a more rational approach to internationalization decisions, by identifying risk 
sources as well as the impact these uncertain variables may have on firm performance. 
 
Risk models presented by researchers of international business (e.g. Baird & Thomas (1985) 
Miller (1992); Shrader et al. (2004), Cavusgil et al. (2008)) are mainly categorizations of variables 
possibly affecting a firm in an international business environment. While all of the mentioned 
models are related to risk and uncertain factors in an international business environment, the 
models vary in content and to some extent in terms of intended use (central risk models are 
presented in Appendix 11.2). Baird and Thomas (1985), Miller (1992), Shrader et al. (2000), and 
Cavusgil et al. (2008) all categorize and list a number of factors relevant to risk, while Oviatt et al. 
(2004) extend the list of risk factors to be a process model, with venture performance and 
iterative learning effects as part of the model. The discrepancies between risk models, particularly 
in terms of which factors to include in the risk assessment, indicate that risk models need to be 
tailored to their intended use. Thus, a generic risk model cannot be directly used to model risk in 
a specific context. This view is supported by Shrader et al. (2000), who list managerial, firm- and 
industry conditions that will have a case-specific effect that can both reduce and increase 
perceived risk. We are not aware of empirical evidence suggesting that risk models are used or 
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help managers handle risk. In support of this, Bromiley, Miller and Rau (2005) point out that 
there is a lack of research on how managers actually take strategic decisions involving risk. 
2.4 Risk determinants 
The idiosyncratic nature of risk makes it useful to consider elements from some of the mentioned 
models and more specific research on certain aspects of international business.  In order to group 
the risk determinants in a natural order, the high-level categories found in the mentioned risk 
models are considered useful. We therefore adopt Oviatt et al.’s (2004) main categories of factors 
affecting the level of risk in the internationalization process (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5 - Risk factors influencing the internationalization process. Adapted from Oviatt et al. (2004) 
Bromiley, Miller and Rau (2005) indicate that uncertainty is a result of both internal factors 
originating from the firm and management team, and external factors originating from the firm’s 
environment. Hence, environmental- and industry factors are external risk factors, while the firm- 
and management team factors are internal risk factors. Both Oviatt et al. (2004) and Baird and 
Thomas (1985) suggest that the risk factors will have a cascading effect. Thus, environmental 
factors influence industry factors, which in turn affects firm factors, the management team and 
lastly the strategic problem - the internationalization process.  
The following sections outline the most relevant risk factors for a firm considering foreign 
market entry. Within each risk category, we propose several sources of uncertainty that will affect 
the overall level of uncertainty in the internationalization process.  
2.4.1 Environmental Factors 
The environmental factors affecting risk are mainly related to political and policy uncertainties, 
macroeconomic uncertainties, cross-cultural factors, social uncertainties, and natural uncertainties (Cavusgil 
Knight & Riesenberger 2008; Miller 1992). Figueira-de-Lemos et al.’s (2011) previously presented 
classification of uncertainties provide a useful separation of environmental uncertainties. Of the 
environmental factors, social uncertainties (e.g. social unrest and demonstrations) and natural 
uncertainties (e.g. earthquakes and extreme weather) can have disastrous effects on business 
operations, but are all pure uncertainties. Although the risks relevant to these uncertainties must 
be identified and measures put in place to limit damage, this study will focus on contingent 
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uncertainties. Political and policy uncertainties, macroeconomic uncertainties and uncertainties 
related to cultural differences are all examples of this (Figure 6) – uncertainties that can be 
reduced by knowledge and skill. 
 
Figure 6 - Sources of environmental uncertainty 
Although this study is focused on internationalization in a single country, we find it useful to look 
at environmental risk factors rather than country risk factors as the most peripheral risk category. 
Environmental factors encompass both country level risk factors as well as effects of global 
trends. This view is supported by Miller (1992), who points out that environmental uncertainties 
may spill across country borders.  
Political and policy uncertainties 
Several authors distinguish between political and policy uncertainties (Mascarenhas 1982; Miller 
1992; Oviatt, Shrader & McDougall 2004; Ting 1988). While political uncertainty is associated 
with “the threats and opportunities associated with potential or actual changes in the political system” (Miller 
1992, p. 313), policy uncertainty is associated with changes in government policies that have an 
impact on firms (Miller 1992; Ting 1988). Following this tradition, we find it useful to separate 
the terms political risk and policy risk, as they are distinct risk factors in terms of their effect and 
appropriate responses. Extreme events resulting in high political uncertainty, such as revolutions, 
wars, and violent democratic changes in government (Miller 1992) will have an adverse, and in 
many cases, prohibitive effect on business operations, but are less likely to occur than changes in 
government policy.  
Government policies should and need to change to reflect a changing environment, but 
unpredictable changes will increase the level of risk. This is reflected in Henisz and Zelner’s 
definition of policy risk: “the risk that a government will discriminatorily change the laws, regulations, or 
contracts governing an investment – or fail to enforce them – in a way that reduces an investor’s financial return” 
(Henisz & Zelner 2010, p. 90). Miller (1992) states that fiscal and monetary reforms, price 
controls, trade barriers and general changes in government regulation are the most relevant policy 
uncertainties for international firms.  
Macroeconomic uncertainties 
Ghoshal (1987) states that macroeconomic events are fully out of a firm’s control, and certainly 
takes a holistic approach as he includes wars and natural disasters as macroeconomic risks. While 
macroeconomic uncertainty is a broad term, Miller (1992) and Oxelheim & Wihlborg (1987) 
  Theoretical Background 
12 
 
argue that it is more appropriately used to describe changes in economic activity and prices. Baird 
and Thomas (1985), Miller (1992), Oviatt et al. (2004) and Cavusgil et al. (2008) all include 
economic conditions as potential sources of uncertainty. Specifically, changes in foreign exchange 
rates, inflation rates, and fluctuations in relative prices of commodities, such as oil, will affect 
firms’ financial performance in the short term. Real and expected economic growth in a region or 
industry will often be influential on long term investment plans, and is therefore important to the 
long term prospects of an internationalizing firm. Oviatt et al. (2004) state that new ventures are 
particularly fragile in weak economies, but the authors add that as environmental effects are 
mediated by industry conditions, as some sectors will prosper even in economic downturns.  
Cross-Cultural Uncertainties 
Culture comprises human population’s beliefs, rules, techniques and artifacts (Rugman, Hodgetts 
& Collinson 2009). Cavusgil et al. (2008) emphasize that international business involves cross-
cultural risk, which is a result of cultural miscommunication. In order to reduce this risk, they 
emphasize that it is possible to learn appropriate rules and behavioral patterns through a 
socialization process termed acculturation. Ghemawat (2011) takes a more holistic approach in an 
investigation of cross-border differences as barriers to globalization by introducing four 
dimensions of distance (Figure 7).  
 
Figure 7 – The CAGE framework. Adapted from Ghemawat (2011) 
In the CAGE framework, two countries can be compared to each other according to the 
determinants of each dimension – a multidimensional approach that will give a more precise 
understanding of cross-border differences than consideration of a single dimension only 
(Ghemawat 2011). Through empirical studies, Ghemawat (2011) finds that CAGE-differences 
translate into trade barriers, and similar countries are found to have significantly higher cross-
country trade levels than countries with larger differences. While culture is hard to identify and 
analyze (Cavusgil, Knight & Riesenberger 2008), awareness of cultural differences is essential to 
building a relationship of trust to foreign partners (Ghemawat 2011) – making this same 
awareness an essential aspect when identifying risk in the internationalization process. We 
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acknowledge that Ghemawat’s (2011) framework spans several of the discussed environmental 
factors. However, the framework is comparing a static view of current differences in the CAGE-
dimensions – not the uncertainty tied to these factors – in order to give an indication towards 
potential challenges related to cross-border trade between two countries. 
2.4.2 Industry Factors 
While environmental uncertainty factors set a general basis for operations in a country or region, 
industry conditions will mediate the effects of environmental uncertainty (Baird & Thomas 1985; 
Miller 1992, 1993; Oviatt, Shrader & McDougall 2004). In line with this, Porter (2008) argues that 
government policies will have an effect through industry forces –making the competitive climate 
and profit potential industry-specific although the industries share the same macro-level 
environment. In this discussion of how industry factors affect the level of uncertainty faced by a 
firm, a model first presented by Miller (1992, 1993) and later adopted by Oviatt et al. (2004) – see 
Figure 8 - will be compared to Porter’s five forces framework (Porter 1980, 2008).  
 
Figure 8 - Industry factors affecting risk and return (adapted from Miller, 1992) 
The factors presented by Miller (1992, 1993) and Oviatt et al. (2004) have much in common with 
the five forces that according to Porter (1980, 2008) determine industry structure and profitability 
(Table 1). Competitive intensity arises from rivalry among existing customers as well as firms 
entering an industry (Miller 1992; Porter 1980). A high level of competitive intensity, in which a 
large number of firms target a limited number of customers, can have an eroding effect on the 
profitability in an industry (Porter 2008). To counter low profitability, Porter (2008) argues that a 
clear understanding of the competitive environment might allow participants to target less 
populated, more profitable market segments. However, Ghoshal (1987) states that an 
international competitive environment is more complex than a competitive environment with 
national actors only, and this indicates that identifying a profitable market segment might be a 
significant challenge in international markets.  
 
 
 
  Theoretical Background 
14 
 
 Miller (1992, 1993) and Oviatt 
et al. (2004) 
Porter (1980, 2008) 
Force 
Competitive intensity Threat of new entrants 
Rivalry among existing competitors 
Substitutes 
Input uncertainties 
Product market uncertainties  
Bargaining power of suppliers 
Bargaining power of buyers 
Table 1 - Comparison of forces 
Input uncertainty is caused by disruptions in the delivery of a product or service, and the 
likelihood of such disruptions increases in situation where there is only a few available suppliers 
of specialized product or service (Miller 1992). In such situations, and particularly when the costs 
associated with changing the supplier are high, suppliers may use their bargaining power to 
capture profits at the expense of other industry participants (Porter 2008). Ghoshal’s (1987) 
concept of resource risk is particularly relevant to firms offering services or a combination of 
products and services: the risk that a “strategy will require resources that the firm does not have, cannot 
acquire, or cannot spare” (Ghoshal 1987, p. 430). Ghoshal (1987) specifically mentions lack of 
managerial talent, appropriate technology, and financial resources as relevant resource risk factors 
for multinational enterprises (MNEs), but these risks are highly relevant to SMEs as well.  
Technological uncertainty is related to not knowing when rivals may introduce new technology 
that disrupts market dynamics. According to Miller (1992) and Ghoshal (1987), this is a 
dimension of competitive uncertainty, as process or product innovation only can have an effect 
on an industry when it actually is adopted by a firm. According to Porter (2008), industry growth 
and technological change are factors that will have an effect through the competitive forces. Porter 
(2008) denies the assumption that fast-growing industries always are attractive, as industry growth 
can alter the five competitive forces and thereby profit opportunities - for example as a result of a 
shift in the power balance of suppliers and customers or a pressure from a high number of 
entrants in an industry with low entry barriers. Miller’s (1993) concept of product market 
uncertainty – unexpected changes in product demand - complements this view. Demand for a 
particular product or service is not only determined by industry growth, but also other factors 
such as client preferences and availability of substitute and complementary products (Miller 
1993).  
Despite the similarities, there is a major difference between Porter’s (1980, 2008) view on how 
industry structure and turbulence affects organizational outcomes, and the view of Baird and 
Thomas (1985), and Oviatt et al. (2004). Porter (2008), along with Aldrich (1979), argue that 
environmental factors directly influence organizational outcomes, while Baird and Thomas and 
Oviatt et al. suggest that managerial actions will mediate environmental and industry factors. The 
latter view is supported by empirical research on managerial risk taking by Palmer and Wiseman 
(1999) based on a broad sample of 235 U. S. firms from 64 industries, where the authors “failed to 
detect a direct influence of environmental characteristics on organizational risk that was independent on managerial 
risk taking” (Palmer & Wiseman 1999, p. 1054).  
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2.4.3 Firm Factors  
 
Figure 9 - Influencing forces on firm factors 
Several factors related to the firm are highly influential to a firm’s overall risk exposure (Figure 9). 
While political, policy, and macroeconomic uncertainties often offer useful insight, they need to 
be supplemented by firm-specific and sometimes investment-specific information for accurate 
risk assessment (Miller 1993). Firm risk can be defined as income stream uncertainty (Palmer & 
Wiseman 1999), and the effect of this uncertainty is influenced by firm age, size, and organizational 
slack (Oviatt, Shrader & McDougall 2004). Organizational slack is related to financial strength, 
and defined as a “cushion of actual or potential resources which allows an organization to adapt successfully to 
internal pressures for adjustment or to external pressures for change in policy, as well as to initiate changes in 
strategy with respect to the external environment” (Bourgeois 1981, p. 30).  
Smaller, young firms are often resource constrained (Aspelund, Madsen & Moen 2007), resulting 
in a low level of organizational slack that reduces the firms’ capacity to handle unexpected 
changes in its environment, such as economic shocks (Palmer & Wiseman 1999). In addition, 
Zahra (2005) points to several common INV liabilities; newness, inexperience, size, and foreignness, 
which help explain that newly founded, small firms are more likely to fail than larger established 
firms (Laitenen 1992). Thus, small firms might be particularly prone to experience high income 
stream uncertainty caused by resource limitations, and liabilities related to lack of experience and 
foreignness. In their study of managerial risk taking, Palmer and Wiseman (1999) find that 
managers experiencing a high level of income stream uncertainty seek to reduce uncertainty by 
pursuing strategies that reduce income variability.   
Network relationships can be an effective mechanism to manage risks of internationalization 
(Oviatt, Shrader & McDougall 2004). First, networks allow firms to tap into resources that they 
do not own (Oviatt, Shrader & McDougall 2004). Second, network relationships can reduce 
uncertainty in an unfamiliar business environment as foreign market knowledge can be acquired 
from a local network partner (Johanson & Vahlne 2009). Third, network relationships can 
increase the firms’ strategic flexibility in entering a market, as well as facilitate exit from particular 
markets (Miles, Preece & Baetz 1999; Shrader 2001). Nevertheless, network reliance is also 
associated with risk, as sharing knowledge and technology with a partner involves dissemination risk 
- the risk that valuable know-how will be expropriated by a partner (Shrader 2001). Shrader 
(2001) argues that an uncertain business environment increases the chances of such opportunism, 
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and that a manager’s bounded rationality (March, Simon & Guetzkow 1958) complicates 
evaluation of the benefits of a partnership –increasing the risk of selecting a less-than-ideal 
partner.   
2.4.4 Management Team Factors 
 
Figure 10 - Influencing forces on management team factors 
Several scholars argue that managerial choices mediate the influences of environment conditions 
(Baird & Thomas 1985; Oviatt, Shrader & McDougall 2004). Palmer and Wiseman (1999) argue 
that managers choose strategies – and thereby influence the firm’s risk exposure – in their effort 
to align the organization to its environment. Oviatt et al. (2004) point out that a small group of 
managers often holds a more dominant position regarding decision-making in smaller firms. 
Thus, personal characteristics (e.g. experience, education and age) and psychological traits (e.g. risk-
taking propensity and overconfidence) of managers are important influences to how risk factors 
are managed in the internationalization process (Figure 10).  
 
Relevant managerial experience might reduce complexity, ambiguity and the likelihood of loss in 
a given situation (Oviatt, Shrader & McDougall 2004), and the lack thereof might therefore 
increase perceived the risk. Oviatt et al. point to two important types of relevant experience which 
have been found to have positive effects: Previous international experience, and relevant industry 
experience. The former has been found to reduce the uncertainty of doing business 
internationally (Sambharya 1996), while the latter has been found to increase alertness to business 
opportunities (Ronstadt 1988). Oviatt et al. argue that education is positively related to higher 
tolerance of ambiguity, referring to research by Wiersema and Bantel (1992), and may contribute 
to lower risk perception in the internationalization context, as found by Simpson and Kujawa 
(1974). Baird and Thomas (1985) suggest that age is negatively related to risk-taking, and this is 
supported by MacCrimmon and Wehrung’s  (1990) study of 500 U.S. and Canadian business 
executives where mature executives were found to be more risk averse than younger managers.  
 
While experience, education and age are acquired characteristics, psychological traits are innate in 
nature (Oviatt, Shrader & McDougall 2004). In Shapira’s (1995) study of managerial decision-
making, based on 50 in depth-interviews with 50 top executives and a following survey of 650 
managers, managers were found to believe that they could alter or manage uncertainties inherent 
in business operations. Managers who strongly believe that they can manage business 
uncertainties may overestimate their risk management abilities and take unacceptable risks. 
Higher risk-taking propensity is believed to result in greater risk-taking (Forlani & Mullins 2000; 
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Oviatt, Shrader & McDougall 2004), and Forlani and Mullins suggest that this is because greater 
entrepreneurial risk propensity is associated with lower perceived risk in a given situation. 
Further, risk-taking seems to be associated with perceived firm performance level, as 
performance below a preset objective is found to increase risk-taking (Bromiley, Miller & Rau 
2005).  
2.5 Identifying, Evaluating and Mitigating Risk 
The next sections will provide a background for answering the 
study’s two research questions, following a three step analytical 
approach to risk inspired by Rowe (1977). Rowe’s three phases 
have been adopted by researchers of international business and 
risk professionals; some keeping the original phases (Baird & 
Thomas 1985; Milliken 1987; HBR Analytic Services 2011), others 
using it is a base for adding more steps (COSO 2004; 
Mascarenhas 1982). Although Rowe’s (1977) three step process 
has been used, researchers have often relabeled Rowe’s  initial 
labels of risk identification, risk estimation, and risk evaluation. We 
adopt Rowe’s three-step approach, but choose to label the second 
step risk evaluation, and the final step risk mitigation. In accordance 
with the study’s research questions, the first topic treated is risk 
identification, followed by risk evaluation and risk mitigation.  
2.5.1 Risk Identification 
The objective of the risk identification phase is to reduce the state 
uncertainty (Milliken 1987, p. 136) – the unpredictability of the 
organization’s environment. This can be achieved by identifying sources of uncertainty that the 
firm faces (Aven & Renn 2011), and the nature and controllability of these uncertainties (Baird & 
Thomas 1985). The risk identification phase is critical in any risk management effort, as it 
determines which risk factors to evaluate in the second phase, and which factors sought mitigated 
in the third phase. 
A systematic approach to risk identification involves assessing a large number of actors and firm 
relationships, including suppliers, customers and network partners (HBR Analytic Services 2011), 
and mapping of events – both internal and external to the firm– that may affect the achievement 
of firm goals (COSO 2004). Despite the obvious interest to identify all relevant risk factors, the 
risk identification phase is likely to be constrained by firm resources and managers’ cognitive 
abilities, increasing the chance of overlooking relevant risk factors (March & Shapira 1987). In 
order to limit the risk of overlooking important risk factors, the generic overview of risk factors 
provided by the previously mentioned risk models (Baird & Thomas 1985; Cavusgil Knight & 
Riesenberger 2008; Miller 1992; Oviatt & McDougall 2005) might be helpful – especially for 
smaller firms with limited international experience.  
Milliken (1987) argues that an external environment perceived to be unpredictable will affect 
both the risk identification process and the surrounding strategic planning process. First, Milliken 
argues that state uncertainty will increase the amount of time and resources used on 
environmental scanning. Secondly, Milliken recognizes that a high degree of state uncertainty will 
Figure 11 - Phases of the risk 
assessment process. Adapted 
from Rowe (1977) 
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make a muddling through (Lindblom 1959) approach more suitable for managers than linear strategy 
formulation activities: 
“If one is uncertain about the nature of environmental changes (…) it will be extremely difficult to identify threats 
and opportunities with any degree of confidence. Nevertheless, because of the value attached to the idea of strategic 
planning, administrators may proceed with their strategic planning endeavors, but the strategic planning is likely to 
resemble more closely a ‘muddling through’ mode of strategic thinking than the linear mode recommended in strategy 
books” (Milliken 1987, p. 139). 
Although a high state uncertainty will increase the amount of resources allocated to the risk 
identification process, Milliken emphasizes that the time and resources allocated are only a 
function of how managers perceive the state uncertainty – not a function of objective 
environmental characteristics. The role of perception is also recognized by Cooper, Who and 
Dunkelberg (1988) who based on a large quantitative survey argue that entrepreneurs are not 
more risk seeking than other managers, but instead “perceive their prospect for success as substantially 
better than those for similar businesses” (Cooper, Woo & Dunkelberg 1988, p. 106). Tversky and 
Kahneman (1986) also recognize the importance of perception in explaining how problem framing 
influences managerial decisions. Although Tversky and Kahneman relate framing to managerial 
decision-making, the definition of framing shows its relevance to the risk identification process:  
“The first phase consists of a preliminary analysis of the decision problem, which frames the effective acts, 
contingencies, and outcomes. Framing is controlled by the manner in which the choice problem is presented as well as 
by norms, habits, and expectancies of the decision-maker” (Tversky & Khaneman 1986, p. 257).  
The risk identification process is concerned with identifying contingencies of environmental 
events, and influenced by the management team’s expectancies through an effect called priming 
(Kahneman 2011, p. 52). This effect is recognized when “exposure to a word causes immediate and 
measurable changes in the ease with which many related words can be evoked” (Kahneman 2011, p. 52). As 
priming is not limited to words (Kahneman 2011), this implies that previous experiences and 
attitudes towards risk can prime the outcome of a risk identification analysis. Hence, the attitude 
towards the word risk, or experiences with a certain kind of risk, might influence the perception 
of risk and the thoroughness of the risk identification process. 
Impact for Case Study 
Based on the above discussion of the risk identification phase, the following proposals can be 
made. The proposals will be addressed in the discussion section of the paper. 
 Firm resources will influence the risk identification phase, making resource-strapped 
firms perform a constrained risk identification process. 
 The use of a risk factor framework will help a firm identify relevant risks in an 
internationalization process. 
 The perceived level of uncertainty will be a function of firm and managerial experience, 
and a high level of uncertainty will increase the amount of resources spent on risk 
identification 
 The perceived level of uncertainty in the internationalization process will affect the 
formality of the risk identification process, making it less systematic under high 
uncertainty. 
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2.5.2 Risk Evaluation 
The objective of the risk evaluation phase is to reduce the effect uncertainty (Milliken 1987, p. 137) – 
related to how future changes in the environment will affect the organization. In this phase, the 
possible impacts of the uncertainties identified in the first phase are evaluated (Mascarenhas 
1982), in an effort to reduce the effect uncertainty. By weighting the identified risks against the 
prospective gains of going through with the process in question, a decision to go through with 
the process or not can ultimately be taken (Tanzi & Textoris 2012).  
Miller states that “optimal risk management practices involve simultaneous consideration of the full spectrum of 
corporate exposures to environmental uncertainties” (Miller 1993, p. 708). However, bounded rationality 
makes it necessary to develop decision procedures that reflect cognitive constraints (March 1978), 
implying that managers are more likely to follow Simon’s (1956) satisficing principle of searching 
through fewer alternatives until a satisfactory outcome is found (Shapira 1995). In the context of 
risk evaluation, this means that focus is put on selected factors in the risk evaluation phase 
(March & Shapira 1987). If only a select number of risk factors are evaluated, it is critically 
important that the risk factors considered to be most important by managers during the risk 
assessment phase actually are relevant to the risk exposure of the firm.  
There are multiple approaches to evaluating risk, ranging from the use of systematic evaluation 
methods such as standard deviation5 measures (Taleb, Goldstein & Spitznagel 2009), internally 
developed frameworks and industry benchmarks (HBR Analytic Services 2011) to unsystematic, 
muddling through approaches (Milliken 1987). However, the inherent complexity of the 
international business environment (Palmer & Wiseman 1999) and the multidimensional nature 
of risk (Bromiley, Miller & Rau 2005) make the risk evaluation process challenging.  
First, although one can expect a firm to strive for increased profit and growth (Oviatt et al. 2004), 
risk evaluations are based on a wider range of dimensions and criteria than a financial net present 
value calculation. Shapira (1995) found that managers have little interest in quantifying risk 
factors into a single construct. A possible explanation is that reducing risk to a number does not 
make complex strategic decisions any easier, particularly because of the complex linkages 
between risk factors (Miller 1992). Referring to risk management in general, Taleb et al. (2009) 
warn against using standard deviation measures in risk evaluation, stating that “anyone looking for a 
single number to represent risk is inviting disaster” (Taleb, Goldstein & Spitznagel 2009, p. 80). As firm-
level risk has multiple dimensions (Bromiley, Miller & Rau 2005), reducing risk to a single 
construct increases the chance of omitting important risk dimensions. 
Second, assessing risk caused by environmental uncertainties is further complicated by the lack of 
effective measurement instruments of such uncertainties (Miller 1993). Multiple researchers (Di 
Gregorio 2005; Henisz & Zelner 2010; Oetzel, Bettis & Zenner 2001; Taleb, Goldstein & 
Spitznagel 2009) have dismissed country level measurements of environmental risk available 
through commercially available country ratings as ineffective.  The country risk ratings are based 
on macroeconomic indicators and the risk perception of a group of investors (Henisz 2002), and 
therefore not necessarily a valid for extrapolation of risk levels. Furthermore, country risk ratings 
have been criticized for having a poor track record (Di Gregorio 2005; Henisz & Zelner 2010), 
                                                 
5 The square root of average squared variations in a dataset (Taleb, Goldstein & Spitznagel 2009) 
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being too generic (Henisz & Zelner 2010) and in some cases giving the users a false sense of 
security  by obstructing the true level of uncertainty that a firm faces (Oetzel, Bettis & Zenner 
2001). 
Third, a combination of risk factors can have a greater impact on a firm when acting together 
than they would have individually (HBR Analytic Services 2011), due to interaction effects 
between different risk categories (Baird & Thomas 1985) leading to a multiplying effect from 
sequential risks. The impact from sequential risks is also highly context sensitive, for example with 
regard to the timing of different risk events.  As consequence, proposed measures of different 
risk factors may not be relevant to firms in a given setting.  
According to Milliken (1987), uncertainty stems from lack of information for accurate prediction 
of a phenomena, or an ability to evaluate the relevance of available information. Thus, when a 
sufficient level of information is available, the critical and most relevant insight will be how 
environmental changes affect the particular organization (Milliken 1987). Accordingly, the 
essence of the risk evaluation process is to separate irrelevant risk factors from factors that 
actually will have an effect on firm performance. This is particularly important with regard to 
effect uncertainty:  
“The experience of effect uncertainty, on the other hand, does not necessarily involve a lack of information about 
environmental conditions (in fact, the administrator may have all he/she can handle); rather, the shortage of critical 
information is in knowledge of how environmental events, changes, or sets of changes will affect the particular 
organization, if at all” (Milliken 1987, p. 138). 
Regarding the evaluation of the various risk factors, Tversky and Khaneman’s (1986) prospect 
theory provides an interesting perspective. The theory was developed as a response to a large 
practitioner deviation from the normative, rational decision-making model: 
“(…) The deviation from the normative model are too widespread to be ignored, too systematic to be dismissed as 
random error, and too fundamental to be accommodated by relaxing the normative system” (Tversky & Khaneman 
1986, p. 252). 
In the prospect theory, two distinct phases are separated. First, a preliminary analysis frames 
contingencies and outcomes of environmental changes. All outcomes are expressed according to 
their positive (gain) or negative (loss) deviation from a neutral reference outcome. Second, the 
framed ‘prospects’ are evaluated, and the prospect with the highest perceived value is chosen. 
Thus, the framing – dependent on the decision maker’s norms, habits and expectancies – will 
have a large impact on the later evaluation of the prospects, or in this case environmental 
variables. The value function used to evaluate gains and losses has a concave curvature for gains, 
but a steeper convex curvature for losses in order to account for loss aversion –a more extreme 
response to losses than gains (see Figure 12). Thus, it is clear that an investment representing a 
potential loss of x million, will need to be offset by a gain of x + Δx, where Δx is firm dependent.  
Theoretical Background 
21 
 
Figure 12 - Prospect theory value function. Adapted from Tversky & Khaneman (1986) 
Impact for Case Study 
We propose that the challenges of effectively measuring identified risk factors will be reflected in 
the case companies’ behavior as follows:  
 Firm context and managerial characteristics will influence the risk evaluation process by 
shifting the neutral reference point used to evaluate gains and losses. 
 The risks and benefits of internationalization are not likely to be reduced to a single 
construct  
 The firm’s risk exposure will be determined by an overall evaluation of distinct risk 
components, resulting in a focus on  a few, key risk factors 
 Evaluating the relevance of available information is a challenge in the risk evaluation 
phase, rather than lack of information 
2.5.3 Risk Mitigation 
The objective of the risk mitigation process is to develop strategies for effective risk mitigation, 
allowing firms to strike the optimal balance between growth, return goals and related risks 
(COSO 2004). In order to achieve this, it is necessary to reduce the response uncertainty (Milliken 
1987, p. 137) – the lack of knowledge of response options and/or inability to predict the 
consequences of a response choice.  
Following the chosen risk definition, the level of risk is determined by two components; the level 
of uncertainty and potential loss (Forlani & Mullins 2000). Thus, risk can be reduced by lowering 
the level of uncertainty and/or the potential loss. This is the basis for choosing a risk mitigation 
strategy - a decision complicated in cases of high response uncertainty. In order to reduce 
response uncertainty, researchers have suggested activities ranging from boundary spanning and 
information acquisition activities (Milliken 1987) to emulation and deferral activities (Miller 
1992). The three first activities are focused towards how other organizations – partners, 
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competitors or others – have responded to similar situations and the consequences of the 
responses (Miller 1992; Milliken 1987). If these activities are pursued, it is important to keep two 
aspects in mind. First, there must be an organization to emulate, and a misfit between the 
organizational resources and capabilities of the focal firm and the emulated firm might have 
unwanted consequences (Etemad 2004). Second, risk management strategies are not directly 
transferable given the previously discussed context sensitivity and cascading effect of the various 
risk factors (Baird & Thomas 1985; Oviatt, Shrader & McDougall 2004). The last activity, 
deferral, is to delay strategy implementation until further strategy alternatives are evaluated, which 
Milliken (1987) argues is especially relevant when the stakes are perceived as high and an 
inappropriate risk response is seen as very costly.  
Ultimately, the strategic risk response is intended to align the firm’s risk appetite and strategy 
(COSO 2004), and the chosen risk mitigation strategy must therefore reflect the firms’ risk 
tolerance (Johanson & Vahlne 1977). Some risk factors will be accepted, some will be sought 
reduced or shared, and some risk factors will be found to be of such magnitude that they are 
rejected. In Figure 13, four risk mitigation strategies are seen as a result of choices made in the 
strategic risk analysis, where risk and gains are evaluated against each other before a response is 
chosen. Possible risk mitigation responses are outlined in the following sections.  
 
Figure 13 – Selection of risk mitigation strategy 
Risk Rejection 
The strategy of risk rejection is simply to refuse to accept the risks involved in a specific activity 
and choose not go through with the activity. The choice of risk management strategy is an 
outcome of the risk evaluation phase, and a decision to reject risk means that the perceived 
uncertainty is too high compared to the expected return of the activity (Mascarenhas 1982). Risk 
rejection implies that firms that have not entered a market where they find the risk of the product 
or geographic market to be unacceptable will postpone entry until uncertainty is at an acceptable 
level (Miller 1992). Milliken’s (1987) deferral strategy of delaying process execution until a 
satisfactory strategy alternative is found, is a variant of the risk rejection strategy.  
Risk Sharing 
Risk sharing involves entering into multilateral agreements as a means of reducing uncertainty 
(Miller 1992). According to Miller (1992) some of the most commonly used cooperative risk 
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management strategies are long term partnerships with suppliers and customers, alliances and 
joint ventures, and technology licensing agreements. Risk sharing strategies are considered to be 
appropriate risk management tools when “the nature of the risk is more ambiguous and when information 
asymmetries persist” (Di Gregorio 2005, p. 219), suggesting that local firms are likely to have an 
advantage from relevant experience . While the benefits of collaboration, such as lower resource 
commitments and market exit barriers imply actual risk reduction, this must be balanced against 
increased dissemination risk and the need for an effective governance structure of the risk 
partnership still apply. Still, Di Gregorio (2005) argues that risk transfer is a particularly relevant 
risk reduction strategy to SMEs due to resource constraints and limited capability to reduce risk 
by other means. This is in line with Boisot and Child’s (1999) recommendation of an absorption 
strategy for small firms facing environmental complexity. In this strategy, the firm should try to 
gain access to relevant information, advice and support from relationship and alliances with local 
actors. This is better suited for small firms than a complexity reduction strategy (imposing familiar 
routines and standards on foreign subsidiaries), as SMEs may not have developed organizational 
routines suited to be applied on other entities (Boisot & Child 1999). In addition, the complexity 
reduction strategy requires complete control over another organizational entity, which would not 
be the case in cooperative arrangements (e.g. joint ventures) (Boisot & Child 1999).   
Risk Reduction and Control 
Risk reduction strategies are likely to be employed when the perceived level of risk is near or 
above the maximum tolerable risk the firm is willing to take (Johanson & Vahlne 1977). A 
possible risk reduction strategy is to reduce the firm’s commitment to the foreign market 
commitment. In the pre-entry phase, this usually means allocating less financial and human 
resources to the internationalization effort. At the point of international entry, risk can be 
reduced by making a minimal resource commitment, keeping the potential financial loss of an 
entry failure to a minimum. An important potential effect of the resource commitment is 
increased market knowledge, which according to Johanson and Vahlne (1977) can reduce the 
perceived uncertainty and prepare the firm for a greater market commitment.  
Further, firms may try to reduce uncertainty by attempting to affect environmental contingencies 
through control strategies (Miller 1992). The control strategies, such as lobbying or using market 
power to make aggressive moves toward competitors, are implemented to shift industry dynamics 
to deter entry and control competitors (Porter 1980). Although Miller (1992) makes a distinction 
between financial and strategic risk responses, we consider financial risk management as part of 
the overall risk reduction effort. Financial hedging6 instruments (e.g. forward contracts and options) 
are widely used to manage currency commodity price fluctuations, as they “insulate the firm from 
potentially detrimental events in exchange for a premium that reflects the nature of the risk and the company’s 
stake” (Di Gregorio 2005, p. 218). However, hedging instruments are mostly relevant to 
managing currency risk (Miller 1992), and are not offered in the full spectrum of risk factors that 
a firm might be exposed to. As a consequence, firms generally use changes in strategies to reduce 
risk (Miller 1993).  
                                                 
6 “Making offsetting commitments in order to minimize the impact of unfavourable potential 
outcomes” (Clark & Marois 1996, p. 361), as cited by Di Gregorio (2005)  
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Last, Miller (1992) found that risk handling strategies are likely to involve situations where 
reduction of exposure to one risk factor increases the exposure to another risk factor – risk trade-
offs. These findings were also supported by Shrader et al. (2000) who, through empirical tests on 
a sample of 87 US international new ventures, found interdependency of risk factors and risk 
trade-offs suggested by Miller (1992). The findings revealed that risk was managed by 
determining trade-offs in the political and economic risk of the country of entry, the degree of 
market commitment in terms of entry mode and foreign revenue exposure in the specified 
country. This implies that the risk of operations in a high-risk country – due to political and 
economic risk – might need to be offset by a decreased market commitment and foreign revenue 
exposure to keep the overall risk level below a risk exposure threshold.  
Risk Acceptance 
Given that all uncertainty cannot be eliminated (Figueira-de-Lemos, Johanson & Vahlne 2011), 
some of the decisions taken in an internationalization process must necessarily involve risk 
acceptance – an indication that the expected gains are considered to be greater than the 
associated risk. According to Di Gregorio (2005), small, flexible firms may actually thrive in a 
business environment of high uncertainty, as they adapt the changing environment more quickly 
than their larger counterparts. Figueira-de-Lemos et al.’s (2011) concept of contingent uncertainty, 
that can be reduced through knowledge and skills, indicates that the degree to which risks are 
accepted depends on the firm’s capability to acquire and process relevant information, thus 
making information acquisition and processing a possible success factor of internationalization.  
Figueira-de-Lemos et al. (2011) argue that risk acceptance and subsequent market entry will lead 
to increased market knowledge and therefore reduce the perceived risk of operating in the 
foreign market. Following this line of thought, one could expect a steadily increasing market 
commitment after initial entry. However, as Johansson and Vahlne also acknowledge, experience 
from other markets with similar conditions can decrease the need for market knowledge when 
entering a new market - as international experience can be an important contributor to a lower 
perceived risk level and a higher inclination to accept risk.  
Impact for Case Study 
The above discussion of risk mitigation strategies suggests several implications that will be 
addressed in the case company discussion:  
 Firms will employ several of the presented risk mitigation strategies to mitigate the 
identified risk factors 
 Response uncertainty will lead to information acquisition and boundary spanning 
activities, in search of relevant experience from firms that have faced a similar situation 
 Risk aversion implies that resource commitments are inversely related to the managers’ 
perceived risk in the internationalization process 
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3 Research Method 
This case study of Norwegian SMEs in the process of entering the Brazilian petroleum sector 
largely follows Eisenhardt’s (1989) proposed case study phases (Figure 14). Although the study 
has followed the sequence of activities suggested by Eisenhardt, it is presented according to the 
master thesis structure.  
 
Figure 14 - Phases of the case study. Adapted from Eisenhardt (1989) 
The research questions and necessary constructs were presented in the introduction. The next 
sections will explain the processes of method selection, as well as data collection and analysis. 
Data collection and -analysis is presented in two separate parts; one focused the literature study, 
and one focused on the empirical study. The case company selection is presented under the 
empirical study. Lastly, hypotheses are presented in the theoretical background where they are 
called propositions, before they are revisited in the case study analysis. The conclusions in the 
end of the case study analysis ties the propositions presented in the theoretical background to 
case study findings – eventually resulting in implications for practitioners, policy makers and 
future researchers.  
3.1 Selection of a Qualitative Research Design 
The research methodology of a study needs to fit the research objectives (Birkinshaw, Brannen & 
Tung 2011; Yin 2009) - in our case to understand how Norwegian SMEs identify, evaluate and 
mitigate risk factors in a foreign market expansion. These research objectives can be achieved 
through both qualitative and quantitative research methods, but the current state of the risk 
research area favors a qualitative approach. Most of the risk research is old, and few researchers 
have focused on the risk assessment process of SMEs prior to actual foreign market entry. Newer 
contributions - like the risk framework of Oviatt, Shrader and McDougall (2004) - have not been 
tested empirically, and therefore lack general validity.  
A quantitative research method will require variables to be defined, operationalized, measured 
and coded prior to data collection (Doz 2011) – an activity that is complicated by a lack of recent, 
quantitative risk research. Secondly, the reductionist and standard methods of quantitative 
research may fail to acknowledge individual variability or the influence of context (Dixon-Woods 
et al. 2006). Furthermore, Birkinshaw et al. (2011, p. 573) argue that "it is often inappropriate to engage 
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in large-scale, cross-sectional studies or reductionists methods in the absence of well-developed theory" in order to 
understand emergent and evolving phenomena scattered over distance and differentiated in 
context.  
We therefore argue that a qualitative approach is preferable, as the approach is well suited to 
comprehend both the internal and external climate in which the internationalization process 
unfolds, thus "opening the black box of organizational processes, the 'how', 'who' and 'why' of individual and 
collective organized actions as it unfolds over time in context" (Doz 2011, p. 70). Such an approach "allows 
us to build and test new theories, illustrate and exemplify new phenomena and surface contextual differences (…)" 
(Birkinshaw, Brannen & Tung 2011, p. 576). These are all important traits in absence of theory 
applied to the particular context of our research objectives. 
3.2 Selection of a Case Study Research Design 
“Case studies can (…) be defined as a research method that involves investigating one or a small number of social 
entities or situations about which data are collected using multiple sources of data and developing a holistic 
description through an iterative research process.” (Easton, 2010)  
In a summary of qualitative research methods, Yin (2009) emphasizes that it is not the purpose of 
the study - whether the study is exploratory, descriptive or explanatory - that matters. It is rather 
the form of the research question, the investigator's control over events and the temporal focus 
of the research that is important to the method selection. 
This study asks how the case companies identify, evaluate and mitigate risk – and thus implicitly 
why they make choices of specific entry strategies and commitments in the internationalization 
process. For a study of a “how” and “why” nature, in which the investigators have no control 
over the events unfolding, and where the focus is contemporary, the case study is the preferred 
research method (Yin 2009). 
Furthermore, Bradshaw and Wallace (1991) find case studies useful for studying phenomena with 
partial support or deviation from existing theory. This situation is likely to arise in our case due to 
the unconventional focus on risk assessments prior to the foreign market entry. In support of 
Bradshaw and Wallace, Dubois and Gillbert (2010) argue that case studies provide an opportunity 
to "confront theory with empirical data in an evolving fashion in which the aim is to capture relevant features of a 
case through a particular framework" (p. 131). Lastly, as the case study deals with real management 
situations it has the potential to create knowledge that practitioners will consider useful 
(Bradshaw & Wallace 1991). 
3.3 Literature Study 
The literature study began with a search of relevant articles within the research areas of 
international business and risk management. A dual search strategy was applied, before the 
resulting literature was evaluated against selection criteria – eventually leading to a subset of 
articles which formed the basis of the theoretical background (Figure 15).  
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Figure 15 - Literature search structure 
A literature study is performed prior to the data collection phase in order to construct an 
intertextual coherence (Bryman & Bell 2003, p. 98) - researching existing knowledge and 
organizing it in order to show how different research relate to each other and our case. Yin 
(2009) argues that: 
"(…) for case studies, theory development as a part of the design phase is essential, whether the ensuing study's 
purpose is to develop or test theory" (Yin 2009, p. 35).  
He further states that this is a point of difference between case studies and related methods, and 
a point often skipped by students encouraged to make early field contacts. From the case study in 
our specialization project, we learned the benefits of such an approach. It enables the researcher 
to specify theoretical propositions that can be challenged by the following data collection and 
analysis. Having clarified both research questions and theoretical propositions is of great help in 
constructing the interview guide, and reduces the number of follow-up interviews needed.  
In addition to offering a 'sufficient blueprint' (Yin 2009) for what data to collect in the data 
collection phase, the literature search is of high importance for the data analysis phase. A fallacy 
of case studies is to assume that results are generalizable through statistical generalization (Yin 
2009). The literature study allows us to do analytic generalization (Yin 2009) - by comparing 
theory with the case study's empirical results - thus enabling us to identify both support towards 
existing theories and new rival theories. 
3.3.1 Search Strategy 
Bryman and Bell (2003) recommend carrying out a comprehensive, unbiased search that is 
described in terms facilitating replication. The use of a systematic review process ensures a 
reliable foundation for the research, which is especially important considering the widely 
questioned empirical validity of case studies (Bryman & Bell 2003). 
Also Walsh and Downe (2005) recommend researchers of literature reviews to undertake robust 
searches in the early stages of a systematic review. However, the authors also acknowledge that a 
robust search might be inadequate for identifying all relevant literature, as databases commonly 
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used for meta-analytic searches tend to be concentrated on journal articles. Important studies 
might be of a form to lengthy for a journal article and might rather be in the form of books, book 
chapters, reports and non-published theses  (Walsh & Downe, 2005). Hence, we have chosen an 
augmented search strategy incorporating both a standard database search in the Scopus database 
(Appendix 11.3) and berrypicking (Bates 1989) - an iterative review process based on the reference 
lists of articles from the literature search. In the latter approach the reference list of key articles 
were searched for references to important articles not discovered in the ordinary database search. 
This is in line with suggestions from Bryman and Bell, who suggest to “identify the major ones 
[articles] and work outward from there” (Bryman & Bell 2003, p. 113). The field of risk management 
research was new to the authors, which mean that the literature search criteria had to be adjusted 
incrementally in order to find the most relevant articles. The berrypicking method proved to be a 
valuable contribution to the database search by allowing relevant articles to point in direction of 
other relevant literature. 
3.3.2 Selection Criteria 
The first literature search, where the first column of keywords was included, yielded 187 articles. 
When removing the SME criteria, however, the search yielded 7,731 articles – a clear indication 
of little literature focusing on risk evaluations in SMEs. The articles found in the database search 
and the articles found in the iterative reference list search were all evaluated according to the 
criteria outlined in Table 2. 
Criteria Explanation 
Applicability An abstract elimination performed based on the keywords used in the database and the 
article abstract. Applicability evaluated both according to the research questions, and 
towards more general descriptions of the internationalization, decision-making or the 
risk-identification, evaluation and mitigation process. 
Journal Articles published in top journals7 were considered to be of higher quality than articles 
published in other journals. Hence, articles not published in top journals needed to 
have a very good link towards the research questions in order to be included. 
Citations Articles with a high number of citations considered being of higher quality. Articles 
with a lower number only included if they were of recently published or offered 
important alternative perspectives to the already included literature. 
Authors Authors like Cavusgil, Coviello, Eisenhardt, Johanson, Knight, McDougall, Oviatt, 
Shrader and Vahlne were recognized as important due to their recognition within the 
IB field. The criterion was closely linked to the number of citations, and for authors 
unknown to us the number of citations was considered.  
Table 2 – Criteria for literature search 
3.3.3 Review Procedure 
In the first phase of the literature search, one of the authors read each article that passed the 
selection criteria. After reading each article that could be useful within the scope of the research 
questions, the article was classified within an article review framework (Appendix 10.12). When 
all articles were read, the worksheet containing the completed review framework was evaluated by 
both authors using a meta-ethnographic approach (Bryman & Bell 2003, p. 102). The different 
studies were compared – looking for a shared understanding of a problem, or opposing views – 
before a synthesis was made explaining how the articles related to each other. This ensured that 
                                                 
7 These include Journal of International Business Studies (JIBS), European Journal of Marketing, The Academy of Management 
Review, Journal of International Marketing, International Business Review, Strategic Management Journal, Management Science, all 
ranked as top journals within the fields of international business (Dubois, F. L. & Reeb 2000) and management 
studies (Yuyenyongwatana & Carraher 2008) 
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patterns were identified, and facilitated the process of evaluating which articles to bring into the 
theoretical background of the case study.  
Based on the evaluation outlined above, a subset of articles were chosen to be either core articles 
of the theoretical background or support articles. Both authors read the core articles before they 
were included in the theoretical background, in order to ensure that both authors agreed on the 
articles’ key takeaways, and the intended use. 
3.4 Empirical Study 
The empirical study is mainly focused towards the case firms’ risk assessments in their 
preparation for a Brazilian market entry. However, in order to put the firms’ risk assessments into 
a proper context, we found it necessary to develop a contextual background on the Brazilian 
petroleum market and business culture. In preparation of both the case study and the Brazilian 
background, both interviews and written sources have been important.  
In the following sections, the focus is put on how the case firm empirical data is treated in 
relation to other background material; both theoretical and contextual. An overview of this 
process is shown in Figure 16. Although the development of the Brazilian background context is 
not explicitly treated, it followed the same outline as the case firm study. 
 
Figure 16 - Empirical study structure 
3.4.1 Case Selection and Representativeness   
The authors were given the opportunity to follow a group of ten Norwegian O&G SMEs - in the 
first steps of a Brazilian market entry – participating in the Innovasjon Norge-led Navigator 
program. A sub-sample consisting of four of the firms participating in the project was chosen, a 
number consistent with a desire to generate empirically grounded theory (Eisenhardt 1989).  
The final four case firms were chosen on the basis of theoretical sampling; a focus on finding 
useful samples that can form a solid foundation to the theory-building (Eisenhardt 1989). This is 
in line with recommendations from Eisenhardt (1989), who argues that random selection is 
neither necessary nor preferable, and suggests to use the limited number of cases to replicate or 
extend emergent theory. 
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Company Sampling argument 
Cybernetica Considered cooperation with a local supplier 
Norske Ventiler Considerable international experience 
SafeClean Had made significant progress in the internationalization process 
Sperre Has made their first Brazilian sale, without being established in the Brazilian market 
Figure 17 - Case firms and sampling arguments 
As all of our case firms operate in the Norwegian O&G industry, and the case firms were 
selected with the intention of being as diversified as possible. Consequently, firms have been 
selected based on their products being different from other case firms, and differences with 
regard to international experience and current phase of the Brazilian expansion. The case firms, 
and the theoretical sampling argument used, are shown in Table 2. It is important to notice that 
the sampling arguments are based on a presentation given by the firm at a Navigator project 
meeting, and the authors’ investigation of publically available sources. Although the actual phase 
in the internationalization process, and the number of firms considering cooperation with a local 
supplier might turned out to be different than first anticipated, the initial sampling still 
corresponds to a desire of studying a diversified sample of Navigator firms. 
3.4.2 Data Collection 
The data collection process was designed to follow Yin’s (2009) three principles of data 
collection, enabling appropriate use of the collected case data: 
 
Figure 18 - Principles of data collection. Adapted from Yin (2009) 
First, the use of multiple sources - including interviews with case firm representatives involved in 
the internationalization process, as well as documentation and archival data from both case firms 
and external sources – results in a more accurate and convincing case than relying only on single 
sources of data (Yin 2009). Secondly, a chain of evidence was maintained through both through a 
rigorous explanation of the methodology used, and by the classification of interview citations into 
A- and B-categories (making it easy to follow the chain of arguments). Lastly, case study database 
was developed for internal use by the authors. Although Yin (2009) emphasizes the importance 
of creating a case study database to increase case study reliability by enabling independent 
inspection, such an approach is not attuned to studies where sensitive information is bound by 
confidentially agreements with case firms. We therefore focus on maintaining a chain of evidence 
and a high degree of transparency throughout the case study.  
Data collection ended when a when we reached a level of saturation where additional information 
to the data did no longer provide new, substantial insight (Glaser & Strauss 1967). The following 
sub sections details the process of data collection from interviews and written sources.  
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Non written Sources – Interviews 
Interviews were the main source of empirical data on the case firms’ internationalization and risk 
assessment processes. The interviewees were all managers involved in the Brazilian expansion 
process of the firm, and participating in the Navigator project meetings conducted by Innovasjon 
Norge. Hence, all interviewees had intimate knowledge of their firm’s background, 
internationalization process and risk assessment process. Gathering the knowledge in an ongoing 
risk assessment process, from persons directly involved, ensures data collection close to real 
management situations – a trait Gibbert et al. (2008) emphasize as vital to attempts to create 
managerially relevant knowledge. 
The interviews were performed using focused interviews (Merton, Fiske & Kendall 1990; Yin 
2009), with a semi-structured interview technique (Bryman 2008). An interview guide (Appendix 
11.4) directed the topics of the semi-structured interviews. The interview guide covered general 
topics (firm history, financial data, product offerings and market characteristics) in order to 
ensure a thorough understanding of the firm and its context. Nevertheless, the main focus in the 
interviews was kept on the Brazilian market entry and the pertaining risk assessments. In some of 
the interviews, a third student, writing another master thesis studying the choice of market entry 
mode among Navigator firms participated. Since the two topics were similar, the interview guide 
was constructed as a joint interview guide – reflecting both master theses. We consider this a 
strength as it increases the knowledge of the contextual background influencing their choices and 
risk assessment process. 
The interviews were conducted via Skype, with the exception of a local firm, and typically lasted 
between one and two hours. The interviews were all recorded after given permission by the 
interviewee. The first part of the interviews focused on the general company background in order 
to ensure a thorough understanding of the firm’s general environment, thus getting an idea of 
important risk factors prior to asking risk specific questions. The general background focus led to 
some questions already being answered when they were reached in the interview guide. For 
questions that were already partially answered, a summary of the given answers were included in a 
question asking whether the answers had been interpreted correctly. Questions with unclear 
answers were repeated along with the unasked questions to reduce the chance of 
misinterpretation. The interviews were later transcribed ad verbum from the recording. 
As each interview was conducted by at least two persons investigator triangulation (Patton 2002) 
was naturally achieved. The transcribed interviews were read and discussed by both authors, 
before they were sent to the interviewee for inspection. After being able to read the transcribed 
interviews, each case firm was contacted for a follow-up interview with the purpose of clarifying 
certain issues and gaining additional information.  
Written Sources – Documentation and Archival Data 
Written sources in the form of annual reports, newspaper articles, company analyses and other 
company information – from the case firms themselves, Innovasjon Norge or other external 
sources - were used extensively before, during, and after conducting interviews. The multiple 
sources of evidence enabled data triangulation (Patton 2002) as information gathered in interviews 
were used in conjunction with documentary evidence – and vice versa.  
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Before the interviews, various types of documents provided a useful background to the case 
firm’s financial results, organization, and in many cases, their competitive environment. In 
addition to help answer some of the interview questions prior to the interview, particularly 
relevant topics or incidents were identified. During interviews, information gathered before the 
interview was used to check and follow up topics where diverging answers were given (or 
interpreted). After the interviews, documents - such as news articles and the Brazilian context 
part of the master thesis - provided valuable insight into topics discussed in the interviews, and 
topics left out. This enabled the authors to critically assess opinions regarding the Brazilian 
culture and market, and the risks identification and evaluation processes of the case firms. 
When using written accounts, the purpose and audience of the accounts were sought understood, 
a strategy which according to Yin (2009) reduces the chance of being misled and is likely to result 
in a more critical interpretation of such accounts.  
3.4.3 Data Analysis 
Data analysis is according to Eisenhardt “(…) both the most difficult and the least codified part of the 
[theory building] process” (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 539). Many of the challenges related to the process 
stem from the little attention normally paid by researchers to discussion of data analysis relative 
to research sites and data collection methods (Eisenhardt 1989). Eisenhard notes that “one cannot 
ordinarily follow how a researcher got from 3600 pages of field notes to the final conclusions, sprinkled with vivid 
quotes though they may be” (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 539). 
Case study methods and theory building activities have been criticized for lack of methodological 
rigor and generalizability (Bryman & Bell 2003; Dubois, A. & Gibbert 2010; Yin 2009). Hence, it 
is important that case studies present a transparent overview of how the data analysis is carried 
out. In the following sub-sections the data analysis is explained in two parts; the within-case 
analysis and the cross-case analysis.  
Within-Case Analysis 
The large amount of data from the collection process often triggers a need for within-case 
analysis (Eisenhardt 1989). The within-case analysis started with transcription of the interview 
recordings, before a narrative story was written of each firm’s history, sales strategy, international 
activities and risk assessment activities for the Brazilian expansion. The importance for such 
narrative descriptions is recognized by both Eisenhardt (1989) and Coviello (2006). While 
Eisenhardt regards them as important aids in coping with an enormous volume of data, Coviello 
recognizes that ”biographic histories are a practical way to study the process of entrepreneurial behavior, because 
chronological events can be used as stepping stones in the search for patterns over time” (Coviello 2006, p. 718). 
In addition to facilitating pattern finding, the narratives made it easier for case firm 
representatives to identify misconceptions of the case companies and their histories. 
Glazer and Strauss suggest researchers to follow a grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss 1968) 
approach, meaning that the theory building process should be built on data collected – in this 
case the case company interviews. Glaser and Strauss (1968) emphasize that theory built on data 
is usually too intimately linked to the data to be completely refused by more data or replaced by 
another theory, although the theory inevitably will be modified and reformulated. They further 
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emphasize that while the data underlying the theory might be short lived and susceptible to 
change, the theory itself will be considerably more sustainable. 
In order to follow a grounded theory approach, the transcribed interviews were read and citations 
related to the research questions classified as A-categories (Widding 2003). The transcribed 
interviews and resulting A-categories where reviewed by both authors, to ensure that all relevant 
information had been extracted from the interviews into the A-categories. An organization of the 
A-categories according to each case company was considered beneficial, as the firms’ A-
categories are to be compared to each other in order to find cross-case patterns in the later 
analysis. The A-categories can be found in Appendix 11.7, and use the notation shown in Figure 
19. A category labeled A11-01 would indicate an A-category related to risk identification in 
Cybernetica, and the first statement regarding this in the interview. 
 
Figure 19 - Notation framework for A-categories 
Cross-Case Analysis 
In the cross-case analysis, the A-categories for each research question were analyzed for cross-
case pattern matching (Yin 2009), allowing a cross-case hypothesis covering a subset of A-
categories. The hypotheses generated from the different A-category patterns are labeled B-
categories, and are at a higher abstraction level than the underlying A-categories (Widding 2003). 
This higher abstraction level results in a possibility to “generate properties of categories that increase the 
categories’ generality and explanatory power” (Glaser & Strauss 1968, p. 24). The abstraction process 
also helps focusing on the important aspects of the material, while the other aspects either act as 
support or are regarded as irrelevant (Widding 2003). 
Widding (2003) emphasizes that an initial understanding of the field gained through literature 
studies is helpful in the interpretation of case study evidence, as earlier research guides the 
researcher’s interpretation and a higher abstraction level is associated with a higher influence of 
theory. As long as the observations are consistent with earlier literature, the theoretical influence 
increases the theoretical support of the findings (Widding 2003). In situations where the general 
research consensus is broken, such a support is weaker and the researcher’s understanding of the 
research object more important (Widding 2003). Such a view is supported by Glaser and Strauss 
(1968) who emphasize that hypotheses are suggested, not tested, relations that are verified as 
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much as possible in the course of the research – adding one should not have an excessive focus 
on proving them: 
“Generating hypotheses requires evidence only enough to establish a suggestion – not an excessive piling up of 
evidence to establish a proof, and the consequent hindering of the generation of new hypotheses” (Glaser & Strauss 
1968, pp. 39-40). 
Consequently, the B-categories in this master thesis were funded on a basis of theory where 
possible, while the B-categories breaking research consensus was grounded in the authors’ 
understanding of the case firms in questions.  
3.5 Evaluation of Methodology 
Qualitative research and especially case studies are widely criticized for the lack of a transparent 
method and analysis process, and lack of generalization power of the theories developed (Bryman 
& Bell 2003; Yin 2009). In order to evaluate the methodology used in this case study, we will rely 
on four widely used tests proposed by Yin (2009) to test the validity and reliability of empirical 
social research. 
3.5.1 Validity 
Construct Validity 
Construct validity encompass the concern of whether the operational measures used are 
representing the concepts studied (Yin 2009). Hence, it “refers to the extent to which a study investigates 
what it claims to investigate, that is, to the extent to which a procedure leads to an accurate observation of reality” 
(Gibbert & Ruigrok 2010, p. 712). A common mistake in case study research is failing to use a 
sufficient set of operational measures to study the researched phenomenon, and use subjective 
measures in collecting the data (Yin 2009). 
In order to increase the construct validity of this study, triangulation and a clear chain of evidence 
has been sought applied throughout the study – both strategies suggested by Gibbert and 
Ruigrok (2008). After establishing the research questions, a triangulated literature search ensured 
a thorough understanding of the field. This enabled the choice of a wide risk definition, 
encompassing the necessary elements for what the study investigates. During and after 
interviews, investigator triangulation, data triangulation and response triangulation enabled a 
considerably more accurate observation of reality – ensuring that the interview topics, and 
resulting data was consistent with the research topic. 
Internal Validity 
The internal validity of a study is concerned with the ability to separate actual relationships from 
spurious relationships between two or more elements (Yin 2009). According to Yin, the concern 
over internal validity for case research “extends to the broader problem of making inferences. Basically, a 
case study involves an inference every time an event cannot be directly observed” (Yin 2009, p. 43). 
Inferences naturally have to be made in the course of the study, especially due to the study’s 
research topic and the semi-structured interview guide. The word ‘risk’ has many analogies in 
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every-day speech8, ranging from risk, to uncertainties, unknowns, dangers, etc. In addition, a 
semi-structured interview guide addresses topics, implying that questions are not always 
addressed in a direct manner. Inferences has therefore been made when answers to later 
questions are answered addressing related topics, when patterns of organizational behavior 
becomes apparent during the interview, and when analogies to the word risk is used for 
describing the Brazilian market or market entry. In order to limit the bias from such inferences, 
the authors emphasized the use of summarizing previous question answers when addressing a 
new question. Hence, new questions were asked to clarify whether the information was 
interpreted correctly or if rival explanations were applicable. In addition to this, both data 
triangulation and investigator triangulation were important in the development of the case 
company narratives and A-categories. Lastly, company narratives and A-categories were sent to 
the case companies for revision and feedback prior to follow-up interviews. 
External Validity 
External validity is concerned with the extent to which the study’s findings are generalizable 
beyond the immediate study itself (Yin 2009). This has proven to be especially difficult for case 
studies, with researchers making comparisons to the generalizability of statistical generalization 
(Birkinshaw, Brannen & Tung 2011; Bradshaw & Wallace 1991; Doz 2011). 
The study is not statistically generalizable, but this is not the purpose of a qualitative case study. 
Rather, the more appropriate analytic generalization is sought, in addition to the use of 
replication logic. The analytic generalization improves the external validity by comparing the case 
study findings with widely recognized previous research theories and findings, while the 
replication logic ensures that the cross-case findings are considered more important than single-
case findings.  
3.5.2 Reliability 
A reliable study is possible to replicate by later investigators following the same procedures as 
described by the original investigators, thus minimizing errors and biases in a study (Bryman & 
Bell 2003; Yin 2009). According to Yin, “one prerequisite for allowing this other investigator to repeat an 
earlier case study is the need to document the procedures followed in the earlier case” (Yin 2009, p. 45). 
The study has a thoroughly documented methodology, easily replicable by other researchers. The 
various steps taken in both the literature review and empirical study are explained in detail, and 
the same is the case for the steps taken from data analysis towards generalization of case study 
findings.  
3.5.3 Conclusion 
The inherent weaknesses in the chosen research design and methods have been sought identified 
and limited. The study’s generalization efforts are based on analytical generalization and 
replication logic, generalization methods that are adapted to the nature of the case study. These 
elements should reduce the common critique surrounding the often ‘less rigorous’ analytic 
approach of case studies, while the transparency of methods applied in the study should reduce 
                                                 
8 The Oxford Thesaurus of English presents several analogies to risk: chance, uncertainty, unpredictability, 
instability, insecurity, gamble, probability, likelihood, danger, threat, fear (Waite 2005) 
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the critique of low methodological transparency. The study is therefore considered valid and 
reliable within a case study context.  
Limitations 
The most visible limitation in the study is the choice of case firms being at an early stage of the 
Brazilian market entry, with no actual commitments taken. At this early stage, not all entry 
modes, operational strategies and market characteristics have been thoroughly evaluated by the 
case firms. A study on firms that had completed a Brazilian market entry would yield data on 
actions taken by firms prior to market entry, in addition to an evaluation of the process in 
retrospect. Nevertheless, the nature of the research questions does not imply the need for an 
actual market entry as they focus on the process prior to market entry. In addition, asking firms 
in retrospect would not necessarily yield the same honest answers that case firms in the middle of 
the process can provide. These firms are not limited by cognitive recognition of past events, and 
have not yet made mistakes that they want to cover up or attribute to external factors. 
When conducting interviews the interplay between the interviewee and the interviewers will 
always affect the interview process (Bryman & Bell 2003). A limitation of the research is 
therefore the extent to which the interviewees felt comfortable sharing information with the 
interviewers. However, actions taken in the cooperation agreement and resulting confidentiality 
agreement with Innovasjon Norge have yielded an important amount of trustworthiness to 
counter this effect. 
The search of patterns in the cross-case analysis is another limitation to the study, as “people are 
notoriously poor processors of information. They leap to conclusions based on limited data, they are overly influenced 
by the vividness or by more elite respondents, they ignore basic statistical properties, or they sometimes inadvertently 
drop disconfirming evidence. The danger is that investigators reach premature and even false conclusions as a result 
of these information-processing biases” (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 540). The biases introduced by this 
limitation have been sought reduced through responder feedback on firm narratives and A-
categories, and a grounded theory approach supported by the theoretical background.  
Last, one can question the authors’ ability to judge article quality and the criteria applied for 
evaluating articles.  Although the criteria applied in the article selection process are supported by 
both research method literature (Bryman & Bell 2003) and our supervisor, there will always be 
subjective judgments involved in the evaluation and selection. The criteria for top journal 
publication and author recognition exclude certain literature. The criteria used might therefore 
have excluded relevant research from other disciplines from the development of the theoretical 
background. Nevertheless, the use of an augmented search strategy has limited this liability and 
the potential liability of relying on a single database (Scopus) for the database search. 
What Could Have Been Done Differently 
In this case study, multiple interview objects should ideally have been sought at each of the case 
firms. This would ensure a broader perspective on the companies’ background and 
internationalization process. In some cases, the interview object was not the CEO of the 
company, but another manager involved in the company’s Brazil expansion. Involving at least 
two persons from each company would have increased the quality of the descriptions given, as it 
is hard for a single person to keep track of all events in the company background and Brazilian 
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expansion process. Nevertheless, occupying two persons in each of the case companies would 
have taken up a considerable amount of the companies’ work time. 
Alternative research methods could also have been chosen given the exploratory nature of the 
research questions. First, a longitudinal case study of one firm would have given more insight 
into how the risk management process changes over time. This case study design would however 
not have allowed for comparison of the different firms’ approach to handling risk in the 
internationalization process. Second, a quantitative approach could have been chosen in order to 
increase the generalization power through the less disputed statistical generalization. Of the 
quantitative approaches a statistical, survey based research design would have been preferable – 
as an experimental research design would yield less generalizable results due to the difficulties of 
recreating decision-making in an experimental environment. Nevertheless, a quantitative 
approach would only be suitable outside the scope of the Navigator project due to the limited 
number of firms.  
  Empirical Background 
38 
 
4 Empirical Background 
The empirical background is separated in two parts; a Brazilian background and a case company 
background. The Brazilian background is included in order to give the reader an introduction to 
the Brazilian petroleum sector and business environment, and a basis for understanding the risk 
factor identified, evaluated and later sought mitigated by the case firms. The case company 
background gives information needed in order to understand the case firms’ history, products, 
strategies and procedure for handling risk.   
4.1 Brazilian Background 
Following the discovery of the world’s largest offshore oil resources9 (Financial Times 2011), 
highly ambitious growth plans have been laid out for the Brazilian petroleum and offshore sector 
(Inventure Management 2011)10. The effort is led by the national oil company Petrobras, which 
aims at being the world’ s largest oil producer by 2015 (Inventure Management 2011). As the 
controlling operator in the pre-salt fields (De Oliveira 2012), and the single largest buyer in the 
Brazilian petroleum sector, Petrobras’ investments are considered pivotal to the activity level in 
the Brazilian oil sector (De Oliveira 2012; Inventure Management 2011). The short term industry 
growth is fueled by Petrobras’ planned investments of USD 224 billion in the period from 2011-
2015 (Petrobras 2011).  
There is however a great deal of uncertainty attributed to whether the aggressive expansion plans 
can be  supported by the Brazilian supplier industry, which is a critical player due to strict local 
content requirements in the investment projects (Gall 2011; Inventure Management 2011; The 
Economist 2011b). In addition to concerns over the capability of Brazilian firms to handle the 
planned growth, Nolan and Thurber (2010) maintain that investments in the petroleum industry 
are inherently risky because of the associated uncertainty and the high capital requirements of 
offshore projects. Nolan and Thurber argue that the level of uncertainty in petroleum projects is 
“a function of the maturity of the exploration and production program, with uncertainty decreasing and experience 
are acquired over time” (Nolan & Thurber 2010, p. 9). This indicates that exploration and production 
in the newly discovered pre-salt fields is associated with a high level of uncertainty.  
4.1.1 Risk factors in the Brazilian petroleum sector 
In this section, risk factors are evaluated according to the determinants described in the 
theoretical background on risk models. Three out of the four risk categories presented will be 
applied in the evaluation of the business environment in the Brazilian petroleum sector. The last 
factor, management team factors were not found to be significantly different in the Brazilian 
business environment, and the treatment in the theoretical background is considered to be 
sufficient. 
Each of the three risk categories are treated separately by evaluating the most important risk 
determinants, and the empirical data underlying each risk factor is summarized in a discussion of 
how the risk factors and underlying determinants affects the case firm’s internationalization 
process. Rather than a final summary, the main risk determinants attributed to each factor are 
                                                 
9 Pre-salt fields are estimated to hold up to 16 billion barrels of oil equivalent (boe) (World Oil Online 2011) 
10 A consultancy specializing in facilitating market entry in Brazil for firms in the oil, offshore, and the maritime 
sector. The consultancy was founded by the former director of Innovasjon Norge in South America.  
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presented in Figure 20. This is done to ease the readability of the section, and to avoid repeating 
the case firms implications more times than necessary.  
 
Figure 20 - Identified risk factors of the Brazilian petroleum sector 
Environmental Factors 
Historic events (Appendix 11.5) can be seen as underlying causes for several of the uncertainties 
that firms face when entering the Brazilian petroleum. The local content requirements that may 
have an inhibiting effect on several offshore projects reflect a policy debate in the 1940s and 
1950s on whether to allow international oil companies operate in Brazil or not (De Oliveira 
2012). The slogan “keep the Brazilian oil for Brazilians” (De Oliveira 2012, p. 521) introduced in the 
1940s, is still used today. Similarly, poor infrastructure and low productivity growth in Brazil has 
been attributed to underinvestment during decades of economic hardship (Sharma 2012).  
1. Political and Policy Uncertainties 
While the political climate in Brazil is regarded as relatively stable11 (Sweig 2010), policies 
regarding licensing of the pre-salt blocks in the production sharing regime, local content 
requirements and regulatory responses to accidents has been met by skepticism and sometimes 
hostility by industry actors (Gall 2011; The Economist 2011b).  
1.1 Production Sharing Regime 
A key example of a drastic policy change was the introduction of the production sharing regime. 
After the discovery of the pre-salt fields, licensing was halted until the new regulatory regime was 
introduced in 200912 (Inventure Management 2011). In the new regime, Petrobras is to hold at 
least a 30 % stake in all pre-salt fields, and operators take the cost and risk of finding oil deposits, 
being reimbursed by the Brazilian government only if fields prove to be of commercial value 
(Inventure Management 2011). The profits from the oil production are then shared by the 
                                                 
11 Especially compared to many other countries where oil firms operate (The Economist 2009b) 
12 Licensing to non-pre-salt fields continues under the current concession regime (Inventure Management 2011) 
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operators and the Brazilian government. The production sharing regime is controversial, for 
several reasons. First, licensing rounds to  pre-salt fields have been slowed down due to 
disagreements between different Brazilian states on revenue distribution (The Economist 2011b). 
Second, international oil companies find the government’s double role as a contracting party 
(through Petrobras) and a regulator of the pre-salt fields problematic (Gall 2011).  
In contrast to the regulatory policies reigning in the North Sea basin where competitive forces 
ensure diversification of operating risks between several companies, Petrobras has a dominant 
role for the development of the pre-salt fields, and this has been seen as a gamble by some 
investors (Gall 2011). Petrobras’ human, financial and technical resources are already said to be 
overstretched (Gall 2011) – Petrobras pulled out of Cuba in 2011 due to its domestic 
commitments (Financial Times 2011) – and lack of critical resources at Petrobras might slow 
down the growth of the Brazilian petroleum sector (Gall 2011).  
1.2 Local Content Requirements 
Brazil’s president from 2003 to 2010, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, has argued that everything that 
can be done in Brazil should be done in Brazil, and he and his successor, Dilma Rousseff, have 
made it clear that local content requirements will be made increasingly more demanding (The 
Economist 2009b, 2011b) – from the current level of around 60 % to 90 % by 2020 (Inventure 
Management 2011). The Brazilian government hopes that local content requirement in the 
petroleum sector will stimulate growth of a local supplier industry, but capacity limitations among 
Brazilian suppliers may have a decelerating effect on pre-salt investments (Gall 2011; The 
Economist 2009b).  
1.3 Regulatory Responses to Accidents 
The Brazilian government has given harsh responses to accidents on the Brazilian continental 
shelf. In November 2011, oil started to leak from an oil well in the Frade field in the Campos 
Basin (The Economist 2011b). As a consequence of the relatively small leak of 3000 boe, the 
field operator Chevron and subcontractor Transocean have been fined USD 32 million for the 
leak, and face a USD 10 billion lawsuit and criminal charges against managers of the two 
companies (Inventure Management 2012; The Economist 2011c). Critics of the government’s 
response argue that it was out of proportions with regard to the size of the oil spill and intended 
to set an example to international oil firms in Brazil (The Economist 2011c).  
 
2. Macroeconomic Uncertainties 
The crushing inflation that plagued the Brazilian economy in the last decades of the 20th century 
is largely under control, and the Brazilian economy can now be said to be stable and in a state of 
sustained fiscal disciplin (Norseng 2011). The inflation rate has not exceeded 8 % since 2004, 
compared to an average rate well above 100 % between 1980 and 1995 (Trading Economics 
2012). A triggering factor for Brazil’s economic problems was the 1973 and 1979 oil crises, where 
spiking oil prices slowed the country’s economic growth as inflation rates and the foreign debt 
burden soared (The Economist 2009b). The inflation rate reached 100 % in the fall of 1980 
(Trading Economics 2012), and was not brought under control until the mid-1990s (The 
Economist 2009b).  
Empirical Background 
41 
The hyperinflation and increasing foreign debt burden were devastating to growth and output of 
the Brazilian economy. Productivity grew by a mere 0.2 % from 1980 to 2000, compared to 4 % 
in China, as the government and the private sector were unable to invest in infrastructure, 
education and equipment (Sharma 2012; The Economist 2009b). The result of the chronic 
underinvestment is poor infrastructure and limited access to skilled workers (Sharma 2012), 
eroding the competitiveness of Brazilian businesses and increasing operating costs for all firms in 
Brazil.  
3. Cross-Cultural Factors 
Using Ghemawat’s (2011) CAGE-framework of cross-border differences, distance between 
Brazil and Norway is high in all dimensions. The geographical distance between the two countries 
has little effect besides the cost of travel. The most significant effect of the economic distance is 
the low quality of Brazil’s infrastructure, which increases cost and time of transporting goods and 
personnel (Sharma 2012). However, cultural and administrative factors are most likely to affect 
business operations in Brazil, and will be discussed more thoroughly.  
In the cultural dimension, the language barrier is clearly evident, but also possible to reduce at the 
cost of a translator. Uncertainty is more likely to arise from differences in how Norwegians and 
Brazilians conduct business - particularly in terms of how relationships are established, and the 
degree of openness between business counterparts. Building a network of relevant contacts is 
crucial to access customers and potential partners, and effective networking is likely to reduce the 
time to income generation. However, building these important relationships takes time and 
requires a presence in Brazil – a presence that can also be seen as a sign of commitment to the 
Brazilian market and a way of overcoming skepticism of unknown business partners (Majors 
2012). Presence is important after projects are initiated as well – Janis Majors, a director at 
Inventure Management describes how some Brazilian business partners are known to delay 
sharing bad news until it is absolutely necessary and therefore unnecessarily difficult to deal with 
(Majors 2012).  
The administrative distance between Norway and Brazil is increased by the language barrier, as 
documents and information might be available only in Portuguese, for example on labor relations 
(Economist Intelligence Unit 2011). The language barrier only adds to the difficulties of 
operating in an already administratively complex country (Inventure Management 2011). 
Administrative distances are increased by limited availability of corporate data in Brazil. 
OpenCorporates, a British organization lobbying for greater distribution of company data, gave 
Brazil a score of zero points out of hundred on a survey on the availability of company data 
(OpenCorporates 2012; The Economist 2012b).  According to the group, a number of risks arise: 
“undermining corporate governance, and providing a fertile ground for corruption, money laundering, organized 
crime, and tax evasion” (OpenCorporates 2012, p. 1). Further, limited availability of company data 
complicates market research, a necessity prior to market entry (Inventure Management 2011).   
 
Implications for Case Firms 
Several of the outlined environmental factors are likely to have a direct effect on how firms 
entering the Brazilian petroleum sector conduct business. The political uncertainty in Brazil is 
low, and therefore unlikely to affect the case firms. However, government policies are likely to 
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have a significant effect. First, local content requirements can affect the choice of entry mode for 
firms and the inherent risk level in the foreign market entry. Nevertheless, the policy uncertainty 
tied to local content demands is not very high; the Brazilian government has been very clear on 
its intentions to control the pre-salt resources. Second, the production sharing regime is likely to 
have an indirect effect as it makes Petrobras the controlling operator of the pre-salt fields. This 
makes Petrobras a very likely customer to many of the countries that enter Brazil, and smaller 
firms may find themselves in a weak bargaining position when dealing with Petrobras. Lastly, 
strict regulatory responses to accidents could have a devastating effect on a small firm with 
limited resources.  
 
Macroeconomic uncertainties are not very likely to cause great difficulties to firms currently 
entering Brazil, as the Brazilian economy is regarded as stable. The long-term effects of 
historically low investments in infrastructure and education do however have an effect on the 
general cost level. Nevertheless, this will be a common factor for all firms operating in Brazil and 
might even make direct exports with importation taxes a more competitive option compared to 
the local competition. 
 
The cross-cultural differences, especially cultural and administrative distance, are likely to cause 
the greatest difficulties for firms the Brazilian petroleum sector. Building a network of customers 
and partners in Brazil is likely to take time due to the cultural differences and the need to adjust 
to the Brazilian business culture and administrative system. Some form of presence in Brazil will 
be required to overcome cultural and administrative distance - either directly or through third 
parties – and this increases the cost and risk of entry. Nevertheless, risks associated with cross-
border differences are, in contrast to the mentioned policy and macroeconomic uncertainties, 
possible to reduce by gaining knowledge on and experience in the Brazilian market.  
Industry Factors 
Brazil is currently the most attractive market to Intsok-members13 (Wangen 2012), reflecting a 
global trend of O&G operators and suppliers scrambling towards Brazil and the world’s largest 
offshore market (Gall 2011). New market entrants compete with established players for contracts 
and access to critical resources, altering the competitive dynamics of the petroleum industry. Still, 
technological hurdles need to be cleared, largely attributed to the depth of the pre-salt fields and 
their distance from the Brazilian mainland.  
1. Competitive Intensity 
The competitive intensity in the Brazilian oil and gas industry depends the dynamics between 
several key actors; operators, suppliers, and government agencies (Appendix 11.6). Operators are given 
exploration and production rights in certain blocks by the Brazilian control organ ANP14, and buy 
services from large engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) actors. The large EPC 
firms rely on a base of subcontractors, from which they source services they do not perform in-
house (Majors 2012). A smaller supplier can therefore sell its services directly to Petrobras or 
                                                 
13 A government-supported organization facilitating internationalization of Norwegian oil and gas firms 
14 The National Agency of Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels 
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through the EPC contractors (Jørpeland 2012)15. In the end, demand for products and services is 
determined by the operators’ activity level, and chiefly Petrobras’ actions (De Oliveira 2012; 
Inventure Management 2011). As the projected industry growth opens up for business 
opportunities, it will certainly also attract new entrants to the industry. This makes the 
competitive intensity higher (Porter 2008), a point which further aggravates the low supplier 
power in an industry where Petrobras and the large EPC contractors holds a large buyer power.  
2. Input Uncertainties 
While Petrobras’ staff is regarded as highly competent, there is concern regarding the 
organization’s ability to handle the planned pre-salt growth (Gall 2011). Petrobras position as the 
controlling pre-salt operator makes its employees a finite, critical resource which might inhibit 
development projects. Furthermore, an organizational experience gap16 – 40 % of Petrobras staff 
has less than nine years’ experience while 60 % of the staff has more than 19 years of experience 
and is approaching retirement – will make project staffing more challenging in the long term. 
Inexperienced staff is often less effective and more inclined to make mistakes, and this is a 
challenge to firms of all sizes - Aker Solutions attributed weak results in the third quarter of 2011 
to overspending due to inexperienced personnel (The Economist 2011b).    
Furthermore, there is widespread concern over the ability of Brazilian firms to supply ships and 
equipment at the rate at which the ambitious growth objectives and local content regulations 
require (Azevedo Jr 2011; Gall 2011; The Economist 2011a). Even Petrobras’ former president, 
José Sergio Gabrielli has raised concern over ‘strangulation risk’ - the risk of local suppliers failing 
to deliver ships and equipment on time and at an acceptable cost level (Gall 2011). In particular, 
there are concerns over the efficiency of Brazilian shipyards and their ability to deliver FPSOs17, 
which are a critical hub of offshore oil production (Gall 2011; Majors 2012).  
The shortage of skilled technical workers and engineers in the Brazilian sector (Economist 
Intelligence Unit 2011), has been attributed to historic underinvestment in education by the 
government and lack of investment in productivity-enhancing technology by both private and 
state enterprises (Sharma 2012; The Economist 2012a). The shortage, as well as mandatory 
charges and taxes – Brazilian employees are paid 14 months of salary per year – drive labor costs 
up (Economist Intelligence Unit 2011; Inventure Management 2011). In general, equipment costs 
in the Brazilian offshore industry are 10-50 % higher than world market prices, and certain 
equipment is not available from local suppliers (Gall 2011; The Economist 2011a). There are 
records of Brazilian engineering firms using six times as many man-hours than foreign 
counterparts on similar projects, and Brazilian-made offshore valves costing four times as much 
as imported valves (Gall 2011). Brazilian suppliers attribute their cost and efficiency problems to 
high taxes and interest rates, lack of skilled workers and substandard infrastructure (Gall 2011). 
 
 
                                                 
15 K. Lund Offshore is a Norwegian supplier of compressors and lifting equipment to the O&G industry, and 
entered the Brazilian market in 2004 largely on their own 
16 The experience gap was caused by downsizing in the 1980s and 1990s due to low oil prices (Gall 2011) 
17 FPSOs, or floating production, storage and offloading units, receive, process and store hydrocarbons 
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3. Technological Uncertainties 
The pre-salt oil is located at depths up to 7000 m, below thousands of meters of water, rock and 
salt – making extraction a significant technological challenge (Gall 2011). First, the unstable salt 
layer - up to 2000 m thick (Gall 2011) - is likely to shift during exploration, increasing the risk of 
well collapse (The Economist 2011a). Second, the pre-salt fields are filled with corrosive gases 
that cause high reservoir pressure and increases the risk of material failure (The Economist 
2011a). Third, the high gas-oil ratio in the pre-salt fields (Gall 2011) means that pipelines need to 
be laid to transport gas from the pre-salt oil wells18 (The Economist 2011a). Fourth, the pre-salt 
fields are not only located at great depths, they are more than 250 km from the Brazilian coast, 
exceeding the range of helicopters transporting personnel to the drilling platforms. Personnel 
need to be transported by a combination of boats, floating logistical hubs and helicopters (The 
Economist 2009b), increasing the logistical complexity of pre-salt operations. Finally, responding 
to an accident at the pre-salt platforms will be slowed by the distance (The Economist 2011a).  
Implications for Case Firms 
The prospect for large growth in the Brazilian petroleum sector attracts many new entrants, a 
situation that in a long-term perspective is likely to reduce suppliers bargaining power versus the 
large buyers represented by Petrobras and multinational MNCs. The fact that Brazil is already the 
world’s largest offshore market, and hundreds of billions of dollars will be invested here over the 
next few years, does not imply that all firms will succeed. The entering firms should therefore 
invest resources in mapping the competitive environment before entering, and a solution faced 
with a highly competitive environment may be to seek market niches – as is often done by early 
internationals.  
Smaller firms may be particularly exposed to the input uncertainties present in the Brazilian 
petroleum sector, which drive operation- and hiring costs up – raising barriers of entry to levels 
that may prohibit some firms from entering the Brazilian market. Furthermore, dealing with 
resource risk is likely to be particularly challenging to small firms with little market experience, as 
they often lack resources and contacts to overcome resource bottlenecks. Because of already 
established relationships to customers, suppliers and other market actors, firms already present in 
Brazil are likely to have an advantage over entering firms. However, a Brazilian supplier industry 
incapable of delivering ships and equipment when needed, opens up opportunities for 
international suppliers especially from partnerships that satisfy local content requirements. 
Technological uncertainty is primarily related to extracting oil from subsea reservoirs– not to 
surface treatment. Consequently, the impact of these factors on the case firms depends on the 
nature of the firms’ service offerings. Whereas subsea equipment must be able to handle the 
ocean depths, surface equipment will likely be subject to more familiar operational challenges. 
Lastly, the risk of technological changes on an industry level is ever present for firms in the 
petroleum industry, and not subject to changes with regard to Brazilian operations. Lastly, the 
technological challenges related to extracting pre-salt oil mean that innovative firms with 
                                                 
18 While gas is sometimes pumped back into wells to increase the reservoir pressure, there is likely to be so much gas 
from the pre-salt fields that gas pipelines are necessary (Gall 2011) 
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capabilities that will increase the speed or reduce the cost of oil extraction have promising 
prospects in the years to come.  
Firm Factors 
Small Norwegian firms that have not yet entered the Brazilian market possess several of the INV 
liabilities proposed by Zahra (2005); newness, inexperience, size and foreignness. Newness and 
inexperience is likely to make it necessary to spend resources on gain knowledge on the Brazilian 
market, while foreignness makes it difficult to evaluate both customers and eventual partners in a 
joint venture or other cooperative agreement. Further, a small firm's resources might make it 
difficult to dedicate a substantial amount of time and resources to overcome these liabilities. 
1. Firm Resources 
Inventure Management offers the following advice to firms entering the Brazilian market: “A 
crucial success factor is the willingness and ability to dedicate sufficient resources to the Brazil entry, in terms of 
both money and personnel” (Inventure Management 2011, p. 10). They further emphasize that an 
internationalization attempt is likely to come at a high relative cost to SMEs compared to larger 
firms, but that an allocation of sufficient financial and human resources to the process is 
important in the pre-entry phase as well as post-entry.  
Extensive market research is necessary prior to market entry (Majors 2012), as it allows firms to 
gain an understanding of their competitive environment and is likely to help firms target their 
efforts effectively. Allocation of financial and human resources to market research is therefore a 
necessary mean in order to reduce income stream uncertainty. However, it is not sufficient to 
ensure success, as underestimating the complexity of running operations in Brazil is very likely 
have an adverse effect on the firm’s core activity of generating sales (Jørpeland 2012; Majors 
2012).  
2. Income Stream Uncertainty 
A market in growth is no guarantee for sales of a specific product, and the Brazilian petroleum 
market is in some areas significantly different from the Norwegian market. There are different 
regulations and competitors (Majors 2012), in addition to the fact that high demand services from 
the North Sea may not be in demand in Brazil. An example of such a service, is the quantitative 
risk analysis required prior to operations in the North sea basin. This is not compulsory in the 
Brazilian petroleum sector, and firms that use them in the North Sea do not necessarily use them 
in Brazil (Majors 2012).  
In addition to the question of Brazilian market demand for a firm’s products, the income from 
the Brazilian market operations will come at a later stage than the investments needs to be made. 
Inventure Management emphasizes the need for patience and continuous presence in order to 
generate sales in the market (Majors 2012). The consultancy also points towards the 
administrative challenges of establishing a legal entity in Brazil - a requirement for sales directly to 
Petrobras - or a Brazilian subsidiary (Majors 2012). While Inventure Management promises to be 
able to have a Brazilian subsidiary running within six months (Majors 2012), and K. Lund 
Offshore, a Norwegian SME unfamiliar with the Brazilian petroleum sector, spent a year on 
establishing their Brazilian subsidiary (Jørpeland 2012). Although K. Lund experienced significant 
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demand for their products in Brazil, mainly from Petrobras, it took seven years before the 
Brazilian subsidiary made profits (Jørpeland 2012).    
3. Operational Strategy 
Selection of a strategy for handling the challenges firms face when operating in Brazil is a key 
issue for successful entry. The entry mode determines how firms target their customers and 
therefore greatly influences its chances of generating sales quickly, as well as the overall risk level 
of the internationalization process. Entry strategies are highly dependent on the firm’s product or 
service offering; while firms offering relatively simple products may successfully export or sell 
through a Brazilian agent, firms with more complicated products often will benefit from a greater 
presence in Brazil (Majors 2012). Three of the most used entry modes are serving the market 
form Norway, selling through a Brazilian agent, and establishing a Brazilian legal entity (Inventure 
Management 2011).  
Serving the Brazilian market from Norway, is the entry mode requiring the smallest resource 
commitment, but it may be difficult to make sales in Brazil without physical presence. Goods 
invoiced from outside Brazil are subject to an import tax of at least 25 % (Inventure Management 
2011), thus raising the price on the product or service offered. Furthermore, Petrobras requires 
its suppliers to have a legal presence in Brazil, although some suppliers that offer products that 
are considered unique or of strategic importance may be exempted from the rule (Inventure 
Management 2011).  
Selling through a Brazilian agent, represents a low resource commitment entry option while 
yielding benefits of a physical market presence. A Norwegian manager with extensive experience 
from Brazil explains: “Effective agents are 100 % committed to the sale, and have relevant contacts. 
Experience from a relevant sector is therefore a major advantage” (Wold 2012). This entry mode is greatly 
dependent on the capabilities of the chosen representative, and the benefit of a low commitment 
physical presence must be balanced against the risk of misrepresentation, agent coordination 
issues and the taxes incurred due to foreign invoicing (Inventure Management 2011).  
Firms that establish a Brazilian subsidiary, are often motivated to do so by local content 
requirements. The most used option for establishment in Brazil is creating a fully owned 
subsidiary (Inventure Management 2011), but firms may also create a joint venture with a 
Brazilian partner or acquire an existing Brazilian company. All of the above options for 
establishment in Brazil involve a greater resource commitment, and therefore a greater risk, than 
exporting or selling through an agent. The process of establishing a Brazilian company is 
bureaucratic and time consuming (Economist Intelligence Unit 2012). Furthermore, compared to 
a fully owned subsidiary, additional risk is associated with joint ventures and acquisitions. First, 
significant resources must be allocated to finding a joint venture partner in accordance with the 
capabilities that the firm seeks, or an attractive acquisition target. Second, joint ventures and 
acquisitions require effective governance process - discrepancies in firm objectives might have 
serious consequences to join ventures and prolong acquisition processes. Third, letting third 
parties in on sensitive technology increases dissemination risk. 
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 Implications for Case Firms 
Allocation of both human and financial resources is necessary to both pre- and post-entry 
processes in the Brazilian market. For a small, resource-constrained firm, the costs will be 
relatively high and hold up a high proportion of the firms’ resources. However, allocation of 
resources to the Brazilian entry is identified as a key success factor, making the resource 
allocation a necessary priority for firms entering the case firms.  
One of the areas requiring a considerable amount of resources prior to entry, is the extensive 
market research that should be performed in order verify demand for the case companies' 
services in the Brazilian petroleum sector - as demand in some segments vary from the demand 
in the Norwegian petroleum sector. The situation is further complicated for the case firms, as the 
income stream is both uncertain and occurs at a later point in time than the need to allocate 
resources to the market entry. A certain amount of organizational slack – to allow resources to be 
held up in the Brazilian market expansion without negatively affecting the firm’s regular 
operations - seems like a key component in a successful Brazilian market entry. This is obviously 
important in any market entry, but the time-consuming process of establishing a legal entity or 
representation in Brail, and the cultural and administrative distance between Brazil and Norway, 
might make organizational slack even more important. 
The operational strategy, or choice of entry mode, is a key influence both on the ability to 
generate sales and the amount of time before income generation. While direct exports from 
Norway will require the smallest resource commitment prior to a sale and thus require less 
organizational slack, it might also limit the ability to generate sales due to low market visibility, 
import fees and Petrobras' requirement for Brazilian presence. Sales through an agent seems to 
have many of the same upsides that option of direct exports has, but the higher market visibility 
comes at a price; agent fees must be paid, and the firm risks partner exploitation. The option of 
establishing a subsidiary is the most resource intensive option, and might therefore be out of the 
scope for some of the case firms - as they do not possess the organizational slack required to 
support this. In order to overcome this challenge, the use of a Brazilian partner might necessary - 
although it also introduces costs and risks that a fully-owned subsidiary does not. 
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4.2 Case Company Background 
The case firms vary in age and size, but all companies are characterized by resource scarcity and 
the limited number of persons involved in the internationalization process (Table 3). In the case 
of Cybernetica two people were originally involved in the firm’s Navigator project, but one of the 
employees left the company before finishing the project without being replaced by another 
employee. In the case of Norske Ventiler the original project leader manager is on sick leave, and 
he has been replaced by the managing director. 
Company Product/service 
offering 
# Employees # Involved in 
Navigator project 
Turnover 
(NOK/year)19 
Funded 
(year) 
Cybernetica Process control and 
optimization 
12 2 (1) 12.9 million 2000 
Norske 
Ventiler 
Process valves 23 1 (2) 34.5 million 1987 
SafeClean Chemical cleaning of 
process equipment 
30 2 30.5 million 2002 
Sperre ROV and related 
subsea equipment 
13 1 46.0 million 1993 
Table 3 - Key information on the case companies 
The case company presentations are similarly structured. The companies are introduced with a 
brief history, leading up to the current operations and service offering of the firm in question. 
Following the introduction, the firms’ sales strategy is outlined, before past and current 
international activities are presented. The last topic treated is the firms approach to the risk 
assessment process, and the main risks identified by the firm in question.   
4.2.1 Cybernetica 
Year Activity 
-> 2000 The three founders work with model predictive control systems for SINTEF, including research 
assignments for industrial clients.  
2000 Cybernetica is founded. The first customers originated from SINTEF research assignments in the 
polymer industry. 
2002 The company expands its business into the metallurgical plant industry after hiring an employee with 
experience from this industry. 
2008 The company decided to enter the oil and gas industry to offer control models for offshore processing 
plants. 
2010 First contact with Petrobras officials visiting the Integrated Operations center at NTNU, Trondheim 
2011 Petrobras indicates interest for a research project 
Table 4 – Key events in Cybernetica's history 
Cybernetica was founded in 2000, when three colleagues at the SINTEF research center in 
Trondheim decided the predictive process models they had been developing in research projects 
for the polymer industry were commercially exploitable. The company’s first customers were 
contacts originating from the SINTEF research projects within the polymer industry. Realizing 
that process control models were applicable in the metallurgical industry as well, the company 
hired an employee with relevant experience and successfully entered the metallurgical industry. 
The company eventually gained customers from the onshore processing industry, including 
Statoil, and this experience led the company to discover the potential for using process control 
technology in offshore process systems. 
                                                 
19 Average over the last the years from 2008-2010 to discount for industry cycle effects 
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Today, Cybernetica develops, implements and maintains process control models for supervision 
and optimization of industrial processes within the polymer industry and metallurgical plants, and 
is still searching for their first customer within the offshore oil and gas industry. The process 
control models are tailor made for each client, and the control systems are based on non-linear, 
physical models20. The use of more complex models allows Cybernetica to operate within a niche 
market of more complicated industrial processes, where standard solutions of larger competitors 
like Hannibal and ABB cannot be applied. While the company considers itself a leader within its 
niche of non-linear, physical process control models, it struggles with limited visibility outside 
selected market segments.  
Sales Strategy 
Cybernetica has deliberately searched for Norwegian clients with international operations or 
connections, as it is much easier for the company to maintain a relationship in Norway than 
having to rely on international marketing activities. In accordance with this strategy, the company 
emphasizes the importance of keeping clients (the company has only lost two clients to this date). 
The company traditionally relies on network-based sales, but has recently started cold-calling 
potential clients in order to expand the client base. 
A new client relationship usually starts with study of benefits or research cooperation in order to 
prove the potential of the technology for the client. The benefit study and/or research 
cooperation usually includes the development of a process model, which in turn is often 
implemented as a pilot project.  A contact in the client company can then use this pilot project as 
leverage to convince management to expand the project. The grooming process leading up to a 
benefit study is considered key to the company’s sales strategy, but can be very time consuming 
(even when involving professors to increase credibility of projects):  
“The potential is often hard to see, and the technology relatively unknown to the customer before a benefit study has 
identified it. This makes it very hard to enter new client relations. However, when you have established a relation, 
the clients often stay – expanding it to a new factory, making a process modification, or something similar.” 
The company has not yet made any sales within the oil and gas industry, and explains the lack of 
sales by referring to two complicating factors. First, Cybernetica’s products require a certain level 
of technological competence to be understood. Second, the company offers a margin improving 
service in an industry where this has not been a key focus, particularly when oil prices are high. 
Of these factors, especially the technological competence demand has shaped Cybernetica’s sales 
strategy: 
“Statoil is first priority, followed by other firms on the Norwegian continental shelf, and then firms around the 
wider North Sea Basin. This is a result of the technological competence needed to understand our product; 
something we know Statoil possesses, but we have seen less of in other companies on the Norwegian continental 
shelf.” 
Although Statoil remains the company’s main priority, selling to Statoil has been complicated by 
the fact that Cybernetica provides consultancy services to Statoil’s process environment, and the 
                                                 
20 Physical control models are based on a physical representation of the process in question, rather than the 
alternative experimental representation. This enables more robust control models that run for a longer period 
without maintenance 
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fact that Statoil develops a process model of their own. In relation to other clients, the company 
struggles with low visibility - as larger oil companies are preferred in the prime speech slots as 
conferences - and a need to rely on third parties in the client company for the business proposal 
to reach higher level management. A letter of intent was signed with ABB in 2007 allowing 
Cybernetica to exploit ABB’s marketing channels and join ABB projects, without yielding any 
results as of today. 
International Activity 
Cybernetica currently has customers in Norway, the United States, New Zealand and Germany. 
Most client relationships are a result of the company’s strategy of client followership, but there 
are also international clients that were unknown to the company at onset. All international 
projects are evaluated based on the condition that the company should be run from Trondheim 
for as long as possible – as more offices would involve both increased costs and risk.  
While the company aims at continued growth in all three industries, only the oil and gas industry 
is targeted in their Brazilian expansion efforts. The Brazilian expansion effort was initiated by 
visits from Petrobras to the IO center21 at NTNU, where a board member of Cybernetica has 
facilitated meetings between the two companies. The Brazilian market expansion is regarded as 
an exception to the company’s sales strategy, as it is believed that Petrobras is much more 
technology driven than the company’s potential clients around the North Sea Basin (Statoil being 
an exception). This belief is based on the impression that a large number of Petrobras managers 
are recruited from CENPES22, and a long-term technology strategy requiring process control 
models.  
Cybernetica has faced several challenges related to their Brazilian market entry. First, the local 
content demands are challenging due to the company’s size and strategy of being able to run 
operations from Trondheim. The complex regulations have also made it hard for the company to 
separate actual regulations from what a customer prefers. Furthermore, Petrobras initially asked 
Cybernetica to contact TriSolutions – a Brazilian company delivering process optimization 
services – to evaluate the possibilities for cooperation. As TriSolutions did not answer 
Cybernetica’s contact request, and Cybernetica does not find cooperation particularly interesting, 
it has been decided not to pursue this issue any further.  
As of today, Petrobras has indicated a willingness to enter to cooperate on a research project with 
Cybernetica, and the two parties have agreed on the content of a research project. This research 
project is seen as a stepping stone for a follow-up project, and Cybernetica aims at sorting out the 
remaining pieces by September 2012. Financing of the project has been a challenge, due to 
conflict of interest between the parties. While financing can come from several sources (e.g. 
Petrobras, Innovasjon Norge or The Research Council of Norway) Petrobras has not been 
interested in committing resources, making it necessary for Cybernetica to contribute with own 
funding. Although skeptical to the idea of part-financing a research project for a client, 
Cybernetica has decided to go along with Petrobras’ preferred choice: 
                                                 
21 IO Center – Center for Integrated Operations in the Petroleum Industry 
22 CENPES – Petrobras’ research center in Rio de Janeiro  
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“We were skeptical towards an IRD agreement, but this eventually became the solution. I felt that Innovasjon 
Norge marketed the IRD solution in a way that blocked any chance of getting a real project in place. I still think 
so, but have learnt that an IRD agreement can be a natural first step due to Petrobras’ circumstantial bureaucracy 
– with an IRD agreement we choose a path with much less bureaucracy.” 
The company’s employees have a technical background, and the company’s international 
experience is based on experience gained through Cybernetica’s international operations. The 
company had performed some studies of the Brazilian market prior to the Navigator project, but 
regarded the project participation as a way to get much of the needed market information – for 
an amount of money that would either way have to be spent in order to get this outside the 
project. 
Company size puts some restrictions on the number of risk factors evaluated in the 
internationalization process, a point illustrated when the former project manager of the 
company’s Navigator commitment left the company:  
“Steinar had time to work with these issues, but without him the pot of available resources is smaller. Consequently 
we have to peel away aspects that could be interesting to evaluate, and focus on one thing; getting a project with 
Petrobras. I think the outcome would have been the same anyway, but at least this is the way we do it after he 
quit.”    
Risk Management Activities 
The Brazilian expansion and participation in the Navigator project where evaluated based on 
Cybernetica’s overall strategy plan, as well as more detailed business plans for each business area. 
The company evaluated both how an expansion would influence their current strategy, and how 
the large the cost related to an expansion and the participation in the Navigator program could 
be. A budget for the activities related to the Brazil project was constructed, and the cost 
compared to the firm’s overall budget, before a decision to go forward was made: 
“We evaluated that we could handle the loss if we did not succeed, and saw a large potential; the downside is 
limited, and the upside is large. We have only decided to go through with the Navigator project under the condition 
that we will not establish any subsidiary in Brazil. If we want to take out our full potential in Brazil, the risk will 
naturally rise, and we will have to take a new evaluation – probably considering many more aspects than what we 
currently do. However, there will be a lot of incremental decisions along that road; because you chose A, you do not 
have to choose B.”  
The company does not use any formal frameworks in the process of identifying and evaluating 
risk, but evaluates the costs of each project against a company criterion of always budgeting with 
a surplus – a criterion naturally limiting the number of new projects the company can undertake. 
The fact that no formal risk frameworks are used can be explained by what the company 
considers a risk reducing organizational structures: 
“We do not feel a need for using formal fault-tree analysis or statistical tools for evaluating the risk. We have built 
organizational structures for risk reduction including a quality system, contract templates that have been developed 
with lawyers, a strict employment process and a business culture of responsibility and accountability.“ 
Cybernetica is aware of the risks related to entering a market with an unproven technology and 
low general visibility, but feels that the Brazilian market might be easier to penetrate than other 
markets with less technology-driven companies. The risk factors considered most important with 
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regards to the company’s Brazilian strategy includes the risk of a monetary loss, and 
consequences faced if a later pilot implementation goes wrong: 
“We ask ourselves: If we do not get anything out of this, what is the cost? The risk relied to a financial loss. The 
other big risk factor is the consequences, losses and law suits if we could face if we get a later implementation and 
fail – the liability for damages. We did not evaluate this last risk in any detail, but would we traditionally use 
lawyers and insurance agents to make sure we are covered if anything goes wrong.” 
4.2.2 Norske Ventiler 
Year Activity 
1987 Two entrepreneurs establish Norske Ventiler, and the firm initially focused on maintenance of valves 
used in the North Sea.  
Mid 1990s Investments made in machines such as lathes and milling units, and an engineer with drawing 
competence, enabling Norske Ventiler to design and produce own valves  
2005 An unsolicited demand from US and Canadian customers triggers the company’s first international 
sales 
2010 The company establishes itself in the subsea segment by the introduction of ball valves, connectors 
and valves. Internal discussions and evaluations of the possibilities for entering Brazil  
2010 The company made its first sale to Brazil through the Norwegian branch of Aker Solutions Subsea 
2011 The company joins the Navigator project 
Table 5 – Key events in Norske Ventiler's history 
Founded in 1987 by two local entrepreneurs, Norske Ventiler originally offered maintenance of 
valves used in the North Sea. The company later decided to backward integrate to valve 
manufacture by acquiring needed machines and personnel. Starting with producing low pressure 
valves in basic materials, Norske Ventiler later started producing valves in higher pressure classes 
and exotic materials. Norske Ventiler today specializes in delivering smaller, exotic material23 
valves with short delivery times to process systems in the oil industry. The exotic materials 
increase the valve price, but short lead times enable the company to charge a premium price. 
Although the company has traditionally focused on delivering top-side valves, sale of self-
developed subsea valves is budgeted to reach 40 % of total revenues in 2012. 
Sales Strategy 
The next five years, the company aims at continued growth in the top-side niche segment, 
combined with product development and growth in the subsea segment.  In the top-side 
segment, the company targets maintenance projects performed by EPC24 firms on behalf of 
operators. In this segment, the new valves are likely to substitute old valves on a piping or line, 
implying a lower number of valves and a need for delivery within a specific time slot – e.g. a 
planned maintenance stop. Consequently, delivery time is an important buying criterion, making 
Norske Ventiler a preferred supplier. In the subsea segment, the company targets larger new 
projects as well as maintenance projects. The planning horizon in the new construction projects 
are longer than in the maintenance projects, but frequent specification changes makes flexibility a 
key competitive element.  
                                                 
23 Any metal that does not fit within the major materials categories commonly used in manufacturing. Here it refers 
to metal or metal alloys such as titan, Inconel, Duplex, Super Duplex and stainless steel (6MO) (ToolingU.com 2012) 
24 EPC – Engineering, Procurement and Construction 
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In the top-side segment, Norske Ventiler’s customers are either EPC firms or large valve 
traders25, while the company sells directly to subsea companies within the subsea segment. This 
difference implies that subsea companies do not always know of Norske Ventiler. This was the 
case with Aker Solutions Subsea, although Norske Ventiler had a long relationship with Aker 
Solutions EPC department. In order to increase customer awareness, the company relies on word 
of mouth and relations in both segments, in addition to regular advertisements in relevant 
international journals and presence at large conventions (e.g. the ONS in Stavanger).  
The choice of producing valves in exotic materials is a result of an inability to compete with 
large-scale valve manufacturers on purchase prices of less exotic raw materials. While stainless 
and carbon steel are the most common valve materials in the North Sea, the company has 
identified a trend of EPC companies increasingly use more exotic material qualities in their valve 
specifications: 
“If one focus purely on purchasing price, less exotic materials can represent large cost savings. However, considering 
life cycle costs it is less expensive to purchase materials that are more expensive and get reduced maintenance costs 
over a 20-year period. In the Gulf of Mexico, there is a trend of EPC companies beginning to specify more exotic 
materials as a result of longer planning horizons on oil rigs and subsea systems. The same trend can be seen in the 
North Sea, were oil installations are re-certified for a new 10-20 years period – implying that much of the 
maintenance operations actually replace low quality materials with higher quality materials.” 
There are several direct competitors in the international market using the same production 
technique and/or possessing similar capacity of short delivery times. Norske Ventiler has 
identified direct competitors based in the Netherlands, Belgium, and England. While some of the 
competitors have a larger product assortment, none can match Norske Ventiler’s lead-time. The 
short delivery times and flexible production process is a result of a choice to use steel bars in 
order to machine, rather than cast, valves: 
“The cast process requires a larger number of valves to be economically efficient and casts one valve size and 
material at a time. Our machining process is able to handle 10-12 different orders simultaneously – with different 
delivery times and material quality.” 
International Activity 
Norske Ventiler’s first international sales were a result of unsolicited orders from US and 
Canadian customers, eventually leading the company to identify a potential for international sales. 
The company currently serves customers from Norway, Scotland, England, Denmark, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, the Middle East, Singapore, Australia, Brazil, Canada and the United States. 
Customer references from the North Sea basin is a vital facilitator of international sales, as the 
customers are usually the same large EPC firms that operates in the North Sea. In fact, a large 
share of international sales are delivered through the end customers’ Norwegian representatives: 
“A large share of our deliveries are delivered and invoiced in Norway. The customer then installs the valves on 
different skids and X-mas trees before exporting it as one unit. We have delivered equipment to FMC’s Kongsberg 
office and to Aker Solutions Subsea this way, with final delivery addresses in Russia and Angola. For us this set-
up is risk free, and preferable to the alternative of sending the bill and delivery to an address in Angola.”   
                                                 
25 The valve traders often operate on behalf of EPC firms, ordering single valves or building a valve package from 
different suppliers.  
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Using publicly available information from Innovasjon Norge and Intsok, the company evaluated 
the market potential for valves in the Australian petroleum sector eventually deciding to serve the 
market with an agent due to the geographical distance. An identical approach was used for 
evaluating the Brazilian petroleum sector before the company was contacted regarding the 
Navigator project. The company had at this time decided to enter the Brazilian petroleum sector, 
but uncertainties regarding how to enter the Brazilian market made the Navigator project an 
attractive option. The main motivation for entering the Brazilian O&G industry is the large 
market potential, combined with the presence of EPC companies familiar with Norske Ventiler: 
“The real trigger is the potential; Brazil will become the world’s largest oil nation within a 10-year period. The salt 
layer field found outside Rio is likely to be the world’s largest, regardless of what you compare it to. There is an 
enormous demand for almost everything in the Brazilian oil sector, and what is going to happen in the next ten 
years is so big that you have to position yourself now if you want a piece of the cake. As the EPC business is 
inherently global, the customers will be the same – so in principle it is exactly the same customer, and you can say 
we are simply following customers that have an international attitude.” 
In earlier market entries to countries on other continents, the company has used sales 
representatives. External representation was originally also thought of as the optimal entry 
strategy in the Brazilian market, as large distances makes it tiresome and resource demanding to 
visit the country frequently. However, Norske Ventiler has now settled on a strategy of selling to 
Brazilian subsidiaries via their Norwegian EPC customers. This choice is seen as less risky, 
resource demanding and costly than the alternatives:  
“When we chose to focus on the Norwegian customers’ entities in Brazil, which after all covers 60-70 % of the 
market, the whole strategy became significantly easier. We did not have to consider distributors, agents, or an 
eventual establishment, making the strategy less resource and cost demanding than the original alternatives.” 
With a hesitation to establish an own subsidiary, the largest challenge the company faces when 
entering the Brazilian market is the demand for local content. This has consequences for the 
segment targeted in the Brazilian expansion. Rather than focusing on both top-side and subsea 
valves, Norske Ventiler has decided to focus primarily on the subsea segment in Brazil – as this 
seems to represent least difficulties: 
“In meetings with Petrobras and other large oil companies we were given a lecture on local content requirements. 
However, in meetings with subsea actors like Subsea7, Oceaneering and Aker Solutions Subsea this was not on 
the agenda. When I asked directly, they told me that they had no choice but to purchase our equipment – regardless 
on importation costs or restrictions – as the products are unavailable in South-America and they have to have it.” 
Risk Management Activities 
The top management of Norske Ventiler has considerable international experience. Both the VP 
of sales and marketing (no longer involved in the project due to a long-term sick leave) and the 
managing director has experience from international business activities. This experience is an 
important asset in the risk assessment process, as the firm use what they label common sense 
rather than formal risk assessment models: 
“We do not have any formal models – other than what you might call common sense. You can use common sense in 
quantifying the costs, and then you have to be certain that you can secure a sales volume that will cover those costs. 
You can analyze yourself to death considering costs and possible scenarios, but in the end, it balances on whether 
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you really believe in it. It is clear that a large order will demand more effort into this. If something relevant turns up 
we will put more money into it – but we do it in that order.” 
Experiential and institutional knowledge from members in the NCE Subsea maritime cluster, 
Innovasjon Norge and Intsok provide important support in both the market evaluation and risk 
assessment process. The maritime cluster has been used to meet managers with experience from 
establishment in similar markets, to confirm that the company is heading in the right direction. 
Innovasjon Norge and Intsok have been used in order to get publically available market data, and 
have to some degree been directly contacted to get help evaluating the market.  
The largest risk identified by the company is the risk of losing money, and this aspect makes the 
establishment of a subsidiary in Brazil unrealistic unless very certain estimates on future sales 
volumes can reduce the risk. Neither intellectual property theft, nor cultural differences are seen 
as large challenges. Intellectual property theft is ruled out due to a time consuming, resource 
demanding process of imitation and low prospects of gaining returns. Cultural differences are not 
considered important based on the managing director’s experience: 
“I have travelled the world, and have a very relaxed attitude towards cultural differences. There are cultural 
differences, but then again; smile to the world and the world will smile back. There is a lot of literature out there, 
but I have a very relaxed attitude towards it. 
Concerning resources, the company emphasizes that limited organizational resources constrain 
how thoroughly the Brazilian market can be evaluated. The chosen strategy for entering the 
Brazilian market is a result of these constraints: 
“We do not really see any risk factors related to the Brazilian market entry as long as we stick to the known 
customer constellations. These are customers we have served for a number of years, and we assume that their 
Brazilian subsidiaries have the same internal procedures as their Norwegian offices.” 
4.2.3 SafeClean 
Year Activity 
2002 Overflateteknikk is established on the estate of a bankrupt supplier of industrial paint  cleaning services 
2002-
2007 
Overflateteknikk delivers onshore services  for chemical cleaning of paint and offshore services for 
offshore cleaning of process systems and components 
2007 Overflateteknikk leaves the onshore paint-cleaning segment, and rebuilds the plant in Høyanger to be 
able to clean pipes and other removable offshore process system components. A sister company, 
Industrial Chemicals, is established with the purpose of becoming self-reliant on chemicals. 
2007 Overflateteknikk is encouraged by Statoil to develop a method for handling the waste generated in the 
chemical cleaning process. Avfallsteknikk is founded in order to separate the wash water components 
and handle them according to individual waste handling specifications. 
2008 Overflateteknikk is self-reliant on chemicals (from Industrial Chemicals) 
2010 Avfallsteknikk and Overflateteknikk merge, and the company name is changed to SafeClean 
Table 6 – Key events in SafeClean's history 
SafeClean, formerly Overflateteknikk, was built on the estate of a chemical paint cleaner and 
initially offering paint cleaning services for the industry in the vicinity of Høyanger. As one of the 
founders had experience from maintenance work in the offshore industry, the company also 
started to deliver chemical cleaning services for offshore process systems. Discovering that the 
offshore cleaning services provided a significantly higher income stream, the land-based paint 
cleaning services were abandoned in 2007. The company rebuilt its plant in Høyanger to handle 
equipment and pipes sent onshore for cleaning purposes, and established two sister companies. 
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The first company, Industrial Chemicals is established in order to become self-reliant on cleaning 
chemicals, while Avfallsteknikk was established in order to handle waste handling demands for 
wash water components. After the merger of Overflateteknikk and Avfallsteknikk in 2010, the 
new company was named SafeClean.  
Today, SafeClean provides chemical cleaning services for process equipment in offshore 
installations - offering on-site cleaning for fixed or unmovable equipment, and onshore cleaning 
for pipes and other movable equipment. The equipment brought onshore is sent to the 
company’s location in Høyanger, where fouling26 materials are removed before the equipment is 
sent either back offshore or to a third party for remelting. The offshore cleaning can be done as a 
shutdown operation on a cold platform where the whole process system is cleaned in one 
operation, or component-wise as a non-shutdown operation. When working offshore the 
company brings both pumping equipment, chemicals and own personnel offshore.  
Sales Strategy 
Safeclean’s customers of chemical cleaning services are operators in the Norwegian section of the 
North Sea (Statoil, Conoco-Phillips, BP). SafeClean’s marketing and sales efforts are directed 
toward the operations and maintenance divisions of the operators. These divisions are targeted in 
a two-fold approach; onshore employees contact managers within operations, maintenance and 
production with responsibility for daily operations offshore, while offshore personnel give 
presentations to the operation and maintenance divisions when they get the chance. The main 
challenge of the sales process is to get into a position to present their cleaning serivces to relevant 
client company representatives: 
“It might sound wild, but the times where we get into position with the right persons, and get sufficient time to 
explain our concept, it most often results in a test assignment. After a test assignment, we have a high resale factor 
through repeated assignments. If you break it down, the key to the whole sales process is getting in position to 
explain the effects of the concept.” 
SafeClean’s chemical cleaning services represent large cost savings and divisional savings 
compared to a mechanical cleaning process, which would require more time and more personnel 
exposure to hazardous waste (e.g. low-level radioactive waste).  What separates SafeClean from 
competitors within the chemical cleaning segment, is an ability to separate the fouling materials, 
hydrocarbons and chemical liquids from the water solutions – allowing each component to be 
handled according to its waste handling specifications. SafeClean’s most significant advantage 
compared to its competitors, in addition to the inherent advantages in chemical cleaning, is full 
control over the cleaning components used. The detailed knowledge of chemical components 
enables the company to separate the resulting wash water and handle each component 
individually.   
International Activities 
SafeClean did not have any plans of internationalization before being contacted by Innovasjon 
Norge regarding the Navigator project. Feeling that the company still had unproven potential in 
the Norwegian offshore segment – Safeclean is currently in a bid process for a general agreement 
with Statoil, their largest customer – the Navigator project was regarded only as a non-binding 
                                                 
26Build-up of unwanted material on the inside surface of process equipment  
Empirical Background 
57 
opportunity to get insight into an unknown market. However, the motivation for 
internationalization has increased: 
“During the course of the [Navigator] project, we have received a lot of information and mental barriers have been 
broken. In this regard it is really the process that has made us sure that there is a market there – that we have a 
potential worth allocating time and resources to.” 
Safeclean is targeting the same customer segment in Brazil as in Norway - with Petrobras as the 
primary target due to their size. The company has visited Brazil also outside the arranged trips in 
the Navigator project in order to pinpoint the attractiveness of their solution to Brazilian clients. 
As in their home market, the sales and marketing efforts are targeted towards representatives 
from different operations and maintenance divisions inside Petrobras. The necessary meetings 
have been arranged by the local Innovasjon Norge office. The company follows a similar strategy 
as in the Norwegian market:  
“What we have chosen of strategies is solely based on success stories from the home market. Our goal, within the 
first year, is to perform a pilot assignment. This pilot ought to be possible to perform without establishing a legal 
entity in Brazil, but rather through import of all input factors from Norway before doing the work offshore. We 
then hope that the results will create interest among customers to such an extent that they will help us in a future 
establishment – and possibly be a contributor to forming our Brazilian strategy.” 
While SafeClean has mapped its competitive environment in Norway, it has not done substantial 
research on the Brazilian market besides asking Petrobras employees if any other firm currently 
offers similar services. The company has not yet decided which form of entry that will be sought 
after a successful pilot project. In different workshops, Osterwalder and Pigneur’s (2010) 
business model canvas has been used to evaluate three entry forms – joint franchise, agent 
representation and a fully owned subsidiary. Each entry form has been simulated, without 
yielding any clear preferences: 
“We have simulated the three business models based on the situation possessed today. Based on this we see clear 
advantages and disadvantages with the different models, but do not have enough knowledge of the Brazilian market 
to take a definite decision. We have evaluated some scenarios based on the current information, and then we will 
have to adjust them as new information is available before finally reaching a point where we can say ‘this is the 
business model’ worth pursuing” 
Although SafeClean has not made any decision with regards to their final entry mode, some sort 
of local presence is viewed as highly probable: 
“When it comes to establishment, we do not regard local content as an obstacle as many others do. We rather regard 
it as a possible competitive edge, and when we have decided to establish we want to do it all the way; by increasing 
the local content as much as possible. An establishment will therefore most likely involve some kind of cooperation 
with a Brazilian company. A company that can complement our products, have access to an offshore base along the 
coast, or want to expand a product line within maintenance.” 
Risk Management Activities 
In the risk assessment process, SafeClean draws on both internal and external sources of 
knowledge. Without any international experience among the managers involved in the Brazil 
project, Innovasjon Norge and Intsok are regarded as vital partners in the knowledge gathering 
process. No systematic framework is used in the risk assessment process, but there is a focus on 
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continuous evaluation of individual risk factors identified during the course of the 
internationalization process. The company believes a more formal process is needed as the 
internationalization process unfolds. Although the process is not formalized today, it is still quite 
thorough: 
“Risk assessments mean that you have to draw the complete risk canvas; getting it up on the board and evaluating 
each individual element is vital. You can always estimate that you have a large potential to succeed, and you can be 
interested in doing things a certain way –but we cannot afford to fail, we have to do things right. Considering the 
size of our wallets, we are not in a position to jeopardize the company by risking a [NOK] 5-10 million loss 
without knowing that you have a certain payback. We have to be careful, and eventually you will get to a point 
where you have to make a strategic decision – but the foundation for such a decision is not there yet.”  
The largest challenge faced by the company is the Brazilian import regime, potentially hindering 
vital material shipments from Norway. In order to solve this problem, the company is following a 
two-fold strategy. In Brazil, Innovasjon Norge is used to get in touch with agents and companies 
that can facilitate logistical operations. In Norway SafeClean seeks to use companies with an 
extensive experience on transport and logistics in the offshore business – actors that are 
established in Brazil and know the system from the inside. The company also plans to gather 
necessary information and simulate a delivery, thus expecting to discover barriers that have not 
yet been identified. The waste disposal regime is expected to differ from the Norwegian market, 
but these differences are not expected to yield any significant problems to the company. 
Other challenges that have been identified by SafeClean include the possibility partner 
opportunism, in the form of intellectual property (IP) theft, corruption and cultural differences. 
The collaborator opportunism reflects the possibility for the company to be sidelined by an 
eventual partner. IP theft is another concern, and the company has chosen not to patent their 
products in a bid to not make their technology publically available – thus preventing competitors 
from making small adjustments to circumvent a patent. Lastly, challenges related to corruption 
and cultural differences are sought mitigated through internal competence building in the 
company. With regard to cultural differences, especially the apparent positivity of Brazilian 
market actors (masking an eventual negative message) and questions regarding the loyalty of 
Brazilian workers have been stressed as important to be aware of. 
4.2.4 Sperre 
Year Activity 
1993 Sperre is founded, a company focusing on building of ROVs and offering ROV inspection services 
2001 The company sells its first ROV outside Norway 
2006 The company makes its first sale to the O&G industry 
2009 Sperre enters a sales agreement with MacArtney Underwater Technology Group 
2012 The company makes its first sale to the Brazilian market – a ROV unit for use on a navy vessel being 
designed by a Norwegian friend of Sperre’s CEO.  
Table 7 - Key events in Sperre's history 
Tor Olav Sperre founded Sperre in 1993 and is still the owner and CEO of the company. With a 
background as a diver, he started making his own ROVs before starting the company, which 
focused on selling ROVs and ROV inspection services. The firm initially focused on offering 
ROV inspection services, but has gradually shifted focus towards direct sales of ROVs in order 
not to dip into their client’s markets. Sperre today builds electrical remotely operated vehicles 
(ROVs) for the offshore, fish farming and hydropower industry. The ROVs are often used for 
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inspection purposes, and each ROV is customized to fit the customers’ specific purposes and 
needs. The company has a large service portfolio, and offers direct sales and rental of ROVs, 
sales of ROV related equipment (e.g. cameras and lights) and diving equipment, and maintenance 
services for ROVs and hyperbaric chambers. Sales of ROVs generate the largest revenue share, 
and the main revenue drivers are the contracts in the oil industry.  
Sales Strategy 
Sperre’s clients represent a number of industries, ranging from the offshore industry to the fish 
farming and hydropower industry. In the two latter industries, deliveries are usually small, often 
only consisting of the ROV itself and a smaller winch as the ROV is operated in shallow waters 
inspecting fishing nets or hydropower inlets. In the offshore industry, a typical delivery often 
includes larger winches, A-frames and a control container for the ROV operation. 
A typical sales process often starts with a request for quotation from a company, followed by a 
tendering process. In this process price is a typical competitive element, although Sperre is 
offering a more customizable design than large scale competitors. When a ROV is sold, the client 
is invited to Sperre’s facilities at Notodden in order to learn the basic build-up of the equipment 
and how to do self-service of the ROV. Sperre also encourages clients to bring their ROVs to 
Notodden for a yearly maintenance service, although the ROVs are designed to be maintained by 
the clients themselves. Several clients buy additional ROVs after the first purchase – making 
resale an important factor in the sales strategy. Sperre has not made a detailed business plan, but 
is present at selected industry conventions and advertises in some industry magazines in order to 
increase their market visibility:  
“We have been quite spoiled in our home market, always having a lot to do, so we do not have a specific business 
plan – although we subconsciously market ourselves at industry conventions and rely much on the word of mouth.” 
International Activities 
Although 80 % of sales are to Norwegian customers, Sperre has sold ROVs to all the Nordic 
countries, Russia, the US and Brazil. The company has only made on sale to Brazil, and the sale 
was a result of a recommendation from the Norwegian ship designer, who is a business partner 
of Sperre’s CEO. Sperre serves the international market with a twofold strategy; the MacArtney 
Underwater Technology Group acts as a sales agent in countries where they are present, while 
Sperre handles sales to remaining countries. 
The agreement with MacArtney Underwater Technology Group was made in order to strengthen 
Sperre’s international presence, as the MacArtney group can leverage size, extensive market 
experience and a solid reputation. The MacArtney Group has been a supplier to Sperre for 20 
years, and will now handle sales in most countries where MacArtney has an office. Sperre will 
help the group drafting bids, but will not be in direct contact with the end-customer. The ROVs 
are sold to MacArtney, which sells it to the end-customer either as a stand-alone product or 
bundled.  
Although the company had international ambitions due to a small home market, Brazil was not a 
strategic target for the company before Sperre was asked to participate in the Navigator project 
by the local Innovasjon Norge office. As the offshore segment generates the largest revenues for 
the company, this industry is targeted in Sperre’s expansion efforts in Brazil. More specifically, 
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the company wants to target the area vessels offshore, delivering ROVs for subsea observation 
and inspection services. The MacArtney group is already present in Brazil, and Sperre wants to 
extend their current sales representative agreement to include the Brazilian market. MacArtney is 
envisioned to deal with both sales and after-sales service – and potentially welding and final 
assembly of the ROVs to satisfy local content regulations. The company has explored other 
potential partners in Brazil, but none of them match MacArtney’s attractiveness. Establishing a 
subsidiary is regarded as too expensive and resource demanding for the company: 
“We are planning to use MacArtney as a dealer for us in Brazil as well. We will not establish ourselves in any 
way if MacArtney is interested – and as long as they make an equal to sell our products as in the other countries 
they represent us. We are far too small to do it on our own, and we see that knowing the language is an advantage 
[MacArtney has local employees in Brazil]. It is also an advantage to know how the Brazilians behave – it is very 
different to do business there compared to how it is done at home.” 
The company has both Norwegian and international competitors that they meet in tendering 
processes, but has not performed a detailed study of the competitive situation in the Brazilian 
market: 
“What our competitors do towards the Brazilian market; we have not figured it out yet, and have not used many 
resources on it. It would of course be interesting to know, but people say Brazil is kind of similar to the Norwegian 
market in the 80s – so we definitely have an opportunity to succeed there if we get MacArtney to believe in our 
products. “  
Risk Management Activities 
Concerning risk in the internationalization process, no detailed framework is in use. However, 
the company has a quality system that it uses to limit the risk of technical faults. When the 
company loses a tender, the quality system is updated with the feedback from the holder of the 
tendering process – this way the company is better prepared for the next tendering process they 
enter. The company also perform a technical risk assessment prior to foreign assignments, 
illustrating that the main risk considered by the company are of technical nature; live circuits, 
faulty documentation and faults relied to a client’s improvised repairs. The company believes to 
have these risks under control: 
“To us risk would be to deliver faulty equipment, getting a bad reputation, but I cannot really remember any fatal 
faults. We have put time and resources into documentation and standardization, making it easy to do maintenance 
and explaining what not to do with the ROV. There is always a certain risk of failure, but we manage to repair 
the equipment. If something is returned under warranty it might get expensive, but it usually turns out all right – 
we have always landed on our feet. “ 
Brazilian import regulations are regarded as most important challenge for handling the Brazilian 
market. This is partly based on the company’s earlier export experiences, which included 
considerable paper work and in some cases an application for an exportation license. However, 
the company does not believe importation challenges will result in any insurmountable obstacles: 
“We have kind of an open mind; we do not believe that it [importation] will be a huge problem, we just have to try 
and see how it goes. At the same time we know that Brazil has some special regulations that you need to relate to 
in order to avoid the largest pitfalls – but this something we need to deal with as it occurs. We have sold some 
equipment to Russia, a market many are skeptical to trade with, but we have not experienced any major challenges 
there.” 
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Lack of a Brazilian network and local content demands have also been identified as challenges. 
While the first is sought overcome through the relationship with Innovasjon Norge, Sperre plans 
to satisfy local content regulations by letting MacArtney do part of the assembly of ROVs in 
Brazil.  
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5 Empirical data analysis 
The cross-case data analysis follows the structure outlined in the theoretical background, where 
the firms’ risk assessment process is separated into the three distinct phases; risk identification, 
risk evaluation and risk mitigation. 
The analysis of each phase follows the same pattern. Each phase is introduced by the main 
findings of the data analysis followed by a table listing the B-categories found in the cross-case 
analysis of the identified A-categories. Further, each B-category is discussed under a separate 
heading, making the argumentation underlying the formation of each B-category transparent. 
Under each discussion, the A-categories supporting the relevant B-category are presented in a 
table.  
5.1 Risk Identification 
The risk identification phase is found to be influenced by the firms ’resource constraints and 
perceived level of uncertainty. The perceived level of uncertainty is influenced by firm- and 
managerial experience, as well as third party inputs. Innovasjon Norge seems to have an 
important role both in reducing the resource demands in the internationalization process of small 
firms, and in reducing the perceived level of risk in the internationalization process – thus 
reducing both resource- and psychological barriers of internationalization. Further, the risk 
identification process is found to be a muddling-through process by default, and a process where 
formal risk assessment frameworks are not used.  
B-Categories – Risk Identification 
1 The resource constraints of SMEs shape the risk identification process by reducing the scope and the number of 
entry strategies evaluated 
2 Experience strongly influences the perceived level of uncertainty, and what risk factors are identified 
3 Personal characteristics of manager(s) are influential to the thoroughness of the risk identification process 
4 Third party input is of high importance in the risk identification phase, both to fill own knowledge-gaps and to 
confirm managerial perceptions 
5 Normal reasoning, assumptions and gut feelings replace formal risk models 
Table 8 - B-Categories for risk identification 
5.1.1 Resource-Limitations Reduce the Scope of the Risk Identification 
Process 
The involved case firms all have a limited number of employees and small turnover compared to 
larger companies; both within the SME classification - which can include companies with up to 
250 employees - and certainly compared to large MNCs. The resource-limitations do influence 
the case firms, both in terms of scope and process structure, but this is not regarded as a large 
problem by the involved companies.  
Cybernetica focuses specifically on how the limited human resource base makes it difficult to use 
specialists in each process, and how the roles are necessarily more fluent in a smaller company. 
The company also experienced how resource constraints make it necessary to peel away aspects 
that could otherwise have been evaluated. This is in line with Norske Ventiler, which emphasizes 
that the amount of resources limits how thoroughly the market can be evaluated. In addition, 
Norske Ventiler states that the resource base influences which strategies are evaluated as potential 
entry strategies – as a limited number of entry strategies reduces the scope and complexity of the 
risk assessment process. SafeClean also recognizes that resources have an impact on the risk 
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assessment process, but emphasizes that the inherent uncertainty is another important factor for 
how systematic the risk assessment process is - as high uncertainty makes it difficult to plan an 
approach beforehand. Lastly, when asked how resources influence the risk assessment process, 
Sperre’s answer is shaped by the fact that they focus more on technical risk aspects than business 
risk. The risk assessment process is only performed prior to performing an assignment for a 
foreign customer, and given the technical scope and internal technical product competence the 
resource limitations is unlikely affect this process to the same agree as in the other case firms. 
1: The resource constraints of SMEs shape the risk identification process by reducing the scope 
and the number of entry strategies evaluated 
A11-19 
Our company is very small, and the roles are very fluent. We mostly do this on an ad-hoc basis, arranging a 
meeting and deciding something. We are light-footed in that aspect, you would certainly get another 
answer talking to a larger company. 
A11-20 
If a larger company were to do something, they would immediately put a specialist on the task, focusing on 
processes, the decision-making basis, etc. When you only see a part of the total picture, you need much 
more rigid processes. 
A11-27 
Steinar had time to work with these issues, but without him the pot of available resources is smaller. 
Consequently we have to peel way aspects that could be interesting to evaluate, and focus on one thing (..). 
A12-14 
Our resource base limits how thoroughly we can investigate the Brazilian market. We do not have an 
abundance of resources, and this is also a reason for the strategy we have chosen in Brazil. 
A13-19 
 [The degree to which risk assessment is systematic] does of course have something to do with resources, 
but it is also difficult to have a theoretical approach to this up front, Then you have to make up scenarios 
based on inadequate information. (…)We can always sit down and try to think about what will meet us, but 
we risk throwing it in the bin right afterwards 
A14-20 
We have not evaluated business risk up until now, but when we lose a tendering process we always ask why 
we did not succeed and put this into our quality system. 
A14-21 
When we do routine assignments in the Norwegian market we have not specified any specific requirements 
with regards to risk, but in relation to foreign assignments we always perform a risk assessment prior to the 
job. 
Table 9 - A-Categories: Resource constraints in risk identification process 
5.1.2 Experience Influences Risk Identification 
The experiences gained by the management teams influence the risk identification process of all 
case firms. A common trait is a tendency of a comparative analysis of the risk picture in Brazil 
relative to the companies’ Norwegian operations, and international experience, if any. The 
experience leads to clear differences in the perception of risk among the case companies – 
especially relied to local content demands and cultural differences.  
SafeClean specifically states that the firm’s risk identification strategy involves comparing 
Norwegian and Brazilian market differences, and while the other firms do not explicitly state this 
as a strategy there is a clear tendency of similar comparisons. While Cybernetica states that the 
company considers the risk of entering Brazil as elevated relative to other market they have 
presence in, Sperre compares import regulations in Russia against Brazilian import regulations 
when stating that the Brazilian import system should only offer surmountable challenges. Lastly, 
Norske Ventiler compares sales of valves to the Brazilian market to its other national and 
international sales – not finding Brazilian sales to be any different.  
SafeClean and Sperre consider the local content requirements as an opportunity, and neither firm 
use the words risk or added uncertainty in association with local content demands. This can be 
explained by the impact of experience, as both Norske Ventiler and Cybernetica explicitly 
perceive local content demands to involve both uncertainty and risk. While SafeClean has 
experience in separating their chemical cleaning services and the production of chemicals into 
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two separate companies, Sperre’s experience indicates that customers are able to dismantle and 
assemble the ROVs – indicating that assembly of the ROV is possible to do leave to a Brazilian 
agent. Neither Cybernetica nor Norske Ventiler have any experience in production splitting, and 
both companies international experience suggests that it is possible to run international 
operations from Norway. Local content demands make running the business from Norway more 
challenging, and both companies experience difficulties in understanding whether the local 
content demands can be avoided and how the requirements will affect their currently planned 
and future operations.  
Cultural differences represent another area where experience clearly influences the firm’s 
perception of risk. Norske Ventiler’s manager states that his experience makes him treat cultural 
differences as a low risk factor, as they are possible to overcome by mutual adjustment. Sperre’s 
representative relies on similar experience when drawing on sales to Russia and a female presence 
in a male dominated oil industry as factors reducing the challenges of cultural differences – 
although the firm does not completely rule out the challenges of cultural differences realizing that 
a local agent is necessary to understand how Brazilians do business. Cybernetica relies on 
experience telling them that the hardest part of making sales is convincing a potential client of the 
technological potential, and although the company recognizes the risk inherent in operating in 
the Brazilian market, the cultural risk of cooperating with Petrobras does not seem to be 
considered a factor worth additional focus. Lastly, SafeClean is the company which finds cultural 
differences to be most challenging. This perception is grounded in how the company lacks 
experience in the Brazilian market, and how the company has not been exposed to risks related 
to cultural differences, risks or bribes before. 
2: Experience strongly influences the perceived level of uncertainty, and what risk factors are 
identified  
A11-18 The risk of entering Brazil is large. It is a hard country to do business in – compared to the other markets 
we are in – and we also skip several steps. We should have started with the home market, getting as far as 
we could there before taking on the North Sea Basin. 
A21-01 We believe that Petrobras, since they recruit a high amount of managers from Cenpes and have adopted a 
long-term technology strategy, will be more open for our technology. 
A12-04 Selling valves for use in Brazil through the large engineering companies makes it just like any other sale. 
This simplifies the process, and we avoid complicating the process through having to consider all criteria 
related to other entry forms. 
A22-15 I have travelled the world, and have a very relaxed attitude towards cultural differences. There are cultural 
differences, but then again; smile to the world and the world will smile back. There is a lot of literature out 
there, but I have a very relaxed attitude towards it. 
A13-07 We try to uncover what is different between the Norwegian and Brazilian market. The customer challenges 
are exactly the same, but doing business down there is completely different. 
A13-10 We are more or less not exposed to cultural differences, corruption and bribes at home. Down there you 
will be exposed automatically, so you will have to think this through before you go 
A23-22 While many regard local content with skepticism, we turn it around and believe it will give a competitive 
edge. At least it is a strength looking at it this way, and we will stimulate as much as possible to raise the 
local content. 
A14-06 The largest challenge operating or selling abroad must be to get equipment through customs clearance – 
with all the papers and commotion there. 
A14-11 We have not really identified any particular risks tied to the Brazilian expansion. In order to get Brazilian 
content we can deliver the electronics, and they can weld and finish the assembly in Brazil – maybe even 
machine something. 
A24-02 We have been selling to Russia. While many ask us how we dare to do it, and how we do it, we have not 
really experienced any problems there. 
A24-08 There is a certain distance, but after you have become friends with a Brazilian – from what I have 
understood – you are really good friends. It might be harder to establish relations, but a female in the oil 
and gas industry is so rare that I think it is possible. 
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A24-10 I think we are dependent on finding a Brazilian partner, to really understand how the Brazilian are 
behaving – it is quite different how business is done there compared to at home. 
A24-11 Doing part of the production in Brazil should not be that hard. We can make the drawings, and they can 
do the machining. 
Table 10 - A-Categories: Perceived level of uncertainty in risk identification process 
5.1.3 Managerial Risk Perceptions Influence How the Risk 
Identification is Performed 
In addition to the influence of experience on what risk factors are considered to be important, 
perceptions of risk among the managers are seen to influence the thoroughness of the risk 
identification process.  
SafeClean exhibits traits of risk aversion, as the company is not certain it will be able to handle a 
financial loss tied to failure in Brazil, and this is expressed through a need to gather more 
information before a final decision is taken. The risk identification process of SafeClean therefore 
seems to be more thorough than what is the case in some of the other companies. Norske 
Ventiler emphasize that it is impossible to analyze all scenarios, and that the decision will 
eventually depend much on a general feeling of belief in the project. When asked whether cultural 
differences could be an important risk factor, the manager had a relaxed attitude towards the 
differences and did not see a reason to investigate them more thoroughly. The evaluation of a 
subset of risk factors is also a trait in Cybernetica’s risk identification process. Feeling that the 
risks involved in the Brazil project is within what the company can handle financially – the 
company will not establish a subsidiary, and a cost estimation showed the costs could be covered 
within the current company budget – the risk identified are specifically related to a research 
cooperation with Petrobras. Sperre seems less risk averse than SafeClean, realizing that they 
might be competing with larger actors but operating without a specific strategy towards them. 
The most obvious example of these differences is SafeClean’s use of delivery simulation to 
identify risk sources in the importation process, and Sperre’s strategy for overcoming import 
hurdles as they occur – not worrying unless it is necessary.  
3: Personal characteristics of manager(s) are influential to the thoroughness of the risk 
identification process 
A11-21 We evaluate risk based on two aspects; our long-term strategy, and a criterion of always budgeting with 
positive returns 
A12-26 When we evaluated the risk of the Brazil project, we made a budget and evaluated the cost related to the 
project with the available budget resources. We saw that we had the necessary resources; if we lose the 
money, we can afford it. 
A11-27 Steinar had time to work with these issues, but without him the pot of available resources is smaller. 
Consequently we have to peel way aspects that could be interesting to evaluate, and focus on one thing; 
getting a project with Petrobras. I think the outcome would have been the same anyway, but at least this is 
the way we do it after he quit. 
A12-13 We do not really see any risk factors related to the Brazilian market entry as long as we stick to the known 
customer constellation. (…) 
A22-10 You can analyze yourself to death, both considering costs and possible scenarios. However, in the end it 
balances on whether you really believe in it, if the organization believes in it, and if there is any substance 
to it. 
A22-15 I have travelled the world, and have a very relaxed attitude towards cultural differences. There are cultural 
differences, but then again; smile to the world and the world will smile back. There is a lot of literature out 
there, but I have a very relaxed attitude towards it. 
A13-06 The size of our wallets is another reason that we cannot take any decision with the current information. 
We cannot risk locking up 5-10 million without a certain payback 
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A23-05 We work a twofold strategy on the importation problem. Through Innovasjon Norge we try to get in 
contact with agents or companies in the business of facilitating importation to Brazil. At home we contact 
actors that have experience from transport and logistics in the offshore industry – actors that are 
established in Brazil and know the system from their side.  
A23-06 We think working these two directions ought to make it possible to point to a practicable way through the 
customs clearance. Then we have to consolidate the information, and simulate a delivery. The simulation is 
likely to identify some fences that we have to evaluate further. 
 
A23-25 
 
Risk in the expansion process is a crucial factor; we basically cannot afford to fail (…) 
A14-05 We could have stayed in Norway (…), but we have higher ambitions. We realize we might be a competitor 
to the larger actors, but we try to hang in there. 
A24-09 We have an open mind with regards to importation, we do not think it will be a huge problem. We just 
have to try and see how it goes, although I know there are special regulations in Brazil. We just have to 
cross the pitfalls when we get there, not taking the sorrows for granted 
Table 11 - A-Categories: Managerial characteristics in the risk identification process 
5.1.4 External Knowledge Provides Important Complements to Internal 
Knowledge  
All firms are dependent on external sources to complement own knowledge in the risk 
identification process. Innovasjon Norge naturally plays an important role for the companies, 
both as a direct source of information and through referrals facilitated by the organization’s 
extensive network. Consequently, Innovasjon Norge is one of several external sources of 
information for the case firms, but play an essential role in facilitating the firms’ 
internationalization process through pushing the firms risk frontier – several of the case firms 
would not have evaluated a Brazilian venture without being contacted by the Navigator project.  
Neither SafeClean, nor Sperre would have considered entering the Brazilian petroleum sector 
unless contacted regarding the Navigator project. For both companies, the Navigator project 
constitutes an important asset in the risk identification process, as a source of information and 
for referrals. While SafeClean emphasizes Innovasjon Norge’s role in breaking both resource- 
and mental barriers in the internationalization process, Sperre focuses on their role as a door 
opener for a company without an extensive network. Cybernetica considered entering the 
Brazilian petroleum sector before being contacted by Innovasjon Norge, but still points to 
Innovasjon Norge’s role as an information provider. Recognizing that the costs for participating 
in the Navigator project is small compared to the cost of gathering the information, the company 
decided to join the Navigator project. Lastly, Norske Ventiler uses the market information 
provided by Innovasjon Norge and Intsok to evaluate the market potential in markets of interest. 
In addition to this, the company is the sole company to exploit a cluster membership for 
additional information and experiential knowledge – reducing the firm’s reliance on Innovasjon 
Norge for these aspects. The cluster meetings and network are exploited to get feedback on risk 
aspects and strategies that Norske Ventiler has evaluated – a trait Innovasjon Norge pulls 
forward as a historically important contribution from the Navigator projects to the participating 
firms.  
4: Third party input is of high importance in the risk identification phase, both to fill own 
knowledge-gaps and to confirm managerial perceptions 
A21-27 Brazil is a country that we have studied a little, and we had some contacts before the Navigator project 
contacted us. However, we regarded the participation as a way of performing much of the necessary 
knowledge gathering – which we would have to do regardless – for a limited cost. 
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A22-09 We use the NCE subsea for cluster meetings and relationship building. Even if we have decided upon a 
strategy, it is very comfortable to get feedback from people that have done what you want to do, or have 
successively established elsewhere. To get a confirmation that what you do seems somewhat right. 
A22-11 I usually say that there is nothing as underrated as good relationships. Being a cluster member, meeting 
firms you can identify yourself and your product with – it is usually free, and far preferable to paying for 
consultants that will tell you whatever you want to hear without much substance. 
A22-17 After internal discussions of the possibility to enter Brazil, we did an evaluation of the Brazilian valve 
market using number from Innovasjon Norge and Intsok. It gave us a firm understanding of opportunities 
in this market for the next 10-15 years, and we evaluated the possibilities for establishing contacts via 
Innovasjon Norge, Intsok or other government entities. 
A13-17 We use both internal and external sources to identify risk factors. The commitment of Innovasjon Norge 
has been very positive; they offer a huge commitment and a short response time. 
A13-22 We had not evaluated neither Brazil nor internationalization in general when Innovasjon Norge invited us 
to join the Navigator project. We were uncertain in the beginning - thinking that we still had much undone 
in the home marked – but decided to join based on a feeling that we could always pull out of the project. 
However, we have received much information during the project breaching barriers and mental barriers – 
so it’s really the process that makes us certain there is a potential that we want to spent time and resources 
on.  
A23-05 We work a twofold strategy on the importation problem. Through Innovasjon Norge we try to get in 
contact with agents or companies in the business of facilitating importation to Brazil. At home we contact 
actors that have experience from transport and logistics in the offshore industry – actors that are 
established in Brazil and know the system from their side.  
A23-27 Innovasjon Norge has an extensive network. They know who to go to, and then we can talk further with 
these contacts. It has been of great help. 
A14-15 MacArtney has been in Brazil for about three years, but it was not straight forward for them – I think they 
stumbled a bit in the beginning. (…) 
A14-17 They say that you have to have Brazilian content in Brazil, or pay full import fees – and that it is very 
expensive to get things into the country (…) 
A24-19 We would never have been in the position we are in today with regard to Brazil had it not been for the 
request from Innovasjon Norge. They have been an important door opener for us, and efforts like the 
Navigator program is very useful for smaller firms that cannot bear the cost of making such efforts alone. 
Table 12 - A-Categories: Third party input in risk identification process 
5.1.5 Formal Risk Models are Not Used in the Risk Identification 
Process 
None of the case companies employs any formal risk assessment models in the risk identification 
process, although one of the companies uses a business model framework to simulate how 
different business models would be organized in the Brazilian market – facilitating the 
identification of risk factors. The remaining companies do not find it worthwhile to apply any 
specific framework for identifying risk factors, and largely identify risk factors based on their 
potential costs.  
SafeClean is the company with the most formal risk identification process, employing a model for 
mapping a business model that is used to simulate different business models applicable to a 
Brazilian entry. Through these simulations the company gets an overview of all the components 
necessary to operate in the market with the given business model – thus facilitating the 
identification of risk factors. Although the use of the business model framework facilitates the 
risk identification process of SafeClean, the differences in the number of identified risk factors 
(Appendix 11.8) cannot be explained solely by use of a business model framework. Sperre 
focuses mainly on technological risk, while Cybernetica focuses on identifying risks related to 
cooperation with Petrobras. Consequently, there is no clear evidence suggesting that the business 
model framework has helped SafeClean identify more risk factors than the other companies. 
Both Norske Ventiler and Cybernetica emphasize that they do not see the need of any formal 
models for risk identification, and both companies rather rely on cost estimates that are 
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compared to the firms’ ability to handle a potential loss. The manager of Norske Ventiler 
emphasizes that it is not possible to evaluate all risk factors, and that the final decision eventually 
relies on a gut feeling and general belief in the project. The manager of Cybernetica is less 
inclined to trust gut feeling, but believes evaluation of projects against the firm’s business plan, a 
criterion of positive budget balance and organizational routines makes the potential losses of a 
project endurable. The company also assesses a sub-set of risk factors, as only risk factors directly 
linked to a research cooperation with Petrobras are found relevant, and emphasize the need for a 
more thorough risk assessment if larger commitments are made – a sentiment shared by 
SafeClean. Lastly, Sperre is most focused on technical aspects of risk, performing a technical risk 
assessment prior to foreign assignments and using a quality system to add experiential data from 
tendering processes.  
5: Normal reasoning, assumptions and gut feelings replace formal risk models 
A11-21 We evaluate risk based on two aspects; our long-term strategy and a criterion of always budgeting with 
positive returns 
A11-28 We do not feel a need for using formal fault-tree analysis or statistical tools for evaluating the risk. We have 
built organizational structures for risk reduction including a quality system, contract templates that have 
been developed with lawyers, a strict employment process and a business culture of responsibility and 
accountability. 
A11-29 If we do not get anything out of this, what is the cost? The risk relied to a financial loss. The other big risk 
factor is the consequences, losses and law suits if we could face if we get a later implementation and fail – 
the liability for damages. We did not evaluate this last risk in any detail, but would we traditionally use 
lawyers and insurance agents to make sure we are covered if anything goes wrong.” 
A12-11 We have not done anything to map the competitive climate in Brazil, although we expect Brazil in 5 years 
to be similar to the Gulf of Mexico – every valve producer and trader will be present 
A12-12 We have not used ant formal methods to evaluate risk, except what you might call normal reasoning; if you 
need an organization of 10 employees in Brazil, you need wages, office rent – you can use the 
multiplication table to find the exposure. Then you have to be able to relate this to your cost limit, and be 
very certain that you have a volume that can cover and defend such an investment. 
A22-08 In the end, the choice of an agent is strongly correlated to gut feeling. In addition to traits that can be 
documented and information from third parties, the gut feeling is important; does it work, is there 
chemistry, are they ready to pull up their sleeves for us. 
A22-10 You can analyze yourself to death. In the end, it gets down to whether you believe in it, if the organization 
believes in it, and if there is any substance to it 
A13-05 We have used Alex Osterwalder’s model to evaluate three different business models; a franchise, use of an 
agent and establishing and establishing a Brazilian entity. In a workshop, several employees have simulated 
the business models based on the currently available information. 
A13-07 We try to uncover what is different between the Norwegian and Brazilian market. The customer challenges 
are exactly the same, but doing business down there is completely different. 
A23-10 Up until now we have not done any formal evaluation of risk – it might not be according to the text books 
– but you get a picture of it in the process. This said, we have to go through more formal processes to draw 
up the risk. Up until now, we have not done any formal evaluations, except the continuous evaluation of 
individual risk factors. 
A14-20 We have not evaluated business risk up until now, but when we lose a tendering process we always ask why 
we did not succeed an put this into our quality system 
A14-21 When we do routine assignments in the Norwegian market we have not specified any specific requirements 
with regards to risk, but in relation to foreign assignments we always perform a risk assessment prior to the 
job. 
Table 13 - A-Categories: Use of risk models in the risk identification process 
5.2 Risk Evaluation 
The risk evaluation phase is found to be significantly influenced by firms’ previous experience, 
which affects how risk is evaluated and the perceived importance of a few, key risk factors. Risk 
is evaluated against a risk tolerance frontier, while potential gains of the internationalization 
process are evaluated in terms of the strategic fit to the Brazilian market. There seems to be a lack 
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of relevant information related to the firms’ competitive environment, and some firms make 
efforts to acquire extra information.  
 
B-Categories – Risk Evaluation 
1 Evaluation of risk factors is strongly influenced by managerial experience and firm characteristics 
2 Risk factors are evaluated against a risk tolerance frontier, where the total commitment is evaluated in monetary 
terms. 
3 Several distinct risk factors are recognized, but attention is put on a few critical factors 
4 A lack of relevant information on the firm’s competitive environment in Brazil affects risk evaluation 
Table 14 - B-Categories for the risk evaluation process 
5.2.1 Evaluation of Risk Factors is Strongly Influenced by Managerial 
Experience and Firm Characteristics 
Evaluation of risk factors is found to be strongly influenced by managerial factors and 
characteristics of the case firms. The potential effect of risk factors is generally evaluated on the 
basis of managerial experience and business practices from the firms’ markets. The degree to 
which firms have experience relevant to the risks of Brazilian market entry seems to affect both 
how thoroughly risk factors are evaluated and the level of risk they pose. This is especially 
evident in the firms’ evaluation of risk associated with cross-cultural factors and corruption, 
which receives a more thorough treatment by SafeClean - the firm with the least international 
experience. 
Norske Ventiler possesses considerable international experience, which the management team 
has gained both from Norske Ventiler’s activities and from past work. As previously discussed, 
this experience is of decisive importance when the manager of Norske Ventiler states that risks 
related to cultural differences only require limited analysis and attention. Cybernetica takes a 
position close to Norske Ventiler, realizing that Brazil is a hard country to do business in, but 
only paying lip service to cross-cultural risk. Cybernetica has made all previous international sales 
and projects from its base in Norway, seemingly without experiencing difficulties related to 
cultural distance – which might explain why this is not brought up as a likely problem in the 
Brazil market entry. In addition to the influence from experience, the apparent lack of focus can 
be attributed to the fact that Cybernetica and Petrobras have been in a research project dialogue 
for several years – making them well known to each other. 
Sperre’s manager displays greater awareness of cross-cultural risk, stating that an understanding 
of how Brazilians conduct business can only be gained by working alongside Brazilians. 
However, the firm does not seem to regard cultural risk as something that must be dealt with 
prior to market entry. The company has made several international sales without experiencing 
problems related to cultural risk, notably in Russia. Further, by using the Brazilian subsidiary of 
MacArtney as a sales agent in Brazil, Sperre will have a limited exposure to cultural differences. 
The combination of some international experience and plans of selling ROVs through an agent 
seems to have a moderating effect on perceived cultural risk for Sperre.  
SafeClean’s lack of international experience – the management team has no previous 
international experience, and the firm has no history of international activities - seems to have an 
effect in the perceived level of cultural risk. While SafeClean has not yet encountered any 
problems in their interactions with Brazilian actors, there is an anticipation of challenges related 
to differences in the Brazilian and Norwegian way of doing business. Specifically, the firm has 
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identified employee loyalty as a potential risk of using local staff. The managers of SafeClean 
regard loyal, experienced employees as important to the quality of the services they provide and 
fear that Brazilian workers will not be as loyal as their current employees. As the firm has no 
experience from managing employees across countries, the newness of the situation increases the 
associated risk. 
The evaluation of corruption risk seems to follow a pattern consistent with the case firms’ 
assessment of cultural risk factors. While Norske Ventiler and Cybernetica do not signal any 
concern over corruption risk, Sperre displays awareness over the issue but seems to consider it as 
something that must be dealt with if it arises, while SafeClean expects to be exposed to 
corruption and identifies it as an issue that requires attention. As such, the case firms’ consistently 
different evaluation of cross-cultural risk and corruption risk supports the impression that firms’ 
organizational culture and personal experience of the decision-maker to a great extent determines 
how these factors are evaluated.  
1: Evaluation of risk factors is strongly influenced by managerial experience and firm 
characteristics  
Cross-cultural factors 
A11-18 The risk of entering Brazil is large. It is a hard country to do business in – compared to the other markets 
we are in – and we also skip several steps. We “should” have started with the home market, getting as far as 
we could there before taking on the North Sea Basin. 
A21-02 The reason we chose to enter Brazil is a belief that it might be easier there – that they are more interested 
as they have a different perspective than the actors in the North Sea. 
A22-15 I have travelled the world, and have a very relaxed attitude towards cultural differences. There are cultural 
differences, but then again; smile to the world and the world will smile back. There is a lot of literature out 
there, but I have a very relaxed attitude towards it. 
A13-07 We try to uncover what is different between the Norwegian and Brazilian market. The customer challenges 
are exactly the same, but doing business down there is completely different. 
A13-12 In Norway we have enjoyed loyal employees that have acquired good experience. A question in Brazil is 
whether the workforce will be equally loyal – an important factor with regards to the services we deliver. 
A24-02 We have been selling to Russia. While many ask us how we dare to do it, and how we do it, we have not 
really experienced any problems there. 
A24-10 I think we are dependent on finding a Brazilian partner, to really understand how the Brazilian are 
behaving – it is quite different how business is done there compared to at home. 
Corruption 
A13-10 We are more or less not exposed to cultural differences, corruption and bribes at home. Down there you 
will be exposed automatically, so you will have to think this through before you go. 
A24-15 (…) With regard to corruption, it seems like they have managed to come a long way. (…) 
Table 15 - A-Categories: Influences in the risk evaluation process 
5.2.2 Risk Factors are Evaluated Against a Risk Tolerance Frontier, 
Where the Total Commitment is Evaluated in Monetary Terms  
The case firms evaluate risk factors against a risk tolerance frontier determined by the perceived 
level of uncertainty in the internationalization process. This is done by balancing the commitment 
to the market entry – in the form of financial and human resources – against the prospects of 
getting a return in the form of sales in the Brazilian market. The case firms have a high level of 
uncertainty tied to if and when such sales will occur as they are in an early phase of the 
internationalization process; Cybernetica and SafeClean have not made any sales in the Brazilian 
market, and Norske Ventiler and Sperre have only sold through middlemen. This income stream 
uncertainty reduces the risk tolerance frontier of the case firms, and while firms confident with 
the sales outlook in the Brazilian market are willing to make greater commitments, resource 
commitments are still kept at the minimum required level. 
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The risk the firms take is evaluated in monetary terms – man hours, travelling expenses and the 
participation fee of the Navigator project. While the costs of participation in the Navigator-
program are below the risk tolerance frontier of all firms, establishing an office in Brazil seems to 
be above the risk tolerance frontier of Cybernetica, Norske Ventiler and Sperre. Sperre plainly 
states that they are too small to establish a sales office in Brazil on their own. Cybernetica and 
Norske Ventiler finds the costs of local investments and human resources spent on governance 
too high. Only SafeClean is currently open to establishing a Brazilian entity as a possible entry 
mode, but it still depends on the level of market interest after a pilot project.   
The resource commitment the firms are willing to make to the Brazilian market entry seems to be 
related to their assessment of chances to make sales relatively quickly. All case companies are 
reluctant to increase their commitment to the Brazilian market until they are more certain that 
they will get a return on the resources spent. As firms get closer to making a sale, they are willing 
to commit more resources. Cybernetica offers a relevant example by keeping resource 
commitment to a minimum until the firm was closer to reaching a research project agreement 
with Petrobras. After positive signals from Petrobras, Cybernetica was willing to allocate 
resources to an IRD jointly funded with Innovasjon Norge, as it found the chances of making a 
subsequent sale to Petrobras sufficiently high. Another example of this is how Norske Ventiler 
states that very certain estimates are required on expected sales volumes before commitment on 
the scale of establishing a Brazilian subsidiary will be made.  
2: Risk factors are evaluated against a risk tolerance frontier, where the total commitment is 
evaluated in monetary terms. 
A11-11 It is very complicating for a small firm like us to establish in an expensive place like Rio, with a single 
customer and time-consuming establishment processes. 
A11-16 The longer we do this without getting return on investment, the harder it will be for us to continue. Just 
counting hours, it gets quite expensive before we get any return. 
A21-28 We were skeptical towards an IRD agreement, but this eventually became the solution. I felt that 
Innovasjon Norge marketed the IRD solution in a way that blocked any chance of getting a real project in 
place. (…) an IRD agreement can be a natural first step due to Petrobras’ circumstantial bureaucracy – 
with an IRD agreement we choose a path with much less bureaucracy. 
A12-08 The largest risk if you establish a subsidiary in Brazil is the risk of losing money. A worker in Brazil is 
equally expensive as a Norwegian. Brazil is an industrialized country with regards to costs. 
A12-09 To establish an office in Brazil, with regards to our size, is not something I think is wise. It will imply a 
very high risk, so you will need very certain estimates on expected sales volumes. 
A22-12 We have kept a low profile, we have visited Brazil twice and talked to potential customers, but not made 
any commitments besides answering potential requests for quotations. 
A22-18 Opening an office in Brazil is not something that we plan to do at this stage – I think it is too resource 
demanding and that we are too small. But that may change in 5-10 years’ time. 
A13-05 We have used Alex Osterwalder’s model to evaluate three different business models; a franchise, use of an 
agent, and establishing a Brazilian entity. In a workshop, several employees have simulated the business 
models based on the currently available information. 
A23-26 We have a goal is that in the next 6-12 months, we will do a pilot project in Brazil, where we bring all 
resources from Norway. Our hope is that the customer will be so interested in our services that it opens up 
for further expansion 
A14-10 We are far too small to establish a sales office, or a subsidiary in Brazil. 
A24-05 It would be nice to figure out what our competitors think about Brazil. But it is really kind of like the 80s 
at home [the North Sea], so we have a good chance of succeeding if we get MacArtney interested in 
pushing our products. 
Table 16 - A-Categories: How risk factors are assessed in the risk evaluation process 
  Empirical data analysis 
72 
 
5.2.3 Risk Exposure is Determined by an Overall Evaluation of Risk 
Components, Resulting in Focus on a Few, Key Risk Factors. 
The identification phase left the case firms with a number of risk factors that were considered 
important; all firms found local content requirements, cultural distance, competitive uncertainties, 
uncertainties related to newness, inexperience, firm size and foreignness, and psychic distance to 
be important sources of risk. Despite similar cognitive risk maps across the sample (Appendix 
11.8), the importance of the individual risk factors is evaluated differently. While firms initially 
assess the potential risks of a wide range of factors, they narrow their focus towards the factors 
found to cause greatest risk in the evaluation process. This reductionist process is illustrated in 
the fact that all risk factors are evaluated by at least one of the case firms, bit no single firm is 
found to do an evaluation of all factors.  
Several case companies emphasize the need to remove less important factors in the risk 
evaluation process. As previously discussed, Norske Ventiler’s manager is most direct, stating that 
not all factors can be evaluated and that a final decision eventually relies partly on gut feeling. 
Although Cybernetica’s manager does not emphasize an importance of gut feeling, also he 
recognize that not all factors can be evaluated – feeling the need to peel away aspects that could 
otherwise be investigated when an employee quit. As a consequence of the perceived inability of 
evaluating all factors, the firms only focus on risk factors directly related to the pursued entry 
strategies; a research project and direct exports from Norway. 
Sperre does not explicitly state an inability to evaluate all risk factors. Nevertheless, the company 
focuses mainly on technical risk factors. This is evident in statements from the firm 
acknowledging several risk factors that have not been evaluated thoroughly; the 
acknowledgement that more knowledge of competitor actions would be beneficial, and 
indications of a complicated legal system compared to other markets. It is therefore clear that 
also Sperre prioritizes which risk factors are being evaluated, thereby reducing the number of 
risks brought from the identification phase to the evaluation phase. 
The only company breaching this pattern is SafeClean, which emphasizes the need to identify and 
evaluate each single risk factor on a continuous basis. As evident in previous discussions, the 
company several times distinguishes itself by doing the most thorough evaluation of individual 
risk factors. However, SafeClean is also the only firm that has not chosen an entry strategy for 
the Brazilian market – the firm still evaluates three different entry strategies – which implies a 
need to evaluate a larger set of risk factors than firms having settled on a single entry strategy. 
3: Several distinct risk factors are recognized, but attention is put on a few critical factors 
A11-21 We evaluate the risk based on two aspects; our long-term strategy and a criterion of always budgeting with 
positive returns. 
A11-22 Our long term strategy is to run the operations from our Trondheim office as long as possible. Establishing 
offices in other locations increases both risk and cost. 
A11-24 We evaluate all risk on the basis that we will operate all projects from Norway and not establish any 
presence in Brazil. Then the local content requirements – which seem to be designed to hinder just that – 
are a challenge. 
A11-27 Steinar had time to work with these issues, but without him the pot of available resources is smaller. 
Consequently we have to peel away aspects that could be interesting to evaluate, and focus on one thing; 
getting a project with Petrobras (…) 
 
Empirical data analysis 
73 
A12-13 We do not really see any risk factors related to the Brazilian market entry as long as we stick to the known 
customer constellation. These are customers we have served for a number of years, and we assume that 
their Brazilian subsidiaries have the same internal procedures as their Norwegian offices. 
A12-14 Our resource base limits how thoroughly we can investigate the Brazilian market. We do not have an 
abundance of resources, and this is also a reason for the strategy we have chosen in Brazil. 
A22-10 You can analyze yourself to death, both considering costs and possible scenarios. However, in the end it 
balances on whether you really believe in it, if the organization believes in it, and if there is any substance to 
it. 
A22-26 When we started the Navigator project, we had a much broader set of possible strategies for handling the 
Brazilian market. However, after getting more knowledge of the market, and taking our resources into 
account, we landed on a strategy of focusing on our Norwegian customers established in Brazil 
A22-27 When we chose to focus on the Norwegian customer entities in Brazil, which after all covers 60-70 % of 
the market, the whole strategy became significantly easier. We did not have to consider distributors, agents, 
or an eventual establishment – making the strategy less resource and cost demanding than the original 
alternatives. 
A13-16 There are many elements of risk; leakage of technology, economic impact, damage to the firm’s reputation 
– and many factors to evaluate. 
A23-19 Things we consider in the evaluation phase include cost structure, when we will generate income, building 
customer relations, and sales channels… - All this is constantly evaluated. 
A23-25 Risk in the expansion process is a crucial factor; we basically cannot afford to fail. It is vital to draw an 
overall risk picture, and evaluate each single element.  
A24-05 It would be nice to figure out what our competitors think about Brazil. But it is really kind of like the 80s at 
home [the North Sea], so we have a good chance of succeeding if we get MacArtney interested in pushing 
our products. 
A24-07 We have focused more on quality assurance lately; that we double check and routinely go over the 
equipment and components several times. 
A24-15 When it gets to Brazil, I think we will succeed if we manage to get some sales and a good reputation. With 
regard to corruption, it seems like they have managed to come a long way. However, I think the laws down 
there are a bit more complicated than in Russia. 
Table 17 - A-Categories: Attention on key risk factors in the risk evaluation process 
5.2.4 Availability of Relevant Information on the Firms’ Competitive 
Environment Affects Risk Evaluation 
All of the case firms had difficulties finding information that could provide insights in the 
competitive environment in their particular segment. This is largely due to the case firms’ size and 
niche positioning. While information on investment outlooks and expected trends in the 
Brazilian petroleum sector is readily available from a large number of consultancies and banks, 
micro-level information on a single firm’s potential customers, partners and competitors is not. 
The lack of relevant micro-level information complicates the assessment of the potential effects 
of various risk factors. More intimate market knowledge would make it easier for the case firms 
to separate relevant from irrelevant factors, and allow the firms to make a more accurate risk 
assessment. However, careful market research takes time and comes at a cost, and the case firms 
display a differing need for detailed market information; the company with the least international 
experience seems to have the greatest difficulties overcoming the challenges related to limited 
available information. 
 SafeClean expresses the greatest need for detailed market knowledge. The firm describes how it 
continuously makes changes and adjustments as more information is gained throughout the risk 
assessment process, and stresses that gathering information is critical to accurate risk assessment. 
The high perceived need for market information made SafeClean take a second trip to Brazil 
outside the Navigator program to gather information on the expected market demand. Norske 
Ventiler displays a highly different perspective to risk evaluation than SafeClean, and does not 
seem to have any difficulties with gathering necessary information prior to market entry. The firm 
  Empirical data analysis 
74 
 
uses macro level indicators such as the oil price and long term investment plans to assess the 
Brazilian market, and uses the firms in the maritime cluster to get feedback and confirmation 
regarding strategies and market assessments. Like Norske Ventiler, Sperre seems comfortable 
with gathering macro-level information. In evaluating the market potential in Brazil, general 
market trends are emphasized, e.g. by comparing the Brazilian petroleum market to the North 
Sea in the 1980s - a period of significant growth. Cybernetica seems to have a greater need for 
detailed market information, as the company has had difficulties evaluating whether the Brazilian 
process modelling company TriSolutions is a potential partner or competitor. In contrast to 
SafeClean, Cybernetica has not made extra efforts to gain further information on the topics 
which they find they have insufficient information on, thus accepting a certain level of 
uncertainty.   
As in the identification process, Innovasjon Norge is an important information contributor to the 
firms – providing both relevant information to the case companies, and important referrals. The 
case companies that apparently have the greatest need for support by Innovasjon Norge in the 
risk assessment process are Sperre and SafeClean. Both companies emphasizes that they would 
not have managed a Brazilian expansion without the facilitation from Innovasjon Norge. While 
Sperre focuses on how Innovasjon Norge reduced the need for the pressure on smaller 
companies’ resource base, SafeClean emphasizes the important barriers the organization helps 
remove.  
4: A lack of relevant information on the firm’s competitive environment in Brazil affects risk 
evaluation 
A21-03 We are not sure whether Tri-Solutions is a direct competitor to us, or if they try to compete against ABB 
and Hannibal – it is a bit hard to evaluate based on the information we have today. 
A12-11 We have not done anything to map the competitive climate in Brazil. But if you look at the Gulf of 
Mexico, Brazil will probably look like that in about 5 years (…). 
A22-03 As long as more oil is consumed than produced globally, a decrease in the oil price is unlikely. With an oil 
price at the current level, most of the projects considered by the large operators will offer attractive returns 
on investment – thus ensuring a high level of activity. 
A22-14 We follow the activity level in the general oil market (…) 
A22-17 After internal discussions of the possibility to enter Brazil, we did an evaluation of the Brazilian valve 
market using number from Innovasjon Norge and Intsok. It gave us a firm understanding of opportunities 
in this market for the next 10-15 years, and we evaluated the possibilities for establishing contacts via 
Innovasjon Norge, Intsok or other government entities. 
A22-24 I think any competitors to our subsea valves in Brazil lies far ahead in time. There are large costs related to 
product development, and it is time consuming as well, so it will take years before other actors enter the 
Brazilian market offering similar products. 
A13-22 We had not evaluated neither Brazil nor internationalization in general when Innovasjon Norge invited us 
to join the Navigator project. We were uncertain in the beginning - thinking that we still had much undone 
in the home marked – but decided to join based on a feeling that we could always pull out of the project. 
However, we have received much information during the project breaching barriers and mental barriers – 
so it’s really the process that makes us certain there is a potential that we want to spent time and resources 
on. 
A23-01 The background for the second Brazil trip was a feeling that we lacked important information about our 
products’ attractiveness in the Brazilian market. This made it difficult to sort out the right strategies for 
market entry. It was not beneficial to use time and resources on planning before this question was 
answered. 
A23-02 Based on the information we have, we have made some drafts. We then have to get back to this as more 
information is available; make changes, adjustments until we reach a point where we can take the decision 
A23-12 The most important element when it comes to balance, or manage the risk is to gather as much 
information as possible. It is by no means insurmountable, but as it is new, it is important to get necessary 
information in order to understand how it works. 
 
Empirical data analysis 
75 
A23-27 Innovasjon Norge has an extensive network. They know who to go to, and then we can talk further with 
those contacts. It has been of great help. 
A24-05 It would be nice to figure out what our competitors think about Brazil. But it is really kind of like the 80s at 
home [the North Sea], so we have a good chance of succeeding if we get MacArtney interested in pushing 
our products. 
A24-19 We would never have been in the position we are in today with regards to Brazil had it not been for the 
request from Innovasjon Norge. They have been an important door opener for us, and efforts like the 
Navigator program is very useful for smaller firms that cannot bear the cost of making such efforts alone. 
Table 18 - A-Categories: Amount of information in the risk evaluation process 
5.3 Risk Mitigation 
Following the risk identification and evaluation phases, the case firms employ a number of risk 
mitigation strategies in order to deal with various risk factors. Risk reduction is the dominating 
risk mitigation strategy, and only one of the case firms is found to use a risk sharing strategy for 
entering the Brazilian market. Two of the case firms reduce response uncertainty through 
information acquisition and boundary spanning activities, but from a different starting point. One 
of the firms seeks to gain knowledge on topics where the management team lacks experience, 
while the other, more experienced firm uses information acquisition and boundary spanning 
activities to reaffirm risk assessments. Last, the case firms experience significant uncertainty 
related to the market entry, and as a response pursue a minimum resource commitment entry 
strategy.  
B-Categories – Risk Mitigation 
1 Firms will use four distinct management strategies to mitigate risk 
2 Some firms engage in information acquisition and boundary spanning activities to gather relevant information 
3 The firm’s market commitment and sales strategy is a result of firm factors and the perceived level of risk 
Table 19 - B-Categories for risk mitigation 
5.3.1 Firms Use Four Distinct Risk Management Strategies 
The risk mitigation strategies employed by the case firms fall into the four categories outlined in 
the theoretical background; risk rejection, risk sharing, risk reduction and control, and risk 
acceptance. In general, the selection of risk mitigation strategy is made by considering the 
benefits and risks of making a resource commitment. The risk mitigation strategy that likely will 
give the greatest benefits is selected, meaning that strategies involving a high level of uncertainty 
must yield the most substantial benefits. We find most evidence of risk reduction efforts, and the 
least focus on risk acceptance. However, the lack of focus on risk acceptance might be caused by 
a tendency of focusing on factors that pose a challenge - choosing to accept the risks involved 
with pursuing a particular strategy does not invite to lengthy reflection.  
By participating in the Navigator program all firms implicitly accept a certain level of risk, as 
continued participation is resource consuming. From the A-categories it is clear that all 
companies have accepted some of the risk associated with an attempt to penetrate the Brazilian 
market. Generally, the case firms find risk factors that are familiar from the home market to be 
acceptable, as they do not contribute to increasing the uncertainty of Brazilian entry. This is 
evident when considering how Norske Ventiler and Sperre find familiar sales setups to be risk 
reducing factors – making the risk easier to accept. As previously discussed, Cybernetica evaluates 
fewer risk factors than SafeClean (Appendix 11.8). This trait can be explained by Cybernetica’s 
acceptance of the overall risk level of the expansion project; the company knows that it will not 
affect their other operations.  
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1: Firms will use four distinct management strategies to mitigate risk 
Risk acceptance 
A21-02 The reason we chose to enter Brazil is a belief that it might be easier there – that they are more interested 
as they have a different perspective than the actors in the North Sea. 
A12-13 We do not really see any risk factors related to the Brazilian market entry as long as we stick to the known 
customer constellation. These are customers we have served for a number of years, and we assume that 
their Brazilian subsidiaries have the same internal procedures as their Norwegian offices. 
A22-25 Selling valves for use in Brazil through the large engineering companies makes it just like any other sale. 
This simplifies the process, and we avoid complicating the process through having to consider all criteria 
related to other entry forms. 
A23-26 We have a goal is that in the next 6-12 months, we will do a pilot project in Brazil, where we bring all 
resources from Norway. Our hope is that the customer will be so interested in our services that it opens up 
for further expansion 
A14-05 We could have stayed in Norway, selling two ROVs a year and surviving on this and maintenance, but we 
have higher ambitions. We realize we might be a competitor to the larger actors, but we hang in there. 
A24-15 When it gets to Brazil, I think we will succeed if we manage to get some sales and a good reputation. With 
regard to corruption, it seems like they have managed to come a long way. However, I think the laws down 
there are a bit more complicated than in Russia. 
Table 20 - A categories: Use of risk acceptance in the risk mitigation process 
The case firms all reject the risk of establishing a subsidiary in Brazil as their initial entry mode, 
both due to the substantial costs involved and uncertain return. Cybernetica and Sperre attribute 
this is to firm size, while Norske Ventiler and SafeClean do not rule out establishing a subsidiary 
in Brazil in the future. For Norske Ventiler and SafeClean, the uncertainty related to the market 
demand in Brazil seems to be the main reasons for rejecting FDI as entry mode, and this 
uncertainty is likely to be reduced post entry. As such, risks that are rejected under the current 
conditions might be accepted as the firms gain experience in Brazil. 
1: Firms will use four distinct risk management  strategies to mitigate risk 
Risk rejection 
A11-11 It is very complicating for a small firm like us to establish in an expensive place like Rio, with a single 
customer and time-consuming establishment processes. 
A22-18 Opening an office in Brazil is not something that we plan to do at this stage – I think it is too resource 
demanding and that we are too small. But that may change in 5-10 years’ time. 
A13-06 The size of our wallets is another reason that we cannot take any decision with the current information. We 
cannot risk locking up 5-10 million without a certain payback 
A14-10 We are far too small to establish a sales office, or a subsidiary in Brazil. 
Table 21 - A categories: Use of risk rejection in the risk mitigation process 
Sperre is the only firm planning to sell through a partner with offices in Brazil, seeking to reduce 
the complexity of operating in the Brazilian market by relying on MacArtney as their agent - in 
effect a risk sharing strategy. Cybernetica considered forming an alliance with the local firm 
TriSolutions, but found that such a partnership would yield few benefits and pose greater risk 
than going directly or a partnership with Petrobras. 
1: Firms will use four distinct risk management strategies to mitigate risk 
Risk sharing 
A21-24 We are ambivalent with regard to cooperation with Tri-Solutions. Petrobras asked us to contact them, and 
we did, but we have not heard anything from them after that. We feel that we have done our part, and will 
not do much unless Petrobras drags them to the table 
A24-03 Concerning service in Brazil, we are planning to train MacArtney in Brazil to be equally good as the boys in 
our repair shop. Maybe bring them to Norway for training, so that they can be around our boys. 
A24-04 We hope that Innovasjon Norge can open some doors for us, in order to get the first contacts. And then 
we will also have to work more with MacArtney, to convince them to be our dealer down there. 
Table 22 - A categories: Use of risk sharing in the risk mitigation process 
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None of the case firms are found to use control strategies, where the main objective is to utilize 
market power to control competitors. Rather, the case companies are concerned with how to 
minimize the risk of internationalization by keeping commitment to the Brazilian market at a 
minimum while at the same allocating sufficient resources to maintain progress, in effect risk 
reduction strategies.  
Minimization of risk while making sure that potential rewards are within reach is expected, 
rational firm behavior. However, the need for keeping rewards within reach means that the case 
companies have a varying degree of flexibility with regard to how much risk can be reduced - as 
product characteristics to some extent dictate the minimum resource commitment at market 
entry. Norske Ventiler and Sperre have the opportunity to reach the Brazilian market through 
intermediaries and choose to do so mainly because it is a low-commitment entry option where 
some risks of operating in Brazil are omitted. The sales strategies of SafeClean and Cybernetica, 
where pilot studies are intended to drum up market interest require the firms to make greater 
commitments and thus take greater risk.  
While the preceding discussion concerned risk reduction strategies for the overall level of risk 
associated with the Brazilian market entry, there is also evidence of risk reduction efforts targeted 
at specific risk factors. Again, the firms’ planned sales strategies are influential – although they are 
not the only factor at work. A clear example of the influence of sales strategies is how neither 
Norske Ventiler, nor Cybernetica will have to deal with distributors, agents or a sales subsidiary in 
the Brazilian market – making it unnecessary to reduce exposure to these risks for the firms. 
Sperre, which is exposed to the risk of dealing with an agent, tries to reduce this risk by following 
up MacArtney on a regularly basis.  
Another highly influential factor for the firms’ effort to reduce risk, is the perceived level of risk 
associated with a risk factor. Sperre, which considers technological failure as the most important 
risk factor, seeks to reduce risk by improving equipment quality and product documentation. 
SafeClean, exhibiting traits of risk aversion, experiences significant risk from a greater number of 
risk factors than the other case firms. Consequently, SafeClean seeks to mitigate a broader set of 
risk than the other firms. To address cultural distance, SafeClean is in the process of establishing 
organizational routines to increase awareness of cultural factors and corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). Further, planned interaction between Norwegian and Brazilians on 
assignments in Norway or Brazil is intended to help the organization gain insight into Brazilian 
business practices and later communicate more effectively with customers and partners in Brazil. 
Finally, the firms seek to reduce input uncertainty by simulating a delivery of chemicals from 
Norway to Brazil.  
Although Cybernetica plans to conduct a research project in Brazil, the company does not make 
efforts to address specific risk prior to market entry. Instead, the firm seeks to hinder risks 
factors from having a negative effect on the firm’s operations in the first place, and trusts that 
existing administrative routines such as using lawyers to review all contracts and make sure that 
insurance against claims for damages are valid for all operations that the firm conducts.   
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1: Firms will use four distinct risk management strategies to mitigate risk 
Risk reduction and control 
A21-18 We have not really made any large commitments yet. The only sunk cost is being a part of the Navigator 
project. Therefore we do not really run the risk of losing a lot of money backing out. And it will be like this 
until we have signed something. 
A22-05 Billing and delivering equipment to Norwegian subsidiaries of international EPC companies is risk free, 
and preferable to billing to an address in Angola 
A22-27 When we chose to focus on the Norwegian customers entities in Brazil, (…), the whole strategy became 
significantly easier. We did not have to consider distributors, agents, or an eventual establishment, making 
the strategy less resource and cost demanding than the original alternatives. 
A23-07 We try to increase the cultural consciousness of the firm, and also the corporate social responsibility 
awareness – especially concerning corruption and bribes. We are running a process there now, wanting to 
be up-front with regards to establishing routines and increase awareness concerning these problems. We 
believe this can have a preventive effect. 
A23-08 In a response to cultural differences, we have considered using Norwegian supervisors in a transition 
period, although the Brazilian’s will be running the operations in the long term. We have also though about 
doing it the other way around; bringing Brazilians with us on assignments in Norway. We are very 
conscious concerning this subject, then time will show if we were conscious enough. 
A23-09 We are very conscious about the limited negative feedback, and try to stimulate to questions to undercover 
underlying feelings. It is in these questions we feel there is a positive vibe towards the concept, and an 
interest. 
A24-06 (…) We have put a lot of effort into [product] documentation, and made a video film to illustrate the 
maintenance process – knowing that many people do not consult the manual before things go really wrong 
A24-07 We have focused more on quality assurance lately; that we double check and routinely go over the 
equipment and components several times. 
Table 23 - A categories: Use of risk reduction and control in the risk mitigation process 
5.3.2 Some Firms Engage in Information Acquisition and Boundary 
Spanning Activities to Gather Relevant Experience 
There is a need among the case firms to collect information in areas they find relevant to the 
Brazilian market entry where the case firms lack experience. The Navigator program seems to 
have been an important arena to share information and experiences for the case companies. 
However, two of the case firms have taken extra steps through information acquisition and 
boundary spanning activities beyond the scope of the program. Interestingly, it is the firms with 
the least and the most international experience that have conducted such activities.  
Norske Ventiler emphasizes the benefits of being able to discuss and get feedback on 
internationalization plans. The firm has done so through meetings in a cluster of local offshore 
firms, and regards this to be more useful input than what consultants might come up with. 
SafeClean stresses the need for collecting information prior to decision-making, and the firm has 
made greater information acquisition efforts than any of the other case firms, among other things 
by making an extra trip to Brazil and contacting logistics firms to identify bottlenecks in the 
importing process. The key difference between Norske Ventiler’s and SafeClean’s  information 
acquisition and boundary spanning activities is that Norske Ventiler uses cluster meetings to 
reaffirm an impressions or get feedback on selected strategies, while SafeClean collects 
information on areas in which the firm lacks experience. SafeClean has a higher perceived need 
for market information because the firm lacks international experience, and finds it necessary to 
allocate resources to fill these experience gaps.  
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2: Some firms engage in information acquisition and boundary spanning activities to 
gather relevant information 
A22-09 We use the NCE subsea for cluster meetings and relationship building. Even if we have decided upon a 
strategy, it is very comfortable to get feedback from people that have done what you want to do, or have 
successively established elsewhere. To get a confirmation that what you do seems somewhat right. 
A22-11 I usually say that there is nothing as underrated as good relationships. Being a cluster member, meeting 
firms you can identify yourself and your product with – it is usually free, and far preferable to paying for 
consultants that will tell you whatever you want to hear without much substance. 
A13-17 We use both internal and external sources to identify risk factors. The commitment of Innovasjon Norge 
has been very positive. (…) 
A23-01 The background for the second Brazil trip was a feeling that we lacked important information about our 
products’ attractiveness in the Brazilian market. This made it difficult to sort out the right strategies for 
market entry. It was not beneficial to use time and resources on planning before this question was 
answered. 
A23-03 We have to be careful, and then you will get to a point where you have to make a strategic decision – but 
the foundation for such a choice is not solid enough. 
A23-05 We work a twofold strategy on the importation problem. Through Innovasjon Norge we try to get in 
contact with agents or companies in the business of facilitating importation to Brazil. At home we contact 
actors that have experience from transport and logistics in the offshore industry – actors that are 
established in Brazil and know the system from their side.  
A23-12 The most important element when it comes to balance, or manage the risk is to gather as much 
information as possible. It is by no means insurmountable, but as it is new, it is important to get necessary 
information in order to understand how it works. 
Table 24 - A-Categories: Information gathering in the risk mitigation process 
5.3.3 The Firm’s Market Commitment and Sales Strategy is a Influenced 
by Firm Factors and the Perceived Level of Risk 
The perceived level of risk clearly influences the amount of resources committed to the Brazilian 
market entry, and the entry mode or sales strategy of the case firms. The inherent risk and 
income stream uncertainty makes the establishment of a subsidiary unrealistic for three out of 
four companies, and all companies have chosen a low commitment entry as their first sales 
strategy for the Brazilian market. A risk aversion is thus clearly present among the case firms – a 
risk aversion that is primarily related to the risk of financial loss in the case of failure to generate 
sales in Brazil.  
Neither Cybernetica, Norske Ventiler nor Sperre consider a Brazilian subsidiary to be a feasible 
option given their current resource situation – although Norske Ventiler does not disregard the 
possibility for establishing one at a later stage, given a more certain demand. SafeClean can be 
considered the exception in this case, but also this company is reluctant. The company 
emphasizes how the available financial resources impede any commitment decision before extra 
information is gathered and the product demand is more certain.  
All companies have chosen different entry modes for their Brazilian venture, but all entry modes 
can are characterized by low resource commitment. Norske Ventiler has chosen to serve the 
Brazilian market through direct exports as this is found to reduce the risk of market entry, and 
the company specifically targets the subsea valve segment in order to bypass local content 
regulations that might make a direct export sales strategy futile. Sperre does not finds the risk of 
selling to Brazil to be moderate, and this is probably because the company has not planned to 
invest in great resources in Brazil, instead choosing to let an agent to represent them in Brazil. 
Cybernetica has chosen a research project financed through an IRD agreement with Petrobras as 
their sales strategy, hoping that this project will eventually lead to a pilot project. Initially, 
Cybernetica hoped that Petrobras would fund the project, providing an opportunity of a very low 
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commitment entry. However, Petrobras was more interested in funding it through an IRD 
agreement between them, Cybernetica and the Norwegian government’s support programs. Due 
to a higher perceived risk in awaiting project approval thorough the hierarchical Petrobras system 
if the project was to be financed by Petrobras, Cybernetica eventually agreed to a higher 
commitment entry mode than initially wanted – as the IRD agreement meant company had to 
cover some of their own costs. Lastly, SafeClean is aiming for a pilot project within the next year 
to prove their technologies potential and attract potential customers. Although this commitment 
mode imposes higher cost on the company than some of the other companies’ entry modes, it is 
still a relatively low commitment sales strategy – especially compared to the other sales strategies 
considered by the company. 
3: The firm’s market commitment and sales strategy is a result of firm factors and the 
perceived level of risk 
A11-11 It is very complicating for a small firm like us to establish in an expensive place like Rio, with a single 
customer and time-consuming establishment processes. 
A11-16 The longer we do this without getting return on investment, the harder it will be for us to continue. Just 
counting hours, it gets quite expensive before we get any return. 
A11-18 The risk of entering Brazil is large. It is a hard country to do business in – compared to other markets we 
are in – and we also skip several steps. We “should” have started with the home market, getting as far as we 
could there before taking on the North Sea Basin. 
A21-02 The reason we chose to enter Brazil is a belief that it might be easier there – that they are more interested 
as they have a different perspective than the actors in the North Sea. 
A21-28 We were skeptical towards an IRD agreement, but this eventually became the solution. I felt that 
Innovasjon Norge marketed the IRD solution in a way that blocked any chance of getting a real project in 
place. I still think so, but have learnt that an IRD agreement can be a natural first step due to Petrobras’ 
circumstantial bureaucracy – with an IRD agreement we choose a path with much less bureaucracy. 
A12-09 To establish an office in Brazil, with regard to our size, is not something I think is wise. It will imply a very 
high risk, so you will need very certain estimates on expected sales volumes. 
A22-01 We believe the margins in the subsea market are more promising, and there are fewer players. This gives us 
more room than in the conventional valve market. 
A22-06 As it looks like now, with the local content restrictions, we will prioritize subsea valves in Brazil. There 
seems to be fewer challenges related to local content there than with the traditional valves. 
A22-13 If a large request is getting more likely, we have to put more into it. Up until now we have just used a 
limited amount on travel and to evaluate the market. If things develop we have to put more money into it, 
but we do it in that order.   
A22-26 When we started the Navigator project, we had a much broader set of possible strategies for handling the 
Brazilian market. However, after getting more knowledge of the market, and taking our resources into 
account, we landed on a strategy of focusing on our Norwegian customers established in Brazil. 
A13-06 The size of our wallets is another reason that we cannot take any decision with the current information. We 
cannot risk locking up 5-10 millions in a Brazilian expansion without a certain payback. 
A23-12 The most important element when it comes to balance, or manage the risk is to gather as much 
information as possible. It is by no means insurmountable, but as it is new, it is important to get necessary 
information in order to understand how it works. 
A23-25 Risk in the expansion process is a crucial factor; we basically cannot afford to fail. It is vital to draw the 
total risk image, to plot it, and to evaluate each single element. 
A23-26 We have a goal is that in the next 6-12 months, we will do a pilot project in Brazil, where we bring all 
resources from Norway. Our hope is that the customer will be so interested in our services that it opens up 
for further expansion 
A14-10 We are far too small to establish an sales office, or a subsidiary in Brazil. 
A14-11 We have not really identified any particular risks tied to the Brazilian expansion. In order to get the 
Brazilian content we can deliver the electronics, and they can weld and finish the assembly in Brazil - 
maybe even machine something. 
A24-21 We do not plan to invest much in Brazil, but we hope to train MacArtney technicians at our facilities so 
that maintenance of our ROVs can be done in Brazil 
Table 25 - A-Categories: Market commitment and perceived risk in the risk mitigation process 
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6 Discussion of Findings 
The case company presentations, the Brazilian background and the preceding case analysis serve 
as the context for a discussion of the case firms’ approach to risk based on the theoretical 
propositions.  Congruencies and discrepancies across the firm sample allows for discussion of the 
degree to which existing theory can explain the processes of identification, evaluation and 
mitigation of risk in the internationalization. The following discussion is structured in the 
tripartite structure used in the case analysis section. The theoretical propositions are discussed 
under separate headings, followed by a conclusion for each of the three sections that directly 
address the research questions.  
6.1 Risk Identification 
The risk identification discussion in the theoretical background provided several propositions 
regarding how the risk identification process would be performed, and what factors that would 
be influential towards the process. It was proposed that the level of firm resources would 
influence the risk identification process and that risk frameworks would help the firms identify 
relevant risk factors. Further, the level of perceived uncertainty was suggested to be firm 
dependent, and an important influence both with regard to the level of resources allocated to the 
risk identification process and the degree of process formality. Each of the propositions are 
discussed under a separate heading.  
6.1.1 Firm Resources 
“Firm resources will influence the risk identification phase, making resource strapped firms perform a constrained 
risk identification process” 
March and Shapira (1987) state that both firm resources and managers’ cognitive abilities are 
likely to affect the risk identification process, as a lack of either can increase the risk of 
overlooking relevant risk factors. Three out of four case firms recognize that their resource 
limitations make the risk identification process less systematic and less thorough. Norske Ventiler 
emphasizes that the resource base limits the thoroughness of the market evaluation. While 
Cybernetica also recognize the resource constraints limit the number of factors that can be 
evaluated, the firm does not believe the outcome of the risk identification process is significantly 
affected. In addition to acknowledging the effect of resource constraints, SafeClean sheds light 
on an interesting point; the available information is an important inhibitor in the risk 
identification process. The lack of information, or Brazilian market experience, makes it difficult 
to construct scenarios and implies a risk of conducting a scenario analysis that is irrelevant when 
new information becomes available. In the end, this is also a question of resources; the 
company’s limited resource base makes the firm wary of spending limited resources on 
something that might not be relevant at a later stage. Sperre does not recognize a large influence 
of resource constraints on the risk identification process, but emphasizes the importance of 
Innovasjon Norge to reduce the resource demands on small internationalizing firms – showing 
that also this company is in fact resource constrained in the internationalization process. 
Nevertheless, the resource base is given, and resource scarcity has not prevented early 
internationals from successful foreign market expansions. Hence, the firms must be aware of the 
danger of overlooking important factors, but more importantly adapt their risk assessment 
approach to their resource base.  This is something all firms seem to be doing, as all case firms 
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are considering a subset of possible entry strategies in the Brazilian market. Norske Ventiler 
specifically states that the resource base limits the number of available entry strategies, SafeClean 
has reduced the number of possible entry strategies to three, and Sperre and Cybernetica 
implicitly recognize this by considering a foreign subsidiary as unrealistic. This adjustment to firm 
resources, evaluating only a subset of entry strategies, yields a limited amount of factors to 
consider and can thus reduce the risk of overlooking factors.  
In conclusion, the risk identification process is noticeably affected by the resource limitations of 
the case firms, but the firms’ limited resource base is accepted rather than regarded as an obstacle 
for a successful foreign market expansion. A key influence resources have on the risk assessment 
process, is that only a subset of entry modes, mostly lower commitment entry modes, are 
regarded as realistic entry modes by the case firms. This is in line with suggestions both from 
gradual and early internationals perspectives. While the gradual international perspective 
attributes this to a lack of international experience and risk aversion, the early international 
perspective explains it as a way to overcome resource scarcity and handle risk. Both perspectives 
have obvious explanatory value; while SafeClean clearly stressed the lack of international 
experience and market knowledge as important, Norske Ventiler emphasizes that resource 
scarcity leads to fewer available entry strategies. Despite an ability to explain resource scarcity and 
risk handling, there is limited evidence of  the reliance on alliances suggested in the early 
international perspective. While several firms have evaluated the possibility of forming an 
alliance, only Sperre relies on an alliance when entering the Brazilian market.  
6.1.2 Use of a Risk Factor Framework 
“The use of a risk factor framework will help a firm identify relevant risk in an internationalization process” 
For three out of four firms, the Brazilian market entry is the first planned foreign market entry - 
Norske Ventiler being the exception with the firms’ planned entry into the Australian market. 
Both Cybernetica and Sperre have international customers, but these are a result of chance rather 
than planned expansion efforts toward a particular market. This makes the Brazilian 
internationalization effort the first planned foreign market entry for most case firms, and given 
the new situation there is not thoroughly prepared routines for how to handle an international 
expansion from the onset.  
None of the case companies use any of the risk frameworks presented in the theoretical 
background. When asked why no models are applied in the risk identification process, the case 
firm managers do not find the use of frameworks necessary and rather rely on cost estimates of 
to identify large risk factors. However, rather than relying on quantification of risk factors, such 
as the frameworks Cybernetica does not see the benefit of using, the frameworks presented in the 
theoretical background can highlight links between risk factors and firm performance (Baird & 
Thomas 1985; Miller 1992). Hence, we do not believe the disregard of the presented risk 
frameworks is a reflection of an evaluation of the appropriateness of the presented risk models, 
but a trait explained by the companies not being aware of their existence. This can be attributed 
to the position of risk models within international business research, as no single risk 
identification framework can be said to be universally accepted by researchers or practitioners 
(Bromiley, Miller & Rau 2005). Furthermore, risk frameworks need to be adapted to a firm’s 
unique situation (Oviatt, Shrader & McDougall 2004; Shrader, Oviatt & McDougall 2000), an 
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adaption that might require competence and specific experience that firms in their first 
internationalization effort might not have or will not allocate resources to. Last, the lack of 
empirical evidence supporting that use of risk frameworks will be beneficial to practitioners 
decreases the chance that firms actually aware of them will put them into use.  
Although none of the case firms use any of the risk frameworks presented in the theoretical 
background, SafeClean is diverging from the other case firms by applying Osterwalder's (2010) 
business model framework to evaluate risk factors related to the subset of entry modes 
considered. This model was introduced to the firms in the Navigator project, and the use seems 
to facilitate the risk identification process by making the entry strategies and involved processes 
more transparent – consequently making the risk factors tied to each business model easier to 
identify. Despite facilitating risk identification by helping the firm evaluate all components of 
their business model and adherent value chain, there is no indication that this use contributes to a 
significant increase in the number of identified risk factors.  
The fact that the business model framework does not contribute to an increased number of risk 
factors is not surprising, considering the intended purpose. However, a framework presenting 
risk factors of general validity could help inexperienced firms to identify risk factors relevant to 
their operations in a new market. Several of the case firms point toward Innovasjon Norge as a 
vital support in the process, making the prospect of a Brazilian market expansion far more 
attainable for the involved firms. As all the firms have similar cognitive risk maps, it is likely that 
Innovasjon Norge has influenced the risk identification process by pointing towards differences 
and possible pitfalls in the Navigator project. In the same manner that Innovasjon Norge has 
made it possible for the case firms to navigate the abundance of information, a framework of 
different generic risk factors could reduce the complexity of the information search for smaller 
firms with limited international experience. This can be of vital importance, as both SafeClean 
and Sperre emphasize that they would never have entered the Brazilian market without the 
support of Innovasjon Norge – they would not even have known where to start their analyses.  
In conclusion, it is clear that a formal risk framework is not applied in the risk identification 
process of the case firms. The reason for this seems to be a combination of an impression that 
formal risk models do not contribute valuable input to the process or is unnecessarily 
complicated to use, and the fact that the companies are unaware of the presented risk 
frameworks’ existence. The constrained risk evaluation process, where several firms only consider 
risk factors directly related to a chosen low commitment entry mode, implies that the use of a 
framework would not increase the number of evaluated risk factors. Nevertheless, the reliance on 
third party support in the process indicates a need for guidance in the internationalization process 
of SMEs with little international experience. As such, a risk factor framework might provide an 
important substitute, or complement, to governmental export programs for smaller, 
inexperienced firms.  
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6.1.3 Level of Perceived Uncertainty 
“The perceived level of uncertainty will be a function of firm and managerial experience, and a high level of 
uncertainty will increase the amount of resources spent on risk identification” 
Tversky and Kahneman (1986) introduce framing and priming as explanatory variables for the 
differences in the perception of choice problems.  Case firm findings suggest that framing – or 
what the case firms expect to find - clearly influences what risks are identified. There are two 
clear examples of this in the case firm material; how firms treat the subjects of local content 
demands and cultural differences. In both cases, the influence of experience on problem framing 
is obvious. 
While SafeClean and Sperre treat local content demands as a condition that needs to be satisfied, 
Norske Ventiler and Cybernetica hope to avoid the local content demands by claiming that they 
are the sole supplier of such products. This framing influences whether or not local content 
demands are treated as a risk factor. While experience related to production splitting makes 
SafeClean and Sperre treat local content demands as an opportunity - neither company associates 
the local content with higher risk or uncertainty – lack of the same experience, in addition to 
experience of being able to run operations from Norway, seems to make Norske Ventiler and 
Cybernetica consider local content requirements as a risk. Further, the lack of experience makes 
SafeClean regard cultural differences as a risk factor – leading the company to seek to mitigate 
the risk by gathering information and training employees in cultural awareness. In contrast, 
Norske Ventiler’s experience indicates that cultural distance is a risk factor that can be overcome 
by mutual adjustment.  
The clear link between framing and experience indicates that while one firm’s experience with a 
given situation makes the perceived uncertainty lower, the lack of experience with the same 
situation will make a firm perceive a higher level of uncertainty. As uncertainty is linked to risk, 
an increased uncertainty will make the perceived risk higher - as one firm might bluntly accept the 
risk, another company might see a need to mitigate or reject the same risk. This is in support of 
the suggested relation between international experience and perceived level of uncertainty in 
international business (Johanson & Vahlne 1977; Sambharya 1996). 
Milliken (1987) argues that the time and money allocated to the risk identification process is a 
function of the perceived state uncertainty of managers. A clear example of this is how 
SafeClean’s risk identification process differs from the risk identification process of Sperre. The 
two firms have very different perceptions of the risks involved with the Brazilian market entry, 
and as a consequence different approaches to the risk identification. SafeClean’s risk 
identification process is very thorough, with an apparent sense of a constant lack of information 
and postponement of the entry mode decision. The company therefore commits a considerable 
amount of time to make sure the scenarios used to identify risks are as close to reality as possible. 
Sperre on the other hand, focuses mainly on technical risk aspects, and already has implemented 
a quality assurance system where technical risk aspects identified in earlier assignments are 
addressed. Although they perform a risk assessment prior to a delivery to a foreign customer, the 
company uses considerably less resources in the risk identification phase than SafeClean.  
Despite support for Milliken’s suggestions in the case of SafeClean and Sperre we argue that, 
although the perceived level of state uncertainty influences the time and money allocated to the 
Discussion of Findings 
85 
process, a high perceived state uncertainty can also make the firms commit fewer resources to the 
risk identification phase. This is evident in the case of Norske Ventiler. While Norske Ventiler 
recognizes that more information could be gathered, the company emphasizes that although you 
can analyze yourself to death, the final decision rest on gut feeling and whether or not you believe 
in the project yourself. The risk of entering the Brazilian market through an agent or own 
subsidiary is regarded as high, and instead of using a considerable amount of time and resources 
evaluating a number of different entry modes, Norske Ventiler has decided to follow a familiar 
approach of selling directly to its customers’ Norwegian subsidiaries.  
In conclusion, the level of perceived uncertainty is clearly a function of firm and managerial 
experience, making risk perceptions non-objective and firm dependent. Khaneman and Tversky’s 
concept of framing seems to be particularly important explanatory variables for the differences in 
uncertainty and risk perceptions among the case companies. The strong relation between 
experience and framing makes both home market and foreign market experience highly 
influential in the risk identification process – as situational experience is found to lower the 
perceived uncertainty. Further, Milliken’s suggested relation between an increase in perceived 
state uncertainty and amount of resources attributed to the risk identification process is disputed. 
The case study evidence suggests that some firms increase resource commitment when faced 
with a high perceived state uncertainty, while others reduce their commitment – relying more on 
gut feeling than what they consider uncertain information.  
6.1.4 Formality of the Risk Identification Process 
“The perceived level of uncertainty in the internationalization process will affect the formality of the risk 
identification process, making it less systematic under high uncertainty” 
As proposed in the theoretical background, the perceived level of uncertainty does influence the 
risk identification process. Milliken (1987) proposed that a muddling-through process would be 
followed in situations with high state of uncertainty, as uncertainty regarding environmental 
changes will make it difficult to identify threats and opportunities with any degree of confidence. 
SafeClean’s risk identification process seems to support this view; their preliminary risk mapping 
is a continuous risk identification process, where risk factors are incrementally added as they are 
discovered. The company already has the most formal risk identification process, but argues that 
a more formal risk identification process is needed when a preliminary risk mapping is done – at 
a lower level of state uncertainty. 
However, while we believe that state uncertainty influence the formality of the risk identification 
process, we do not believe that the state uncertainty is the most important variable at play. 
Considering the empirical data, company size seems to be an important factor influencing 
process formality. As Cybernetica states, a limited number of employees makes it impossible to 
have specialist evaluating each aspect in the internationalization process, and as Norske Ventiler 
and Sperre emphasize, limited organizational resources does not allow use of too much resources 
on a single aspect. Thus, the risk identification phase of smaller firms seems to follow a muddling 
through pattern by default – rather than as a function of uncertainty. Another trait supporting 
this is the fact that case firms exhibits a consistent degree of formality, meaning that the degree 
of formality is the same from the risks are identified until eventual risk mitigation strategies are 
laid out. If state uncertainty was the sole explanatory variable, one would expect the degree of 
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formality to increase as state uncertainty decreased and the final entry decision grew closer – 
except for SafeClean, there have not been indications of increased formality in this direction. 
Another important discovery with regard to the formality of the risk identification process, is that 
none of the case firms approach risk in the three distinct phases suggested by Rowe (1977) and 
later adopted by multiple researchers (Baird & Thomas 1985; Mascarenhas 1982; Milliken 1987) 
and risk practitioners (COSO 2004; HBR Analytic Services 2011). The case companies appear to 
do risk identification and evaluation in a single, intertwined process, which subsequently leads to 
one of the four suggested risk mitigation strategies. Thus, all identified risks are evaluated to 
some extent, but not in a process that is regarded as separate from the identification process.  
In conclusion, although the perceived level of uncertainty influences the degree of formality in 
the risk identification process, the small firm size seems to cause a muddling through process by 
default rather than as a result of an elevated degree of uncertainty. A key insight is that while 
identification, evaluation and mitigation activities are performed – they are part of a cyclic, rather 
than linear process. Hence, there is an apparent discrepancy between the suggested theory and 
observed practice, with the identification, evaluation and mitigation activities being performed in 
a more interlinked fashion than suggested by researchers. 
6.1.5 Conclusion  
The risk identification process of the case firms is clearly resource constrained. However, the 
resource scarcity is accepted rather than perceived as an insurmountable obstacle in the 
internationalization process. Accepting the resource scarcity makes the firms consider only a 
subset of entry modes in the risk identification process, discarding entry modes perceived as too 
resource demanding. This implies that high commitment entry modes, such as subsidiaries, are 
discarded and the resources available for risk identification are used on a subset of lower 
commitment entry modes. 
The case companies do not use risk frameworks in the risk identification process. There is no 
awareness of the existence of frameworks helping the companies to identify relevant risk factors, 
and the case companies dismiss the need for frameworks in the risk identification process - 
pointing towards simpler cost evaluations and gut feeling as the basis for assessing risk factors. 
There is however a reliance on third party support in the risk identification process, especially for 
the firms with limited international experience, and a risk factor framework could decrease this 
dependence. For firms with more international experience, such a framework might be less useful 
as resource constraints limits the risk identification process to key factors. 
The perceived uncertainty in the Brazilian market expansion is clearly influenced by the case 
firms’ experience, and this has clear implications for the risk identification process. As experience 
lowers the perceived level of risk, firms will evaluate the same risk factor differently. This makes 
experience both from home and foreign markets an important influence for the perceived overall 
risk level of a foreign market expansion. Nevertheless, the case study evidence does not support 
the suggested relation between the level of state uncertainty and resources spent in the risk 
identification process. While one of the case firms clearly increases resource allocation in the 
search of new information when faced with higher levels of state uncertainty, other case firms 
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instead reduce the commitment through choosing a low commitment strategy that decreases the 
amount of resources needed in the risk identification process. 
The risk identification process is found to be a muddling-through process by default. Rather than 
an effect of state uncertainty, the size of the case firms implies a need for the employees to 
occupy several roles in the internationalization process. Furthermore, there is no formal division 
between the risk identification and risk evaluation process. In contrast to the linear process 
suggested by researchers, the risk identification and evaluation process is found to be cyclic and 
interlinked. 
6.2 Risk Evaluation 
The theoretical propositions on risk evaluation indicate that manager- and firm characteristics 
would influence the evaluation process that the process was likely to an idiosyncratic process 
resulting in a focus on a few, key factors, and that evaluating the relevance of information would 
be a key challenge. Trends in the firms’ behaviour provide a rich background for comparison of 
the suggested and observed evaluation process. In line with the structure of the discussion of the 
risk identification process, each theoretical proposition is treated under a separate heading.  
6.2.1 Influence of the Firm’s Context and Manager Characteristics on 
Risk Evaluation 
“Firm context and managerial characteristics will influence the risk evaluation process by shifting the neutral 
reference point used to evaluate gains and losses” 
The evaluation of risks associated with different entry modes resembles prospect theory 
processes presented by Tversky and Kahneman (1986). The case firm’s consideration of the risks 
and rewards of foreign direct investment can be likened to the concept of a net present value 
calculation, where future cash flows are discounted to the present value prior to comparison. 
Consequently, the level of risk is measured in terms of financial gains and losses, and the entry 
mode requiring the greatest level of investment therefore must promise the greatest rewards. 
Importantly, the timing of the potential benefits of such a high commitment benefits seems to 
have an impact on the evaluation of the associated risk and rewards. The resources for a foreign 
direct investment are committed before returns are certain, and it may take years before the 
benefits materialize. Due to this uncertainty, the potential future gains must greatly outweigh the 
investment needed at an early stage. This indicates a loss aversion bias where potential losses are 
weighted more heavily than potential gains. The loss aversion bias can be explained partly based 
on the firm context, and partly on managerial risk aversion. 
Of the elements in the firms’ context, organizational slack is found to have the largest influence 
on the risk evaluation of the case firms. All case firms stress that they will not make 
commitments to the Brazilian market that puts the firms’ survival in question. Consequently, 
firms find the resource consuming option of FDI unfeasible – as it involves a significant 
potential loss found to outweigh potential benefits of a clear market commitment and 
compliance with local requirements. Hence, the limited organizational slack affects the case firm’s 
perception the risks involved with foreign direct investment (FDI) – an entry mode found to be a 
highly competitive entry strategy to small firms in the long term by Zahra et al. (2000).  
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Managers play a pivotal role in the risk evaluation process as well as the internationalization 
process as a whole. The responsibility for the Brazilian entry is laid on one or two managers, and 
they fill the role of planner, researcher and decision maker. The key role of managers is 
underlined by the observed impact of experience on the level of perceived risk. Specifically, 
neither Sperre nor SafeClean evaluated a Brazilian market entry before being contacted by 
Innovasjon Norge – both feeling that the prospect of gains in a Brazilian market expansion was 
far lower than the risks and costs involved. During the course of the Navigator project, this risk 
evaluation has changed, and both firms now feel that it is possible to find an acceptable balance 
between costs and gains in a Brazilian expansion. The manager of Cybernetica provides a similar 
example of the importance of managerial risk perception in the evaluation of benefits and gains. 
At onset, he was very skeptical towards the prospect of agreeing to a deal with Petrobras 
involving large commitments from Cybernetica’s side. However, learning that this might be the 
easiest way to get into a research project with Petrobras, he decided to increase the company’s 
commitment and agree to an IRD agreement financed by Cybernetica and the Norwegian 
government. While the level of investment and potential gains remained constant, the managerial 
risk perception decreased – thus making a previously unacceptable risk acceptable. 
The fact that risk taking propensity is likely to increase with the level of managerial experience, as 
the level of perceived risk decreases, is in partial support of Johansson and Vahlne’s (1977) 
suggest relationship between market knowledge and market commitment. However, they focused 
more on the firm-level market knowledge, although they acknowledged that managerial 
experience from previous markets could replace the need for firm market experience in the given 
market. The dominant role of managers in the case firms is more in accordance with early 
internationalization theory, although the theory also suggests a higher risk-taking propensity 
among entrepreneurial managers - a trait not found in this study. 
In conclusion, both the firm context and managerial characteristics influences the evaluation of 
risks and gains in the risk evaluation process. Of the firm level factors, the organizational slack 
has the largest influence - making an investment in a Brazilian subsidiary considered unfeasible as 
a first entry strategy of all the case firms. Of managerial factors, the risk perception is seen as the 
most potent influence. As case evidence indicates that the perceived risk is likely to decrease with 
the level of experience, the amount if risk taken is likely to increase with experience – in support 
of Johansson and Vahlne’s suggested relation between market knowledge and market 
commitment. 
6.2.2 Measurement of Risk Exposure 
“The risks and benefits of internationalization are not likely to be reduced to a single construct” 
We find that none of the case firms have reduced the individual risk factors to a single number 
for evaluation purposes, in accordance with research by Shapira (1995) and recommendations of 
Taleb et al. (2009). Only the costs that the firms have incurred during the course of the 
internationalization process are tracked as numbers, while risk factors such as threats from 
competitors, cultural distance and potential difficulties of importing are structured qualitatively, in 
order of perceived impact. The main reason for this is that most of the risk factors evaluated 
make more sense when evaluated qualitatively than quantitatively –reducing risk to a number 
makes assessment of the interdependencies of various risk factors difficult. On an overall level, 
Discussion of Findings 
89 
however, the risk of the Brazilian venture is measured by a single construct – the potential loss 
associated with the foreign venture. The use of potential amount to lose, rather than an outcome 
distribution (probabilistic approach), is in accordance with the findings of March and Shapira’s 
(1987) study.  
Furthermore, we observe behavior coherent with Figueira-de-Lemos, Johanson and Vahlne’s 
(2011) concept of a maximum tolerable risk frontier. The upper constraint of the maximum 
tolerable risk lever is the resource commitment that each firm can take as a loss and still survive 
financially. As long as the total resource commitment made is below this frontier, and the activity 
is seen as beneficial to the internationalization effort, firms go through with the activity in 
question.  As previously discussed, establishing a Brazilian subsidiary is currently above the 
maximum tolerable risk level of all firms and therefore not of interest, while allocating resources 
for travelling to Brazil is well below the risk frontier and contributes to reducing the uncertainty 
of market entry.  This tolerable risk level is obviously dependent on each firms’ organizational 
slack, and this helps explain why the case firms find the perceived level of risk associated with the 
same risk factors to be different.  
In conclusion, the overall risk exposure is measured in terms of potential loss - a single 
quantifiable construct – while other risk factors largely are evaluated in qualitative terms without 
being reduced to any single quantifiable construct. This is a consequence of the difficulty of 
evaluating individual risk factors in a single construct – as the potential impact of certain risk 
factors are more appropriately assessed in qualitative terms. A maximal tolerable risk frontier in 
terms of total resource commitment is found to constitute the basis of which the risk inherent in 
the foreign ventures is evaluated against. 
6.2.3 Risk is Determined by an Overall Evaluation of Risk Components, 
and Focus is Put on a Few, Key Risk Factors 
“The firm’s risk exposure will be determined by an overall evaluation of distinct risk components, resulting in a 
focus on a few, key risk factors” 
In general, the case firms make a broad initial assessment of risk, by considering a broad range of 
risk factors found to be important by the case firms. This resembles what Miller (1993) labels 
optimal risk management practices, with the important distinction that the case firms cannot be said to 
consider the full spectrum of corporate exposures given managers’ bounded rationality and a 
muddling-through risk assessment process. However, after the broader initial assessment, focus 
was put on a smaller number of what each firm considered to be key risk factors. This focus on a 
few key factors during the risk assessment process is also seen in research by March and Shapira 
(1987).  
The key risk factors are identified based on their expected impact on the case companies’ market 
entry, and factors found to have a small impact are not given much attention. Although the case 
firms have identified largely same key risk factors, the outcome of the subsequent risk evaluation 
is unique to each firm, and largely attributed to firm- and managerial factors. All case firms 
identified cultural distance as a potentially important risk factor, indicating that the firms 
experienced what Johanson and Vahlne (2009) call liability of outsidership. However, after 
Norske Ventiler chose to sell valves through firms based in Norway, cultural risk is no longer 
seen as a pressing issue by the company. SafeClean, on the other hand, plans to use an entry 
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mode where cultural risk is a significant risk factor, making cultural differences a key risk factor 
to the firm.  
In conclusion, the case firms exhibit a trend of doing an initial evaluation of a large number of 
risk factors before focus is put on the most impactful risk factors. What is considered to be key 
risk factors is highly dependent on managerial and firms factors.  
6.2.4 Availability of Relevant Information for Risk Evaluation 
“Evaluating the relevance of available information is a challenge in the risk evaluation phase, rather than lack of 
information” 
As proposed by Milliken (1987) the process of identifying the relevant risk factors - factors that 
may actually affect firm performance – from irrelevant factors is a major challenge to the case 
firms. There is an abundance of information on macro trends and opportunities in the Brazilian 
petroleum sector from various consultancies, banks and academics. However, information useful 
to small, niche firms trying to map their competitive situation is more limited. The firms are 
therefore left with the option of interpreting available information to the firms’ unique setting, 
but this is a challenge for several reasons. First, such interpretation requires significant resources, 
and the firms have very limited experience which would have made the evaluation easier. Second, 
it will be nearly impossible for the case firms to gain an intimate understanding of the 
competitive situation that awaits them in Brazil, as these firms operate in highly specialized niches 
on which relevant information is scarce and fragmented. Third, the firms are in a pre-entry phase 
and entry strategies, which to a great extent determine risk exposure, are not finally decided. 
Further, evaluation of prospective partners or customers is complicated by the lack of corporate 
data in Brazil (OpenCorporates 2012; The Economist 2012b), although this is not  explicitly 
stated by any of the firms. Finally, the language barrier complicates market research, and 
SafeClean acknowledges that targeting customers in Brazil is significantly more difficult than in 
the Norwegian market.  
Nonetheless, the challenge of separating relevant from irrelevant information is to some extent 
mitigated by participation in the Navigator program. Innovasjon Norge is an important source of 
information to the case firms, and arguably, this has contributed to reducing the perceived 
competitive uncertainty. Further, the case firms display a varying need for detailed market 
information to use as a basis for separating irrelevant from relevant risk factors. Sperre seems 
comfortable with a macro-level analysis, repeatedly comparing the current situation in the 
Brazilian market to the petroleum market in the North Sea in the 1980s, and suggesting that the 
Brazilian market will develop in a similar fashion. Thus, to Sperre, general market information is 
most relevant to evaluate the attractiveness of entering the Brazilian market, and this information 
is readily available. 
SafeClean, on the other hand, expresses a need for more detailed knowledge on the Brazilian 
market, to be able to evaluate risk on the best possible basis. The firm has made extra efforts to 
gain knowledge on specific issues, namely the Brazilian import regime. The company contacted 
logistics specialists with relevant experience from Brazil, and this is an example of how third 
party involvement can substitute for lacking managerial experience, as proposed by Crick and 
Jones (2000). In contrast to SafeClean, Norske Ventiler regards over-analysis as a risk factor in 
itself, indicating that some risk factors have to be dealt with as they arise. Consequently, limited 
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availability of information is to a varying degree a challenge during the firms’ risk evaluation 
process.  
Although the case companies have a differing inclination to gather information, a general trend 
can be observed; low availability of relevant information for risk evaluation combined with a high 
perceived level of uncertainty makes the case firm’s reluctant to make large commitments and 
therefore opt for a gradual, incremental market entry.  Thus, the availability of relevant 
information seems to influence the speed at which commitments are made to the Brazilian 
market. This relation is also acknowledged by Johanson and Vahlne (1977), who argue that firms 
need to integrate the knowledge they gain in the internationalization process with existing firm 
knowledge, a process that takes time and might slow down the internationalization process.  
In conclusion, evaluating the relevance of information is a key challenge in the 
internationalization process, a challenge further complicated by the lack of readily available 
company-specific information. Hence, the case firms must map their competitive situation in 
Brazil and evaluate risks themselves implying a need to interpret general market information to 
their specific setting. This is a challenge to the case firms as it requires resources and skills most 
of the firms do not have.  The case firms have a differing need for detailed market information, 
as some firms commit significant resources to information gathering and processing while other 
firms are satisfied with their current level of knowledge. The availability of relevant information 
for risk evaluation seems to influence the speed of the internationalization process, as problems 
with collecting sufficient information for comparison with existing firm knowledge slows down 
the risk evaluation process.  
6.2.5 Conclusion 
Both firm- and managerial factors influence the risk evaluation of the case firms. Of the firm 
factors, organizational slack has the largest influence, while the manager(s)’ risk perception is the 
most important managerial influence. Together the two factors influence how the risks are 
evaluated, the most important implications being that limited organizational slack leads to a loss 
aversion bias that is strengthened by lack of experience of a similar situation – as this increases 
the manager’s perceived level of risk. 
The risk exposure of a firm is measured in terms of total potential loss related to the foreign 
expansion, a single quantifiable construct. Individual risk factors are, with exception of easily 
quantifiable variables such as investments and direct expenses, measured in qualitative 
dimensions and not as a single construct. The total risk exposure of a firm is evaluated relative to 
a risk frontier – indicating the financial loss the firm can handle – where risks surmounting this 
barrier are rejected.  
The risk factors are, after an initial evaluation of a wider range of factors, reduced to a few, key 
risk factors. This is in accordance with findings from the risk identification analysis, which 
showed that resource scarcity imposed a need to consider a reduced set of risk factors.  
Lastly, evaluating the relevance of information is a challenge in the case firms internationalization 
process. This challenge is caused by a lack of international experience, making it hard for the case 
firms to interpret the relevance of background information – a situation that is complicated by 
the fact that there is limited information available on a firm-specific level. The support of 
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Innovasjon Norge, and other third parties, provides important facilitation in this challenge. In the 
end, the availability of relevant information seems to influence the speed of the 
internationalization process, as problems with collecting relevant information slows down the 
risk evaluation process.  
6.3 Risk Mitigation 
The theoretical background outlined four possible risk mitigation strategies that could be used to 
handle risk in the internationalization process. Further, the theoretical propositions indicated that 
firms experiencing response uncertainty would seek to reduce this uncertainty through 
information acquisition and boundary spanning activities. Last, it was suggested that resource 
commitment would be inversely related to the level of perceived risk. As in the preceding 
sections, each of the propositions are discussed under separate headings.  
6.3.1 Selection of Risk Mitigation Strategies  
“Firms will employ several of the presented risk mitigation strategies to mitigate the identified risk factors” 
Baird and Thomas (1985) state that risk mitigation strategies may either involve hindering an 
event from happening in the first place, or mitigating the effect of an event identified as a risk. 
They further argue that the selection of risk mitigation strategies is dependent on the perceived 
controllability of risk factors. The case analysis suggests that risk factors that are generally sought 
reduced, given that they are perceived as controllable by the case firms - supporting the claim of 
Baird and Thomas (1985) that influence over risk is important to how a firm handles it. Norske 
Ventiler’s approach to cultural differences and local content requirements offer an example of 
how the controllability of risk factors affects risk mitigation efforts. Exposure to cultural risk is 
perceived to be a controllable risk factor by the firm, and the firm seeks to reduce the associated 
risk by adapting to the local business culture. Local content requirements are found to be a much 
more impactful risk factor to the firm. However, the firm finds this risk factor to be 
uncontrollable, and seeks to avoid it rather than reducing it.  
Considering Forlani and Mullins’ (2000) definition of risk, risk can be reduced either by reducing 
the uncertainty of a situation or the potential loss involved. Keeping the resource commitment to 
a minimum is emphasized by all case firms, making risk reduction the dominant risk mitigation 
strategy. In fact, the firms’ focus on keeping the resource commitments low is predominant both 
in the pre-entry phase and in future market plans (post-entry). A risk reduction strategy pursued 
by through minimal resource commitment is apparent throughout the internationalization 
process. This is close to the hypothesized incremental market entry process of gradual 
internationals (Figueira-de-Lemos, Johanson & Vahlne 2011; Johanson & Vahlne 1977). Norske 
Ventiler and Sperre serves as good examples of this low-commitment approach. Neither firm is 
willing to establish a subsidiary in Brazil, as both firms prefer the lower commitment strategies of 
direct exports and agent representation. While Sperre does not expressed intentions to establish a 
subsidiary in the foreseeable future, Norske Ventiler is only willing to establish a subsidiary given 
certain prospects of a high market demand. Arguably, participation in the Navigator program is 
in itself a means of risk reduction, as the case firms enjoy Innovasjon Norges extensive network 
in Brazil at a modest cost. 
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SafeClean is also unwilling to establish a subsidiary under the current conditions of uncertain 
market demand, but like Norske Ventiler, the firm does not rule out establishing a Brazilian 
subsidiary in the future. As proposed by Figueira-de-Lemos, Johanson and Vahlne (2011), we 
find that activities that involving greater risk than the firms’ tolerable risk level are rejected. 
However, the examples of SafeClean and Norske Ventiler illustrate that risk rejection is not a 
final decision; risks that are currently rejected might be accepted at a later stage. 
Risk rejection was proposed by Mascarenhas (1982) as a strategy for dealing with activities that 
posed a greater risk than the level of expected returns could justify. The examples of rejecting to 
establish a Brazilian subsidiary as the initial entry mode illustrate a risk rejection strategy. 
SafeClean’s continued evaluation of several entry modes is further an example of a deferral 
strategy, as suggested by Milliken (1987). However, the risk rejection strategies pursued by the 
case firms are in effect risk reduction strategies, as they reduce the level of risk and are not 
regarded as final by most of the case firms.  
Although several researchers have identified risk sharing as a particularly relevant risk 
management strategy to SMEs (Boisot & Child 1999; Di Gregorio 2005; McDougall, Shane & 
Oviatt 1994), only Cybernetica and Sperre seriously considered this strategy, which Cybernetica 
later rejected. According to Di Gregorio (2005), risk sharing strategies are especially suitable 
when the nature of risk factors are ambiguous and market information is unevenly distributed – 
and local firms have an advantage as experienced market actors. The case firms’ focus on cultural 
distance and competitive uncertainties indicates that they face such conditions, yet only one firm 
makes use of the cooperative risk management arrangements suggested by Miller (1992). 
However, establishing a relation with a local firm is not considered to be an effective strategy for 
reducing uncertainty, as the expected contribution from partners is seen as inadequate compared 
to the risks involved. While Cybernetica expressed concerns over what a local partner would 
contribute with besides possible access to Petrobras, SafeClean expressed concerns over the 
possibility of partner exploitation in an unbalanced relationship. This is contrary to the assertion 
of McDougall, Shane and Oviatt (1994) that resource scarcity will make smaller firms rely on 
hybrid structures. 
As all case companies have made sure that their resource commitments so far are within the risk 
tolerance frontier continuing these efforts will not put the firms outside their risk tolerance 
frontiers. This indicates an overall acceptance of the associated risk of pursuing entry into the 
Brazilian market. However, the term ‘not rejected’ might be more appropriate than ‘accepted’ to 
describe the risks that the case companies tolerate in the internationalization process.  The case 
firms accept a certain risk level, which is heavily influenced by experience. Thus, risk levels 
similar to those associated with corresponding operations in the home market are not rejected in 
the Brazilian market either. An example of risk acceptance is how Norske Ventiler does not find 
the risk of selling valves to a well-known customer to be higher than any other sale, whether the 
valve is to be used in Brazil or in the North Sea. 
In conclusion, reducing risk as much as possible is an overarching objective to the case firms, 
and sought done in all activities. All four risk mitigation strategies are employed, with risk 
reduction as the dominant mitigation strategy, due to the case firms’ urge to keep resource 
commitment at an as low level as possible. The perceived controllability of the risk factors 
  Discussion of Findings 
94 
 
determines whether risks factors are sought prevented or the effects of the risks sought mitigated. 
Further, the maximum tolerable risk and the risks accepted from operations in the home market 
set the boundaries for what risks are rejected and what risks are accepted. As the maximum 
tolerable risk might change as firms gain experience, risks initially rejected might be accepted at a 
later stage. Risk sharing is the least used mitigation strategy, as cooperating with local actors is 
believed to yield limited benefits 
6.3.2 Response Uncertainty  
“Response uncertainty will lead to information acquisition and boundary spanning activities, in search of relevant 
information from firms that have faced a similar situation” 
The effect of the chosen mitigation strategies is hard to assess for the case firms prior to market 
entry, resulting in what Milliken (1987) labels response uncertainty. The response uncertainty can 
to a great extent be attributed to the fact that the case companies are not certain of whether 
identified risk factors will have the expected effect. Further, the continuous form of the risk 
evaluation process leads to constant changes to the planned mitigation efforts, likely to increase 
the state of uncertainty.  
In an effort to reduce response uncertainty, some of the possible activities put forward by 
researchers – boundary spanning and information acquisition (Milliken 1987) and emulation 
(Miller 1992) – are put to use. We find no evidence of emulation strategies, possibly because the 
case companies have not identified any appropriate organizations to emulate. Norske Ventiler 
conducts boundary spanning activities by gaining insight into how firms in the local offshore 
cluster has made international sales, and SafeClean collects information on a wide range of topics 
seen as important to entry, such as logistics, imports, and prospective market demand. The 
Navigator program is an important arena for collecting and sharing information for the case 
firms, and Cybernetica and Sperre are not to found to do targeted information acquisition or 
boundary spanning activities beyond the scope of the program.  
While Norske Ventiler and SafeClean share the objectives of broadening the scope of possible 
mitigation options and make the risk mitigation strategies more effective, the firms do so from a 
different starting point. Norske Ventiler has gained access to a network of offshore cluster where 
information can be collected at minimal cost, in contrast to SafeClean which allocates significant 
resources to the effort. Further, SafeClean collects information to fill an experience gap, while 
Norske Ventiler seeks to reaffirms selected strategies. The effect of international experience is 
evident in the perceived need for market information. Norske Ventiler appears only to seek third 
part affirmation after choices are made, while SafeClean finds it necessary collect information 
from external actors prior to decision-making.  
In conclusion, the level of response uncertainty is considerable, chiefly because of the 
uncertainty related to how the identified risk factors actually will affect the firms’ operations in 
Brazil. Response uncertainty is addressed by two of the case firms through information 
acquisition and boundary spanning activities. The level of international experience seems to be 
decisive for the use of the collected information, as the experienced firm acquires information 
with the purpose of third party confirmation at a low cost, while the inexperienced firm puts 
significant resources into collecting information as a basis for decision-making.  
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6.3.3 Resource Commitment and Perceived Risk 
“Risk aversion implies that resource commitments are inversely related to the managers’ perceived risk in the 
internationalization process” 
A strong aversion to financial loss in the case of market failure in Brazil makes the case firms 
seek a minimum commitment entry into the Brazilian market. It is the combination of high 
income stream uncertainty and limited organizational slack (Palmer & Wiseman 1999) that makes 
the firms reluctant allocate more resources than they can tolerate to loose without seriously 
affecting activities in other geographical markets.   
Miller (1992) argued that mitigation of risk factors that firms face in the internationalization 
process would likely involve trade-offs in order to minimize risk exposure to multiple, 
interdependent risk factors. Although none of the case firms have explicitly stated that they find 
risk management activities to involve trade-offs, we observe that the case firms seek to minimize 
risk by simultaneous consideration of potential benefits and associated risks. The case firms seek 
to maximize the likelihood of a successful entry by reducing income stream uncertainty while 
keeping resource commitment at a minimum. Faced with a multitude of risks that increase 
income stream uncertainty this is a difficult balancing act rather than a straightforward process.  
Shrader et al (2000) found early internationals to manage risk by simultaneous determination of 
trade-offs in three dimensions; political and economic risk, resource commitment and foreign 
revenue exposure. We find that resource commitment is the most influential factor for the overall 
risk level, while economic and political risk and foreign revenue exposure are not as important. 
Rather, the trade-off facing the case firms is reducing the risk factors associated with income 
stream uncertainty while keeping resource commitment at the lowest possible level. The income 
stream uncertainty experienced by the case firms arises because of the case firms suffer from 
liability of outsidership (Johanson & Vahlne 2009) and foreignness (Zahra 2005) – they lack 
experience from operating in the Brazilian market and knowledge on competitors and the 
preferences of suppliers and customers. Thus, the case firms must commit a certain amount of 
resources in order to overcome these liabilities and become market insiders, and the selected 
entry strategies are the result of this trade-off.   
The resource commitment made by the case companies is not only dependent on the perceived 
risk, but also on the companies’ flexibility with regard to resource commitment for market entry. 
It is mainly product characteristics that dictate the required presence of firm personnel in order 
to conduct sales in Brazil. Both Cybernetica and SafeClean must come in a position where they 
can explain the potential benefits in order to generate interests, and this is obviously more time- 
and resource consuming than selling products which the purpose of is clearly evident, such as the 
products of the other case firms, valves an ROVs. Thus, attributes of the firms’ products clearly 
influence the resources required for market entry, and does not necessarily reflect the firms’ 
perception of the risk of entry. Norske Ventiler, which has the most relaxed attitude towards 
cultural risk and states that selling valves to the Brazilian market with the chosen sales setup does 
not increase the level of risk, makes the lowest resource commitment, while SafeClean, which 
regards the Brazilian business environment to be completely different from their home market, 
still plans to do a resource consuming pilot project and is the only firm to still consider FDI as a 
possible entry mode.  
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Several firms indicate that a successful market entry will lead to greater commitment to the 
Brazilian market, in line with Johansen and Vahlne’s (1977) stages model. Norske Ventiler, which 
arguably makes the lowest resource commitment of the case firms, still signals that given a 
positive market response, the company might have a subsidiary in Brazil in 5-10 years’ time. 
Using minimal resources in the course of the internationalization process is however not a trait 
unique to the gradual internationals model, it is a rational objective to all managers and expressed 
in early internationals theory as well. Aspelund et al. (2007) argue that early internationals 
generally select an entry mode requiring the least resources, due to resource limitations and as a 
means of reducing risk. Nevertheless, the suggested need perspective of internationalization is 
not found to have significant impact on the firms’ willingness to take risk. 
In conclusion, high income stream uncertainty and limited organizational slack results in a high 
perceived risk and aversion to financial loss among the case firms. As a result of the risk aversion, 
the firms seek to keep the resources they commit to the Brazilian market at minimum level until 
they are more certain that market entry will give a positive return.  However, the case firms face a 
trade-off involving keeping the resource commitment at a minimum while at the same time 
reducing income stream uncertainty arising due to liability of foreignness and outsidership. 
Importantly, both the perceived risk and minimum possible resource commitment is dependent 
on firm factors, primarily managerial experience and product characteristics, which is reflected in 
the case firms’ different entry strategies.  
6.3.4 Conclusion 
While all four risk mitigation strategies are applied, keeping the resource commitment as low as 
possible - while still ensuring progress - is the overarching objective and dominating risk 
mitigation strategy for the case firms. The case firms are found to select risk management 
strategies based on the perceived level of risk; activities involving greater risk than the maximum 
tolerable risk frontier are rejected, while activities found to pose no greater risk than activities 
conducted in the home market are accepted. However, risk rejection is not a final decision. As 
risks are continuously evaluated and the level of perceived uncertainty changes with the level of 
market knowledge, activities initially rejected might be accepted at a later stage.  
Response uncertainty leads to information acquisition and boundary spanning activities by some 
firms only, specifically the case firms that find lack of international experience as a hindering 
factor for decision-making and firms that have easy access to actors with relevant experience.  
The case firms face a trade-off where both resource commitment and income stream uncertainty 
are sought minimized. Income stream uncertainty arises mainly from liabilities of outsidership 
and foreignness, and overcoming these liabilities requires a certain resource commitment. The 
minimum level of resource commitment is influenced by the level of resources needed to 
conduct an effective sales process. The selected entry mode, determining the firms’ risk exposure, 
is the outcome of the above mentioned trade-off.  
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7 Implications 
7.1 Implications for Managers 
A return to the managerial challenges associated with risk assessment presented in the 
introductions, is helpful to explain the relevance of this study to managers of SMEs pursuing 
international activities. The risk assessment process was highlighted as a highly complex 
endeavor, requiring significant resources and resulting in a trade-off between resource allocation 
to risk assessment and other managerial activities. This case study shows that it is possible to 
reduce both complexity and resource requirements in the risk assessment process by adapting the 
process to a small firm context. The following paragraphs outline how complexity can be reduced 
and the impact of complexity-reduction on resource requirements.  
First, managers should only seek to identify risk factors relevant to a subset of feasible entry 
modes, and the potential impact of these risk factors on firm performance. In order to 
understand the relationships between risk factors and firm performance, relevant experience is of 
high value and firms that lack relevant experience should seek to gain this from third parties. 
Separating relevant from less relevant information was found to be a challenge to the case firms, 
and third parties can provide valuable context-specific information which facilitates the process 
of identifying the most relevant information. For more experienced firms, third parties can also 
be used to confirm risk assessments, yielding much needed decision-support in a complex 
business environment. When relationships between the risk factors and firm performance are 
mapped, focus should be put on the most influential risk factors, in order to reduce the 
complexity of the risk assessment process. Furthermore, some entry modes will be rejected based 
on the risk evaluation – thus reducing complexity in the risk mitigation process as only a subset 
of risk factors must be mitigated.  
The resources needed for a thorough risk assessment process is directly reduced by the 
complexity-reducing approach of focusing on a subset of entry modes and only key risk factors. 
Furthermore, third party support in the information acquisition process can limit resource 
requirements by providing context-relevant information and decision support, thus saving 
valuable time for the management teams. Nevertheless, third-party reliance implies a need to 
establish connections to sources with relevant information (e.g. governmental institutions or 
government backed internationalization programs, experienced firms, consultancies or other 
actors). In order to reduce the resource requirements, these connections should be established in 
a cost-efficient manner and the least cost-intensive connections preferred.  
Although the measures presented above both reduce complexity and resource demands, there 
will be a need to allocate a significant amount of resources to the risk assessment process. The 
risk factors identified, evaluated and sought mitigated can be decisive for the success, or failure, 
of the foreign venture. Consequently, this is a process of vital importance, strongly affecting all 
subsequent phases of the internationalization process.  
 
  Implications 
98 
 
7.2 Implications for Policy Makers 
Third-party support in the internationalization process has been found to be of critical 
importance, both to motivate and facilitate SME internationalization. All case firms emphasize 
the importance of third-parties for market information and referrals, and two of the case firms 
would never have considered entering the market in question without being a participant in a 
government-led internationalization program. The importance of internationalization programs 
to SME internationalization, and the vital importance of SMEs and international activity to the 
Norwegian economy, accentuates the need for government-led internationalization programs.  
The internationalization program’s role as a motivator implies a need for active search for firms 
with an international market potential, rather than reactive approach were firms with 
international ambitions contact the organization. Such an approach can push firms that would 
not consider international expansion on their own towards a gradual internationalization. To the 
case firms, important motivational factors have been the visits to the target market, as well as the 
general reduction of resource and psychological barriers to internationalization. 
The role as a facilitator requires internationalization programs to be able to provide necessary 
market information, referrals to contacts in an extensive network and financial support. The 
market information reduces both physical and psychical barriers to internationalization by 
providing a cost efficient alternative to collecting information individually, and an important 
guide to navigating the vast amount of market information available to firms. As third party 
knowledge has been seen to substitute the lack of international experience, it is vital for the firms 
to gain access to such knowledge – either by the internationalization program directly, or through 
referrals provided by the program to actors with relevant experience. Lastly, the financial support 
options provided by governmental institutions have proven to be important to the 
internationalization process by making it easier to generate the first sale and thus increasing the 
speed of internationalization. 
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8 Limitations and Further Research  
A major limitation of the study is that time constraints made it impossible to study each of the 
case firms at the desired level of detail. We were able to conduct only two interviews with each 
firm, and the limited number of observations made it difficult to evaluate the risk assessment 
process in great depth. Further, we have not been able to observe the risk assessment processes 
first-hand, which introduces the risk of managerial bias in the empirical data. Regarding this, 
interviews with more company representatives would have been valuable additional sources of 
data.  
Further, we are evaluating the firms at an early stage in the internationalization process, and not 
all firms have made a final decision regarding entry mode. This means that what we have 
classified as risk mitigation strategies are often just stated plans, and the scope of this thesis does 
not allow for evaluation of the degree to which risk mitigation strategies are in fact implemented. 
Consequently, pro-active firms that articulate the full range of their planned strategies may seem 
to put more effort into risk mitigation than firms that either seek to omit the greatest risk factors 
or have only made a few risk mitigation plans, awaiting selection of entry mode.  
A major limitation with regard to the generalizability of the findings is the fact that all case firms 
were participants in a government-led internationalization program. Arguably, such a program 
attracts a certain type of firms, and excludes firms relying purely on themselves and their network 
for information gathering and decision-support. Specifically, risk-aversion might be a trait that 
significantly separates firms likely to participate in such programs and firms that are not. The 
latter type of firm would likely be less risk-averse than firms that do not initiate 
internationalization efforts before they contacted by a third party.  
In order to generalize our findings, future research should address the risk assessment process in 
a larger number of companies, representing different industries and countries, both inside and 
outside the context of government-led internationalization programs. Specifically, researchers 
should focus on the formality of the risk assessment process, the effect of managerial experience, 
and the trade-off between income stream uncertainty and resource commitment. This calls for 
both qualitative and quantitative studies. Qualitative studies should be well suited to address the 
context-sensitivity of the risk assessment process, while quantitative studies could provide much-
needed statistical generalization of the findings.  
On a general level, much of the risk-related research we have found useful is several decades old. 
This implies a need for a renewed attention on this important aspect of the internationalization 
process. Specifically, we find that the risk models developed by academics are of little relevance 
to the observed risk assessment process, and of little help to managers. Thus, there is a need to 
develop risk models that are both of higher explanatory power and more useful to practitioners.  
In order to further develop risk models, several hurdles need to be overcome. First, risk is an 
ambiguous term that is not possible to confine to a single research stream. A search for the terms 
risk and uncertainty yields numerous results within a range of research areas – each with a 
different interpretation of the two terms. Thus, there is a need for studies of risk in the 
internationalization process to agree on a terminology for risk and uncertainty. This will make the 
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available risk research more accessible to researchers as it is easier to get a thorough overview of 
the field - facilitating further research.  
Second, existing internationalization process models and risk models all contain explanatory 
aspects of the risk assessment process done during an internationalization effort. Thus, future 
research should focus on developing these models further. Specifically, gradual and early 
internationals models – which both are needed to explain the observed risk assessment process – 
should be sought joined to better explain internationalization of SMEs. Further, the risk models 
present relevant risk factor, but fail to explain necessary trade-offs made by small firms between 
resource commitment and perceived risk. Hence, the risk models need to be adapted to a 
practitioner context, and this also implies a need for more thorough empirical testing.  
9 Conclusion 
The objective of the study was to establish how managers of Norwegian SMEs identify, evaluate 
and mitigate risk factors in the internationalization process. The research questions were sought 
answered through a case study of firms participating in an Innovasjon Norge-led SME 
internationalization program.  
The risk identification process is found to be muddling-through by default as there is a limited 
need for a more formalized and structured process for the small case firms, and thus not a 
function of the perceived level of risk. The process does not include the use of any risk model 
frameworks, but is highly influenced by third parties – including Innovasjon Norge and other 
parties with international experience that the firms have access to. Finally, the risk identification 
process is a resource-constrained process. This has implications for the number of risks 
identified, as only a subset of entry modes considered feasible given the firm’s resource base are 
assessed in the risk identification process. 
The risk evaluation process is not separated from the risk identification phase, and the two 
phases are performed in an interlinked, cyclical fashion. The evaluation of risk factors is clearly 
dependent on both firm- and managerial factors - of which organizational resources, product 
characteristics and managerial risk perception are the most influential. While the overall risk level 
is measured in terms of the total financial loss related to the failure of the Brazilian venture, the 
individual risk factors are largely evaluated in qualitative terms. After a consideration of a larger 
set of risk factors, only the key risk factors are thoroughly assessed in the risk evaluation process. 
The overall evaluation of risk is based on a comparison against the risk tolerance frontier of the 
firm – in effect an evaluation of whether or not the firm is able to handle the financial loss related 
to a venture failure. 
The risk mitigation process is characterized by an overarching objective of keeping the resource 
commitment as low as practically possible while preserving the likelihood of successful entry. 
There is a continuous trade-off between keeping the resource commitment at a low level and 
reducing the venture’s income stream uncertainty. As the liabilities of outsidership and 
foreignness declines, implying a lower income stream uncertainty, the case firms seem willing to 
commit more resources to the foreign market venture.  
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11.1 The Navigator project 
The Navigator project is organized by Innovasjon Norge (IN) in order to facilitate the 
internationalization process of Norwegian SMEs. After a pilot project from 2008-2010, different 
Navigator projects have been conducted for different technologies and market segments. The 
project's objective is to increase the speed and reduce the risk of the participating firms’ 
internationalization process. All programs have a similar structure, focusing on competence 
building within areas such as business strategy, network building and the undertaking of an 
internationalization project.  
The Navigator project for the Brazilian petroleum sector is the first within the petroleum 
industry, and the first targeting the Brazilian market. The project stretches over a 16-month 
period, and is organized through five forums where all firms participate. Each forum has a topic, 
and the firms, together with a firm specific business consultant27, prepare deliverables ahead of 
each meeting – including a situation analysis and a business plan for the Brazilian venture. The 
goal of the Navigator program is for the companies to construct a situation analysis, decide to 
follow one or more internationalization projects, that an action plan is developed, and finally that 
the market is visited. 
 Agenda Location 
Meeting 1 Joint platform, situation analysis Norway, spring 2011 
Meeting 2 
Revised situation analysis, choice of internationalization 
project 
Norway, summer 2012 
Meeting 3 Market and network, foreign market discussion Brazil, fall 2011 
Meeting 4 Concretization of internationalization plan Norway, January 2012 
Meeting 5 
Continuation and implementation of internationalization 
plan 
Brazil, March 2012 
Meeting 6 Recruitment to other IN services Norway, August 2012 
Table 26 - Navigator forum overview 
Two of the forums have been held in Brazil, while the remaining meetings have taken place in 
Norway (Table 26). The meeting agenda is a result of the companies’ business plans which point 
towards critical success factors, and IN's own experience. From the firms, handling of cultural 
differences was regarded as a critical success factor, while IN's experience suggest a need to learn 
how to plan long-term, make business models and prepare for client meetings. 
IN finds that the most valuable contribution from the Navigator participation is firm dependent. 
While some firms find it valuable to have an advisor and a discussion partner, others think of the 
network between the participating companies as most valuable and appreciate group discussions 
around important topics in their internationalization process. Furthermore, some firms find the 
meeting topics and guest lectures most valuable, while others find the market information 
provided by IN's foreign offices most important. 
Based on positive feedback on the Navigator projects, IN have decided to include the Navigator 
project in their ordinary service offering - the 'Fram' program28. Navigator will therefore change 
logo and name to 'Fram Marked', without any changes in content. 
                                                 
27 Pre-qualified and appointed by Innovasjon Norge. 
28 http://www.innovasjonnorge.no/fram-og-Navigator/bedre-ledelse-gir-okt-lonnsomhet1 
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11.2 Risk Models in the field of international business development 
Baird and Thomas (1985) 
Baird and Thomas’ (1985) risk taking model conceptualizes how variables of an organization’s 
external and internal environment, traits of the decision maker(s) and the strategic problem 
interact to determine the level of risk accepted by a firm. Variables affecting risk taking are 
grouped into five categories; environmental variables, industry variables, organizational variables, 
decision maker variables and strategic problem variables. The variables of each category contribute to 
the “risk impetus” of each category, and the risk level can be altered by a scale of managerial risk-
taking likelihood. Further, Baird and Thomas point to interaction effects within and between risk 
categories that may affect the overall risk exposure.  
Miller (1992) 
Miller (1992) presented three main sources of uncertainty; the general environment, and industry- and 
firm specific factors. Perhaps more importantly, Miller argues that risk factors are linked and must 
be treated with a holistic perspective. The linkages of the risk factors lead to a trade-off in risk 
mitigation; reducing one source of uncertainty might increase uncertainty from other factors 
(Miller 1992). Several researchers have supported Miller’s view of risk as a multidimensional 
concept (Bromiley, Miller & Rau 2005; Oviatt, Shrader & McDougall 2004; Shrader, Oviatt & 
McDougall 2000).  
Shrader, McDougall and Oviatt (2000) 
Shrader, McDougall and Oviatt (2000) conduct an empirical test of Miller’s (1992) theory of 
interdependent international risk factors based on a sample of 87 US firms making 212 
international entries within their first six years of existence in the 1980s.  Shrader et al.(2000)  find 
that three risk factors – foreign market exposure, host country risk and entry mode commitment – are 
simultaneously determined by managers, supporting Miller’s (1992) view of risk factors as 
interdependent and that risk management might involve trade-offs. Shrader et al. argue that 
managing risk by trade-offs might be especially relevant to young firms that go through a rapid 
internationalization process but are unlikely to have developed an international network, which is  
sometimes used  by larger firms to manage risk (Ghoshal 1987).  
Shrader, McDougall and Oviatt (2004) 
In a subsequent article, Shrader, McDougall and Oviatt present a risk management model for 
new venture internationalization (Oviatt, Shrader & McDougall 2004). The model is based on 
Miller’s (1992) integrated risk model and Baird and Thomas’ (1985) risk variables, but focused on 
new firms and takes venture performance into consideration, as opposed to the previously 
discussed models. An important aspect of Oviatt et al.’s (2004) model is the mediating forces 
interacting between the six elements of the model; the general environment, industry conditions, venture 
entrepreneurs, the venture, venture internationalization, and venture performance. 
The authors propose that factors related to the general environment affect industry conditions, 
which is in accordance with Baird and Thomas’ (1985) model. Next, consistent with findings of 
Palmer and Wiseman (1999), Oviatt et al. propose that industry conditions primarily have an 
effect through managerial actions. Characteristics of the venture entrepreneurs is therefore highly 
important to how risks in the internationalization process is managed, as “personal 
characteristics, psychological traits, and network relationships influence how entrepreneurs 
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interpret industry conditions” (Oviatt, Shrader & McDougall 2004, p. 173). Traits of the venture, 
such as its size, tangible and intangible resources, strategies and governance structure will 
together with the venture entrepreneurs directly influence the internationalization process and 
have an effect on the firm’s performance (Oviatt, Shrader & McDougall 2004).  
Cavusgil, Knight and Riesenberger (2008) 
Cavusgil et al.  (2008) identify four categories of risk that internationalizing firms meet – cross-
cultural risk, country risk, currency risk, and commercial risk- and must manage “to avoid financial loss 
or product failures” (Cavusgil, Knight & Riesenberger 2008, p. 11). Interestingly, Cavusgil et al.’s 
model is the only one to take into account cross-cultural risk factors, and the authors argue that 
the risk of cultural miscommunication might lead to inappropriate business strategies and sub-
optimal customer relationships. While Cavusgil et al. present risk factors related to political risk 
and financial risk factors similar to previously discussed risk models (Baird & Thomas 1985; 
Miller 1992), the commercial risk factors - “potential loss or failure from poorly developed or 
executed business strategies, tactics, or procedures” (Cavusgil, Knight & Riesenberger 2008, p. 
12) – is another risk area not found in the previously discussed models. Further, relating 
uncertainties to specific countries is not supported by Miller’s (1992) model. Miller argues that 
the relevance of country level risk analysis depends on the correlation of uncertainties across 
country borders, and this view is supported by Oviatt et al. (2004). Cavusgil et al.’s (2008) 
definition of country risk is however wide: “the potentially adverse effects on company 
operations and profitability caused by developments in the political, legal, and economic 
environment in a foreign country” (Cavusgil Knight & Riesenberger 2008, p. 12), and similar to 
what Baird and Thomas (1985), Miller (1992) and Oviatt et al.  (2004) label environmental factors.  
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11.3  Search strategy 
The Scopus database search was carried out by using a Boolean search string of keywords related 
to the research questions (Table 27). The search included findings in the title, abstract and 
keywords of the entries in the Scopus database. A wide approach was selected, implying that the 
entire Scopus database was searched through using the keywords, rather than a search 
concentrated to top journals. This ensured a robust search, not excluding articles published in 
smaller journals.  
Company Keyword AND Internationalization Keyword AND Research Question 
Keyword 
SME OR Internationalization OR Risk 
Small and medium-sized enterprises OR Internationalisation OR Uncertainty 
SMTBF OR Oversea expansion OR Risk identification 
Small and medium-sized technology based firms OR Foreign market entry OR Identify risk 
INV OR Foreign entry OR Identifying risk 
International new venture OR Market entry OR Risk mitigation 
ESTBF OR Globalizing OR Mitigating risk 
Early stage technology-based firms OR Globalising OR Mitigate risk 
BG OR Global expansion OR Risk management 
Born global OR Decision-making OR Manage risk 
Start-up OR Brazil OR Managing risk 
Early stage OR  OR Internationalization risk 
Early internationals OR  OR Risk perception 
International firms OR    
Technology-based OR    
Technology firm OR    
International venture OR    
Table 27 – Keywords for literature search  
The first table column contains terms describing the type of company the study is focused on. 
However, this column had to be removed in order to obtain an adequate number of articles in 
the search. The second column contains terms describing the internationalization and decision-
making process of firms, while the latter column is reserved for terms describing the research 
questions. As can be seen in the table, Bryman and Bell's (2003) suggestions for synonym use, 
alternative spellings and opposites were used in the keyword generation. 
The keywords in each row of a column were combined using OR statements, before the three 
columns were combined using AND statements. This resulted in the search string shown in 
Figure 21. The resulting search was afterwards adjusted to exclude non-relevant subject areas. 
 
11.3.1  
 
 
  
TITLE-ABS-KEY(((SME OR "small and medium-sized enterprises" OR SMBTF OR "small and medium-sized technology based 
firms" OR INV OR "int rnational new venture" OR ESTBF OR "early stage technology based firms" OR BG OR "born global" OR 
"start-up" OR "early stage" OR "early internationals" OR "international firms" OR "technology-based" OR "technology firm" 
OR "international venture") AND (internationalization OR internationalisation OR "oversea expansion" OR "foreign market 
entry" OR "foreign  entry" OR "market entry" OR globalizing OR  globalising OR "global expansion" OR “decision-making” OR 
“brazil”) AND (risk OR "risk identification" OR "identify risk" OR “identifying risk” OR "risk mitigation" OR "mitigating risk” OR 
“mitigate risk” OR “risk management” OR "manage risk“ OR "managing risk" OR "international risk” OR  “internationalization 
risk” OR “risk perception”))) 
Figure 21 - Search string 
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11.4 Interview guide 
1. Bakgrunnsinformasjon 
1.1 Selskapsnivå 
1. Antall ansatte, omsetning, økonomiske resultater 
2. Kan selskapets ledergruppe beskrives?  
a. Antall personer, ansvarsområder, utdanning, ledelses- og bransje- og internasjonal erfaring  
3. Hvem er eierne, hvem bidrar med finansiering? 
4. Kan selskapets historie kort gjengis fra oppstart fram til i dag? 
a.  Hvilke faktorer har hatt størst betydning for selskapets utvikling? 
b. Har selskapsvekst skjedd organisk, eller via oppkjøp, JVs etc.? 
c. Spesielle muligheter/utfordringer? 
d. Hvor mange av grunnleggerne er fremdeles med i bedriften? 
 
1.2 Produktnivå 
Hva er produktene/tjenestene selskapet tilbyr? 
a. Kort beskrivelse av teknologi/kompetanse 
b. Proprietær teknologi vs. moden teknologi som er allmenn tilgjengelig? 
i. Er teknologiutviklingen i bransjen hurtig/stabil? 
c. Hvor stor del av omsetningen brukes på F&U? 
d. Er produktet/tjenesten avansert/enkelt?  
e. I hvor stor grad er produkt/tjeneste spesialtilpasset kunde vs standardisert? 
f. Utføres tjenesten on site eller ved hovedkvarteret til bedriften? 
g. Er det definerte inntektsmodeller etter salg? E.g. support etter salg? 
h. Produktfortrinn jfr med konkurrerende produkter? Hvilke? 
 
1.3 Markedsnivå 
1. Kunder 
a. Hvem er kundene? Norge? Internasjonalt?  
b. Mange potensielle kunder, eller begrenset antall? 
c. Er produkter og marked forutbestemt, eller kan en velge? 
d. Hvor lett er det å skifte kunder? (avhengighetsforhold?) 
2. Hvordan markedsføres de ulike produktene? 
a. Kunder/segmenter 
b. Kanaler 
c. Prissetting 
d. Er det planer for ekspansjon, for eksempel til andre segmenter/land? 
e. Er tidsaspektet viktig - avgjørende med hurtig aksept i markedet? 
3. Hvordan foregår salg av produktene/service i Norge? 
a.  Direkte fra hovedkontor/via agent/distributør/salgskontorer?  
b. Motiv for salgskanaler 
i. Tjeneste/teknologi/erfaring/kundeforhold? 
4. Hvem er konkurrentene? 
a. Norske/internasjonale? 
b. Store/små? 
c. Hva er bedriftens konkurransefortrinn overfor konkurrentene? 
5. Hvordan er markedsutviklingen? 
a. Vekst, stabilitet, nedgang? 
b. Individuelle markedsforskjeller? 
6. Hvor stor er en typisk ordre? 
7. Hvordan er innkjøpsprosessen? 
a. Er produktet viktig for kundene? 
b. Har valg av leverandør langsiktige konsekvenser? 
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c. Hva er de viktigste faktorene for kjøp hos kundene? 
i. Kriterier for valg av løsning, leverandør, produkt? 
8. Er der definerte inntektsmodeller etter salg? Hva tenkes rundt service/oppfølging? 
 
2. Internasjonal virksomhet 
2.1 Global tilstedeværelse, internasjonal erfaring, motivasjon for 
ekspansjon 
1. Har bedrifter noen kunder eller aktiviteter utenfor Norges grenser? 
2. Hvilke land/markedsområder er dere tilstede i? 
a. Hvorfor disse landene? 
b. Hvordan foregår prosessen med å velge satsingsområder eller –land? 
i.  Standardisert prosess? Faste roller og involverte eller ad-hoc? 
3. Drivfaktorer (tilgang til markeder, råvarer, teknologi, internasjonal samarbeid) 
4. Hvor tidlig ble det aktuelt å satse internasjonalt? 
5. Hvilke inngangsstrategier er blitt benyttet ifm tidligere internasjonal ekspansjon? 
a. Direkte eksport/agenter/distributører/samarbeidspartnere internasjonalt? 
b. Hvorfor har disse strategiene blitt valgt? 
c. Ressurser, egne erfaringer, eksterne erfaringer? 
d. Hvordan har dette fungert? 
6. Har internasjonaliseringsprosessen endret seg underveis? 
a. Grunnet erfaringer/lærdom trukket ut? 
7. I hvilken grad evaluerer dere prosessen som har vært i forkant av internasjonale satsinger? 
a. Når skjer dette? 
2.2 Muligheter/motiv for entry 
1. Hvorfor ønsker bedriften å entre Brasil? Motiv? 
2. Potensielle kunder i Brasil. Hvem? Antall? 
3. Hvorfor tror dere bedriften vil lykkes i det brasilianske markedet? Mulige konkurransefortrinn? 
4. Hvilken tidshorisont har bedriften for etablering i Brasil? 
2.3 Valg av inngangsstrategi i Brasil 
1. Hvilken inngangsstrategi ønsker bedriften å benytte i Brasil? 
a. Direkte eksport, agent, distributør, salgskontor, franchising, JV? 
b. Hvem vil utføre tjenesten, og hvor og hvordan? On site eller ikke? 
c. Hvilke alternativer står/stod de mellom? 
2. Hva er årsaken til at de vurderer akkurat denne/disse inngangsstrategiene? (faktorer med 
innvirkning på valget) 
a. Aspekter ved det brasilianske markedet? Tidligere erfaring? Aspekter ved tjenestene? Nettverk? 
Kjennskap til det brasilianske markedet? 
3. Hva er de viktigste kravene en inngangsstrategi må oppfylle? 
4. Hva er de viktigste kravene en partner må oppfylle? 
a. Tilgang til kunnskap om markedet, nettverk, fleksibilitet, local conten. 
5. Var det noen alternative inngangsstrategier som aldri ble vurdert? Hvorfor? 
a. Ressurs- og kapitalbegrensninger? Erfaring (internasjonalt og brasilkunnskap) 
6. Sammenheng mellom tidligere erfaringer og inngangsstrategi? 
a. Tidligere erfaringer de kan dra nytte av? (salgskanaler, samarbeidspartnere, internasjonal erfaring) 
b. Sammenheng mellom salgskanaler i Norge og valg av inngangsstrategi i Brasil? 
c. Nivå av internasjonal erfaring: annen inngangsstrategi eller vurderinger hvis mer de var mer 
erfarne (internasjonalt, brasil) 
7. Partner 
a. Avhengig av å ha en partner? Hvorfor? 
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b. Formell kontrakt, eller basert på relasjoner og tillit? 
c. Kreves det mye opplæring av en partner? 
d. Vil en potensiell partner ha enerett til å selge deres produkter? Eksklusivitet? 
e. Er bedriften bekymret for at en partner skal utnytte negativt deres teknologi/kunnskap? 
f. Hvis forholdet med en spesifikk partner viser seg å ikke fungere, vil det være vanskelig eller 
kostbart å bytte partner? Hvorfor? 
g. Innvirkning på hva slags type partner? Franchising, JV, distribusjon, agent, samarbeid) 
2.4 Utfordringer 
1. Er organisasjonen forberedt på å støtte virksomhet både i Norge og i utlandet?  
a. F.eks. med tanke på markedsføring og salgsstøtte i utlandet 
2. Hva er de største utfordringene ved inngang i markedet? 
a. Hva er den største inngangsbarrieren? 
b. Innvirkning på inngangsstrategi? 
3. Ser bedrifter noen ekstra utfordringer ved å operere i Brasil kontra et mer utviklet land som Norge? 
a. Innvirkning på inngangsstrategi? 
4. Hvordan går bedriften fram for å evaluere muligheter og utfordringer i Brasil? 
a. Benyttes rammeverk eller definerte kriterier? 
5. Bedriftens kjennskap til Brasil 
a. Tidligere erfaringer fra Brasil? 
b. Kjennskap til businesskultur og marked 
c. Tilgang til nettverk 
d. Innvirkning ved entry/inngangsstrategi? 
6. Private property rights/legal protection 
a. Er bedriften bekymret for uønsket lekkasje/utnyttelse av teknologi/kunnskap/ressurser i Brasil? 
b. Er bedriften bekymret for uønsket lekkasje/utnyttelse av teknologi/kunnskap/ressurser i Norge? 
c. Innvirkning på inngangsstrategi? 
7. Usikkerhet/volatilitet 
a. Brasil usikkert/risikabelt å gå inn i? 
i. Økonomiske svingninger, politisk ustabilitet, valutasvingninger 
b. Hvordan vurderer dere behovet for fleksibilitet og exit-muligheter? 
c. Innvirkning på valg av inngangsstrategi? 
8. Kulturforskjeller 
a. Hvilke tanker har bedriften om kulturforskjeller mellom Norge og Brasil? 
b. I hvor stor grad er bedriften nødt til å tilpasse seg den brasilianske forretningskulturen 
c. hvilken betydning har kulturforskjeller for deres entry i Brasil? 
i. Inngangsstrategi, behov for partner? 
9. Korrupsjon 
a. Oppfattes korrupsjon som et problem? 
b. Hvordan påvirkes de i såfall av dette? 
10. Myndigheter/forretningsklima 
a. Det norske bedriftsmiljøet i Brasil/Rio? 
b. Brasilianske myndigheters holdninger til utenlandske/norske bedrifter? (ulempe ift lokale? 
c. I hvilken grad blir bedriften påvirket av føringer/lover fra brasilianske myndigheter 
i. Local content 
ii. Eierskap 
iii. Føringer med innvirkning på inngangsstrategi? 
2.5 Nettverksaktører i internasjonaliseringsprosessen 
1. Har bedriften et internasjonalt kontaktnettverk? 
2. Hvem er bedriftens sentrale samarbeidspartnere? 
a. Rolle 
b. Hvordan har samarbeidet utviklet seg over tid? 
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3. Støtte fra Innovasjon Norge (IN) 
a. Bidrar deltakelsen i Navigator-prosjektet til en enklere internasjonaliseringsprosess? Hvordan? 
b. Bruker dere støtte fra IN utenom Navigator-prosjektet? 
4. Støtte fra andre aktører 
a. Får bedriften støtte fra andre aktører?  
i. Intsok, handelskammer, ambassade, andre bedrifter, konsulentselskaper 
ii. Hvordan ble kontakten opprettet? 
1. Profesjonelle/private nettverk 
2. Nettverk fra tidligere arbeid, eller utarbeidet i forkant av internasjonalisering? 
b. I hvilken form kommer denne støtten? 
c. Hvilken støtte er høyest verdsatt? Kommer bidragene i ulike deler av 
internasjonaliseringsprosessen?  
 
5. Risikoidentifikasjon 
1. Hva ligger dere i begrepet risiko/hvordan tolker dere begrepet? 
a. Below target performance 
b. Deviation from expected value 
c. Unpredictability of outcome variables 
2. Hvordan identifiseres risikofaktorer i internasjonaliseringsprosessen? 
a. Hvilke faktorer tas hensyn til? (Environmental risk (political, legal), industry risk, 
organizational/firm risk etc.) 
i. Hvilke faktorer regner dere som viktigst? 
1. Noen produktrelaterte risikofaktorer? 
2. Er dette avhengig av land? 
ii. Finnes det en «best practice» for risikoindentifikasjon? 
b. Gjøres alt internt, eller brukes også eksterne aktører for risikoidentifikasjon? 
i. Hvilke? (Innovasjon Norge, analyseselskaper, nettverksaktører)  
c. Brukes egne verktøy/modeller i denne prosessen? 
3. Hvordan evalueres ulike risikofaktorer 
a. Kvantifiseres risiko? 
b. Evalueres risikofaktorene samlet, eller invividuelt? 
i. Hvordan sammneliknes risikofaktorer av ulik natur? 
4. Hvordan integrerer dere funnene i en risikoanalyse i strategiutviklings-
/internasjonaliseringsprosessen? 
a. Risikoanalyse før strategiutvikling? 
b. Kontinuerlig risikoanalyse fulgt av strategijusteringer? 
i. Låses strategien? Når? 
c. Sees mulig gevinst i sammenheng med mulig tap, eller er det en tendens til å overse mulige tap? 
5. Hvor høyt prioriteres identifisering, evaluering og reduksjon av risiko i forhold til andre hensyn in 
internasjonaliseringsprosessen? 
a. E.g. Markedsanalyser, partnersøk 
6. Hvordan vil dere anslå risikobildet i forsøket med å gå inn i det brasilianske markedet i forhold til 
andre prosjekter bedriften har gjennomført? 
 
6. Strategier for risiko-håndtering 
1. Kan noen risikofaktorer påvirkes av deres valg? 
a. Har risiko en relasjon til return? Får man noe igjen for å ta risiko? 
b. Kan risiko kontrolleres, reverseres eller unngås? Er det eventuelt ren gambling? 
c. Vil du si at bedriften er risikoavers, eller risikotakere? 
i. Hva med beslutningstakerne? 
ii. Hvordan påvirker bedriftens situasjon dette? 
1. Kan bedriften ta mer/mindre risiko hvis det går generelt bra/dårlig? 
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2. Hvilke strategier brukes/har blitt brukt for å håndtere risikoelementer? 
a. Internalisering/eksternalisering av prosesser 
b. Risiko trade-offs 
i. Location, entry commitment, revenue share 
c. Strategiske risikotiltak 
i. Imitasjon, avoidance, fleksibilitet, samarbeid, kontrolll 
d. Exit-strategier 
3. Har det blitt vurdert å dra gradvis utfra Norge, til nærliggende land først? 
a. Hvorfor, hvorfor ikke? 
4. I hvilken grad spiller kostnader (e.g. transaksjonskostnader) en rolle under valg av strategi? 
a. Transaksjonskostnader ved samarbeid vs. transaksjonskostnader ved internalisering 
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11.5 Timeline of central events affecting the Brazilian petroleum 
industry 
Year(s) Event(s) 
1950s and 
1960s 
 The Brazilian economy grows steadily, largely financed with foreign debt 
1953  Petróleo Brasileiro, or Petrobras, is created to fill the role of a state monopolist in the Brazilian oil industry. 
Petrobras was established before any meaningful oil resources were found in Brazil and relied on government 
subsidies until the 1970s.  
 Following the birth of Petrobras, there is an early debate on whether international oil companies should be 
allowed to operate in Brazil. The slogan “keep the Brazilian oil for Brazilians” was used to mark opposition to 
IOCs, and resembles slogans used to defend the current pre-salt production sharing regime.  
1955  Onshore oil is found in the Amazon, but the field proves to be non-commercial 
1963  Centro de Pesquisas Leopoldo Américo Miguez de Mello (CENPES), Petrobras’ R&D unit is created 
1964  Start of a 21-year military rule in Brazil, which is said to have given Petrobras a stable environment for growth 
and development of technical capabilities 
1968  First offshore discovery in the Guaricema field at a depth of 30 m 
1970s  Oil shortages lead to rapid oil price hikes in 1973 and 1979. The oil shock slows economic growth in Brazil 
while inflation rates and the foreign debt burden increases.  
1974  Offshore oil is discovered in the Campos Basin. Petrobras has little technological capability to operate 
offshore and cooperates with IOCs to extract the offshore oil. Later offshore projects move from shallow to 
deeper waters, and the Campos basin is regarded as an important R&D “laboratory” for the Brazilian 
petroleum sector.  
1980s  The annual inflation level reached 110 % in 1980, and the inflation level soared for the next 15 years.  
 The government tries to reduce the effects of the aggressive inflation by linking wages to price increases. 
Instead, the result is a vicious cycle of price increases  
 The Brazilian government’s capacity to invest in infrastructure is very limited for the next two decades 
1985  The military rule ends  
1990-1994  Inflation peaked in 1994 when prices for a period rose by 2100 % 
1994  A new currency, the Real is introduced and pegged to the US dollar, and price rises are under control as a 
consequence of the Real Plan.  
 Foreign direct investment (FDI) increases dramatically 
1997  Petrobras’ monopolistic power is loosened a part of a broader privatization reform 
 The national petroleum agency ANP is created 
1999  ANP starts to run annual licensing rounds and foreign firms are invited to drill for oil (Economist, April 16th 
2002) 
 International oil companies that enter the Brazilian market prefer to form joint ventures with Petrobras, as 
Petrobras has superior knowledge on Brazilian geology an political conditions 
 Exchange-rate peg is abandoned, the Real is allowed to float 
2000  Productivity of Brazilian workers grew by a meager 0.2 %, compared to a productiveness growth of 4 % in 
China in the same period. This is largely attributed to lack of investment in personnel and technology by 
Brazilian firms.  
2001  The Petrobras 36 (P-36) platform sinks in the Roncador oil field, killing 11 workers 
2002  The Brazilian oil market is liberalized and concession rounds for oil fields start. Local content is required in 
the block licensing rounds.  
2005  High oil prices allows higher offshore exploration activity by Petrobras and IOCs 
2006  Petrobras, British Gas (BG), Repsol and GALP announced that they had found oil 300 km off the coast of 
Brazil at depths up to 7000 m. The discovered oil field was originally called Tupi, and commercial production 
started in 2010. The Tupi field was later renamed Lula, in honor of the Brazilian president from 2003-2010,  
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.  
 Brazil is self-sufficient with oil 
2007  More pre-salt oil fields are discovered. Licensing of pre salt blocks is stopped until 2009 due to development 
of a new licensing regime.  
2008  The Brazilian economy escapes the global recession relatively unharmed, and is one of the last countries into 
the financial crisis and is of the first countries to escape the crisis. Average annual GDP growth from 2008-
2011 was 4 %  
 Activity in the Brazilian offshore market was only to a small extent affected by the global financial crisis  
2009  Brazil becomes the second-largest destination for foreign direct investment of all developing countries, after 
China. 
2010  First oil produced in the pre-salt Tupi (Lula) field 
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 USD 70 billion is raised in a Petrobras share offering, the largest ever. USD 45 billion was raised by the 
Brazilian government.  
 From 2008-2010, Petrobras increased its R&D spending fivefold, to more than USD 800 per year 
 From 2005-2010, more than half of all deep water oil discoveries are done on the Brazilian continental shelf.  
2012  The oil and gas industry accounts for about 10 % of the Brazilian GDP.  
 Personal and corporate taxes amount to 38 % of GDP, limiting investment in human resources, technology 
and equipment 
2015 
(expected) 
 Petrobras is expected to be the world’s largest oil producer 
2020 
(expected) 
 Brazil is expected to be among the world’s top five oil producers by 2020  (The Economist 2011b). Petrobras 
has set a 2020 production target of 6.4 million barrels of oil equivalents per day (boed), of which 2 milllion are 
to come from the pre-salt Santos basin. The Swiss bank Credit Suisse forecasts a 2020 production of 4.6 
million boed.  
 Petrobras plans to drill 1000 wells by 2020, at a cost of USD 100 billion 
 40.5 % of Brazilian oil production is to come from pre-salt fields by 2020 
 The oil and gas industry is expected to account for 25 % of the national economy 
 
The timeline is based on the following sources: (De Oliveira 2012; Gall 2011; Inventure 
Management 2011; PetroNews 2011; Rystad Energy 2010; Sharma 2012; The Economist 2009b, 
2010, 2011b, 2012a; Thurber, Hults & Heller 2011; World Oil Online 2011) 
  
Appendices 
xiii 
 
11.6 Key actors in the Brazilian petroleum industry 
Key actors in the Brazilian petroleum sector 
Operators 
National oil company (NOC) 
 
 
 
Petróleo Brasileiro (Petrobras) 
Petrobras is a global energy conglomerate, involved with oil 
exploration and production, gas pipelines, petrochemicals, electricity 
production, and ethanol and biodiesel production. The company is a 
world leader in deep water oil exploration and production and has a 
dominant position in the Brazilian petroleum market.  
 
Petrobras operates more than 40 deep-water production units, more 
than the 2nd, 3rd and 4th largest offshore operators combined. The 
investments made by Petrobras are regarded as a key driver of industry 
activity, and a majority the investments are made in the pre-salt fields. 
75 % The company is expected to be the world’s largest oil producer 
by 2015, and the staff is expected to grow from the current level of 
77 000 to 103 000 by the same year.  
International oil companies (IOCs) 
 
e.g. Exxon-Mobil, Statoil, Chevron, Shell, 
Conoco-Phillips, BP-Amoco, OGX 
IOCs operate alone or in partnerships in in the non-pre salt fields, and 
in a partnership with Petrobras in pre salt fields. Some of the key 
actors:  
 
OGX: Is the largest private Brazilian oil company. Produced first oil in 
January 2012.The firm is known as less bureaucratic, more flexible and 
more accessible than Petrobras. 
Suppliers 
Engineering, procurement and 
construction (EPC) actors 
 
e.g. Transocean, Halliburton, 
Schlumberger, Aker Solutions, Aibel and 
FMC 
 
EPC actors are often met with a local content requirement of around 
60 % on projects, which is passed on to suppliers.  
Some of the largest actors are  
Specialized suppliers Specializes in certain areas of the oil and gas supply chain. Norwegian 
suppliers are highly competent several areas, such as seismic surveys, 
drilling technology, process and materials technology, and subsea 
equipment  
Government agencies 
Industry regulators 
The National Agency of Petroleum, 
Natural Gas and Biofuels (ANP) 
ANP is responsible for issuing exploration licenses and ensuring 
compliance with regulations, such as local content requirements.  
Petrosal State owned entity with ownership and administration rights of the 
pre-salt blocks. 50 % of Petrosal’s revenues is to be allocated to 
financing science and technology education 
Banks 
The Brazilian National Development 
Bank (BNDES) 
BNDES is a heavy corporate lender and a tool for indirect government 
ownership, accounting for nearly 25 % of corporate debt in Brazil. Its 
lending capacity is said to approach saturation.  
Table 28 - Key actors in the Brazilian petroleum sector 
Information compiled from (De Oliveira 2012; Inventure Management 2011; The Economist 
2009a, 2012a; Utenriksdepartementet 2011) 
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11.7 A-Categories: Cybernetica 
RQ1 – Cybernetica 
 
A11-01 It is oil and gas we are 
considering in Brazil - although 
it is really our third and least 
developed business area or 
market 
A11-02 The natural choice 
with regards to oil and gas 
would be to sell to Statoil, but 
the consultancy role is pacifying 
us in that direction 
A11-03 We have tried selling a 
new application of a technology, 
that has not been used on 
platforms anywhere in the world  
A11-04 We think it is unwise 
to aim too broadly; you need a 
certain amount of industry 
knowledge to sell these products 
A11-05 The potential benefits 
of applying our technology are 
often invisible to the customer. 
This makes it hard getting a new 
customer relationship on its 
feet.  
A11-06 Getting new clients is 
very hard work. We do some 
cold calling, and it is often here 
you get a first sign of interest. 
However, it might take years 
from this phase until we can sell 
an application. 
A11-07 The oil industry is a 
very hard industry to sell in. It is 
very, very large and fractioned. 
We are like a mosquito, no one 
has heard about us. 
A11-08 We cannot even 
present at the conferences - 
which could have strengthened 
our position as experts within 
the field 
A11-09 Our experience is that 
the best practice for sales is to 
get hold of some kind of 
manager and get a meeting. As a 
small company, you do not get 
to meet the managers of a large 
oil company like Statoil. We 
have to convince the foot 
soldiers, which in turn have to 
sell the project internally.   
A11-10 ABB has been a 
competitor to us in some ways, 
but no one has really sold this 
technology and gotten it 
implemented offshore. I do not 
know how high ambitions ABB 
has, I know they have 
ambitions, but it is difficult to 
say. 
A11-11 It is very complicating 
for a small firm like us to 
establish in an expensive place 
like Rio, with a single customer 
and time-consuming 
establishment processes. 
A11-12 It is very expensive to 
have an office there with a 
single employee. First you have 
to hire him, then keep him from 
quitting, and pay his wages – 
and then maybe also having to 
wait a year on Petrobras when 
having to pay him salary. 
A11-13 Installing 
instrumentation on a running 
processing plant is hard. It 
might have to happen under a 
planned maintenance shutdown. 
Then it might become a 
resource problem, and although 
the cost of adding the 
instrumentation is small, it 
might drown in all the tasks to 
be done within the shutdown. 
A11-14 It is hard to get a clear 
answer to the local content 
question. It is difficult to 
separate legal demands from 
managerial wishes. And in the 
end it is hard for us to use the 
law against them – they can use 
the law against us, but we 
cannot use the law against them. 
A11-15 Innovasjon Norge is 
very willing to tell Petrobras 
about the possibility of 
financing the project through an 
IRD. If the Petrobras research 
project ends up as a joint effort 
between us and the Norwegian 
state, our conditions are quite 
bad. We end up paying for most 
of it ourselves, with a little 
something from the 
government. Thus, in the end, 
we will have been paying to do 
research for Petrobras. 
A11-16 The longer we do this 
without getting return on 
investment, the harder it will be 
for us to continue. Just counting 
hours, it gets quite expensive 
before we get any return. 
A11-17 Risk includes all 
unknown factors at the time of 
decision. For instance factors 
that was uncertain or unknown 
at the time when we decided to 
enter Brazil, but that in the end 
will affect the bottom line; that 
it is more complicated, takes 
longer time, gives less payback 
etc. 
A11-18 The risk of entering 
Brazil is large. It is a hard 
country to do business in – 
compared to other markets we 
are in – and we also skip several 
steps. We “should” have started 
with the home market, getting 
as far as we could there before 
taking on the North Sea Basin. 
 A11-19 Our company is very 
small, and the roles are very 
fluent. We mostly do this on an 
ad-hoc basis, arranging a 
meeting and deciding 
something. We are light-footed 
in that aspect, you would 
certainly get another answer 
talking to a larger company. 
A11-20 If a larger company 
was to do something, they 
would immediately put a 
specialist on the task, focusing 
on processes, the decision-
making basis, etc. When you 
only see a part of the total 
picture, you need much more 
rigid processes. 
A11-21 We evaluate risk based 
on two aspects; our long-term 
strategy and a criterion of always 
budgeting with positive returns.  
A11-22 Our long-term strategy 
is to run the operations from 
our Trondheim office as long as 
possible. Establishing offices in 
other locations increases both 
risk and cost. 
A11-23 The fact that we always 
budget with positive returns 
strongly influences which 
projects we can and cannot take 
on. 
A11-24 We evaluate risk on the 
basis that we will operate all 
projects from Norway and not 
establish any presence in Brazil. 
Then the local content 
requirements – which seem to 
be designed to hinder just that – 
are a challenge. 
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A11-25 The most important 
thing learnt during the Brazil 
trip was how bureaucratic the 
Brazilian society is. The more 
we have seen, the clearer it gets 
that we would be dependent on 
someone else if we wanted to 
establish a presence in Brazil. 
A11-26 Right now, we are 
focusing on getting a research 
deal with Petrobras, but if we 
eventually want to something 
else, we will seek companies 
with relation to Norway – to 
exploit a Norwegian network 
towards Brazil. 
A11-27 Steinar had time to 
work with these issues, but 
without him the pot of available 
resources is smaller. 
Consequently we have to peel 
away aspects that could be 
interesting to evaluate, and 
focus on one thing; getting a 
project with Petrobras. I think 
the outcome would have been 
the same anyway, but at least 
this is the way we do it after he 
quit 
A11-28 We do not feel a need 
for using formal fault-tree 
analysis or statistical tools for 
evaluating the risk. We have 
built organizational structures 
for risk reduction including a 
quality system, contract 
templates that have been 
developed with lawyers, a strict 
employment process and a 
business culture of 
responsibility and accountability. 
A11-29 If we do not get anything out of this, what is the cost? The risk relates to a financial loss. Also, potential liabilities, losses and 
law suits related to failures. We did not evaluate this last risk in any detail, but would we traditionally use lawyers and insurance agents 
to make sure we are covered if anything goes wrong 
RQ2 – Cybernetica 
 
A21-01 We believe that 
Petrobras, since they recruit a 
high amount of managers from 
Cenpes and have adopted a long 
term technology strategy, will be 
more open for our technology 
than Statoil in the North Sea 
A21-02 The reason we chose 
to enter Brazil is a belief that it 
might be easier there – that they 
are more interested as they have 
a different perspective than the 
actors in the North Sea. 
 A21-03 We are not sure 
whether Tri-Solutions is a direct 
competitor to us, or if they try 
to compete against ABB and 
Hannibal – it is a bit hard to 
evaluate based on the 
information we have today. 
A21-04 I am a bit uncertain 
concerning what technology 
Petrobras has access to in 
relation to process simulation, 
but I think they are missing a 
considerable amount 
A21-05 We have mainly done 
network-based sales. It is just 
recently that we have begun 
calling people we don’t know 
A21-06 We ordinarily would 
compete against Hannibal and 
ABB, both much larger than us, 
but have targeted a niche where 
the processes are so complex 
that their standard products will 
not work. 
A21-07 It can be both an 
advantage and a disadvantage 
being present in three markets, 
but there is a certain level of 
sturdiness to it. 
A21-08 Having a local office in 
Brazil makes it very 
complicated, so it is much better 
for us if we can manage without 
it. 
A21-09 Customer relationships 
we have had have usually started 
with a research project. 
A21-10 We have considered 
the risk of entering the 
Navigator project as low, 
considering that the 
participation fee is quite low. 
Nevertheless, we do realize that 
the real cost is higher due to the 
time we put into it. 
A21-11 We are such a small 
company, that any patent 
dispute with Petrobras, ABB or 
Hannibal would be hopeless – 
we would have gone bankrupt 
before winning any trial. 
A21-12 If we write a patent 
application, explaining in detail 
all the smart things we do, a 
competitor will just read the 
application and implement it. 
A21-13 It might be an equally 
good IPR protection to have a 
product that it takes time to 
copy. If you start from scratch it 
might take 10 years before it is 
as mature as ours. 
A21-14 The size of an eventual 
loss will not be devastating to 
us. At least we will have to take 
some decision before we reach 
such a point. 
A21-15 We are able to handle a 
failure in Brazil, and we believe 
there is a large potential there if 
we succeed. It is really this that 
pushes us to enter Brazil. 
A21-16 You can say that we 
have quantified the risk, but it is 
not really structured with 
numbers. It is rather in order of 
magnitude. 
A21-17 Skipping steps in the 
internationalization process 
makes the risk higher, as we 
might do mistakes that we could 
have fixed in the Norwegian 
market first. 
A21-18 We have not really 
made any large commitments 
yet. The only sunk cost is being 
a part of the Navigator project. 
Therefore we do not really run 
the risk of losing a lot of money 
backing out. And it will be like 
this until we have signed 
something. 
A21-19 It will probably take 
more time in Brazil. It takes 
time to build the model, and 
then it is uncertain how long 
time Petrobras will need to 
install missing measuring 
instruments in the process 
system, and we will need to get 
offshore which implies a 
chamber and a helicopter seat. 
You are likely to have the lowest 
priority in these aspects, so that 
might be a challenge. 
A21-20 
It might be easier for Petrobras 
to agree to an IRD, but who 
knows how long it will take to 
get through Petrobras’ project 
approval process. We suspect it 
might take years. 
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A21-21 We evaluated that if we 
did not succeed, we could 
handle the loss. The downside is 
limited, while the upside is large. 
There will be several 
incremental decisions before a 
larger commitment is made; you 
do not have to do B because 
you did A.  
A21-22 A specific problem 
with our efforts in the oil 
industry is that we have not 
succeeded in selling our product 
to the industry yet. So it is kind 
of a long shot, I mean, you take 
a risk trying to sell a product 
that we do not know will 
succeed. 
A21-23 Growth in the oil 
industry does not necessarily 
imply growth in our segment. 
Our services focus on 
improving operating margins, 
and oil firms generally have 
good margins, making sales in 
this industry more difficult.  
A21-24 We are ambivalent 
with regard to cooperation with 
Tri-Solutions. Petrobras asked 
us to contact them, and we did, 
but we have not heard anything 
from them after that. We feel 
that we have done our part, and 
will not do much unless 
Petrobras drags them to the 
table 
A21-25 We have joined the 
Navigator project under the 
condition that we are not 
establishing a presence in Brazil. 
If we want to take out the full 
potential, the risk will naturally 
increase – this will require a new 
evaluation, probably involving 
more aspects than the current 
evaluation. 
A21-26 When we evaluated the 
risk of the Brazil project, we 
made a budget and evaluated 
the cost related to the project 
with the available budget 
resources. We saw that we had 
the necessary resources; if we 
lose the money, we can afford it. 
A21-27 Brazil is a country that 
we have studied a little, and we 
had some contacts before the 
Navigator project contacted us. 
However, we regarded the 
participation as a way of 
performing much of the 
necessary knowledge gathering 
– which we would have had to 
do regardless – for a limited 
cost. 
A21-28 We were skeptical 
towards an IRD agreement, but 
this eventually became the 
solution. I felt that Innovasjon 
Norge marketed the IRD 
solution in a way that blocked 
any chance of getting a real 
project in place. I still think so, 
but have learnt that an IRD 
agreement can be a natural first 
step due to Petrobras’ 
circumstantial bureaucracy – 
with an IRD agreement we 
choose a path with much less 
bureaucracy. 
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11.8 A-Categories: Norske Ventiler 
RQ1 – Norske Ventiler 
 
A12-01 In many cases we are 
both a supplier and a 
competitor to the valve trading 
companies; a strange 
constellation in terms of market 
relations. 
A12-02 Our competitors 
cannot match us in terms of 
delivery time, but we cannot 
match them in terms of volume. 
 A12-03 A market trend is 
higher demands to both 
documentation and materials – 
most pressingly in the subsea 
segment. This raises the entry 
barriers, which is good. 
Nevertheless, it is incredibly 
resource demanding; we re-
certified a valve last year, paying 
more than 1 million just in 
document fees. 
A12-04 One of the hardest 
things you do in a marked is to 
choose the right agent. There is 
a lot of interested actors – most 
with someone else in their 
portfolio as well. 
A12-05 It is very hard to rely 
on telephone contact across the 
globe. You have to have a 
relation that you can develop 
further. 
A12-06 The biggest challenges 
to entering the Brazilian market 
are the local content regulations, 
and how the government 
handles them in the years to 
come. 
A12-07 You can be copied, 
but then again they have to get 
their products approved. This is 
too resource demanding, time 
consuming and expensive – and 
you usually get very little in 
return. 
A12-08 The largest risk if you 
establish a subsidiary in Brazil is 
the risk of losing money. A 
worker in Brazil is equally 
expensive as a Norwegian. 
Brazil is an industrialized 
country with regards to costs. 
A12-09 To establish an office 
in Brazil, with regard to our size, 
is not something I think is wise. 
It will imply a very high risk, so 
you will need very certain 
estimates on expected sales 
volumes. 
 A12-10 A Brazilian worker 
has the same employment 
protection as a Norwegian 
worker, so if you make a 
mistake here it is difficult to get 
out without losing a 
considerable amount of money. 
 
A12-11 We have not done 
anything to map the competitive 
climate in Brazil. But if you look 
at the Gulf of Mexico, Brazil 
will probably look like that in 
about 5 years –every valve 
producer and valve trader will 
be present. 
A12-12 We have not used any 
formal methods to evaluate risk, 
except what you might call 
normal reasoning; if you need 
an organization of 10 employees 
in Brazil, you need wages, office 
rent -you can use the 
multiplication table to find the 
exposure. Then you have to be 
able to relate this to your cost 
limit, and be very certain that 
you have a volume that can 
cover and defend such an 
investment. 
A12-13 We do not really see 
any risk factors related to the 
Brazilian market entry as long as 
we stick to their known 
customer constellation. These 
are customers we have served 
for a number of years, and we 
assume that their Brazilian 
subsidiaries have the same 
internal procedures as their 
Norwegian offices.   
A12-14 Our resource base 
limits how thoroughly we can 
investigate the Brazilian market. 
We do not have an abundance 
of resources, and this is also a 
reason for the strategy we have 
chosen in Brazil. 
A12-15 We usually say that we only serve one market – the global 
market. I believe it is old fashioned to talk about a domestic 
market and a foreign market. We have to acknowledge that 
Norway is a small country; if we want to work in this market, the 
market is global. 
RQ2 – Norske Ventiler 
 
A22-01 We believe the 
margins in the subsea market 
are more promising, and there 
are fewer players. This gives us 
more room than in the 
conventional valve market. 
A22-02 A combination of 
cultivating a specialist position 
in the conventional valve 
market, and a development of 
our subsea position, will be our 
main strategy over the next 5 
years. 
A22-03 As long as more oil is 
consumed than produced 
globally, a decrease in the oil 
price is unlikely. With an oil 
price at the current level, most 
of the projects considered by 
the large operators will offer 
attractive returns on investment 
– thus ensuring a high level of 
activity. 
A22-04 We cannot travel these 
areas the traditional way as it is 
very tiresome to travel quarterly 
from Norway to Australia. 
Hence, we need someone acting 
as our extended arm - the 
further away you get, the more 
dependent you get on some 
kind of external representation. 
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A22-05 For us, billing and 
delivering the equipment to the 
Norwegian subsidiaries of 
international EPC companies is 
risk free, and far preferable to 
billing to an address in Angola. 
A22-06 As it looks like now, 
with the local content 
restrictions, we will prioritize 
subsea valves in Brazil. There 
seems to be fewer challenges 
related to local content there 
than with the traditional valves. 
A22-07 You have to evaluate 
whether agents have contacts, 
competence and necessary 
motivation. There has to be an 
agreement that they promote 
you, so obviously some 
numbers must be the basis of an 
agreement. This is like 
everything else, nothing comes 
for free. 
A22-08 In the end, the choice 
of an agent is strongly correlated 
to gut feeling. In addition to 
traits that can be documented 
and information from third 
parties, the gut feeling is 
important; does it work, is there 
chemistry, are they ready to pull 
up their sleeves for us. 
A22-09 We use the NCE 
Subsea cluster for meetings and 
relationship building. Even if we 
have decided upon a strategy, it 
is very comfortable to get 
feedback from people that have 
done what you want to do, or 
have successively established 
elsewhere. To get a 
confirmation that what you do 
seems somewhat right. 
A22-10 You can analyse 
yourself to death, both 
considering costs and possible 
scenarios. However, in the end 
it balances on whether you really 
believe in it, if the organization 
believes in it, and if there is any 
substance to it. 
A22-11 I usually say that there 
is nothing as underrated as good 
relationships. Being a cluster 
member, meeting firms you can 
identify yourself and your 
product with – it is usually free, 
and far preferable to paying for 
consultants that will tell you 
whatever you want to hear 
without much substance. 
A22-12 We have kept a low 
profile; we have visited Brazil 
twice, talked to potential 
customers, but not undertaken 
any commitments besides 
answering potential RFQs. 
A22-13 If a large request is 
getting more likely, we have to 
put more into it. Up until now 
we have just used a limited 
amount on travel and to 
evaluate the market. If things 
develop we have to put more 
money into it, but we do it in 
that order.   
A22-14 We are following the 
activity level in the general oil 
market and were affected by the 
financial crisis, as well as an 
activity vacuum in the wake of 
Statoil renegotiating 
maintenance contracts. 
A22-15 I have travelled the 
world, and have a very relaxed 
attitude towards cultural 
differences. There are cultural 
differences, but then again; 
smile to the world and the world 
will smile back. There is a lot of 
literature out there, but I have a 
relaxed attitude towards it. 
A22-16 Innovasjon Norge and 
Intsok publish relatively detailed 
reports on the outlook of 
different markets, and this is our 
primary source of information 
for market evaluation 
A22-17 After internal 
discussions of the possibility to 
enter Brazil, we did an 
evaluation of the Brazilian valve 
market using numbers from 
Innovasjon Norge and Intsok. It 
gave us a firm understanding of 
opportunities in this market for 
the next 10-15 years, and we 
evaluated the possibilities for 
establishing contacts via 
Innovasjon Norge, Intsok, or 
other governmental entities.  
A22-18 Opening an office in 
Brazil is not something that we 
plan to do at this stage – I think 
it is too resource demanding 
and that we are too small. But 
that may change in 5-10 years’ 
time.  
A22-19 The large markets are, 
and will be Brazil and Australia, 
besides the Mexican Gulf. And 
if you are going to take part in 
what is about to happen there in 
the next 10 years, you have to 
get in position now 
A22-20 I do not put any 
weight on the fact that we have 
sold valves to Brazil. I put much 
more weight on the presence of 
the larger engineering 
companies – Aker Solutions, 
FMC, Oceaneering, Subsea7 – 
which are all principally 
Norwegian companies, towards 
whom we are a qualified 
supplier. 
A22-21 Although there 
probably are Brazilian 
engineering companies, they are 
probably not very large. When 
all the large Norwegian, or 
Western-European, engineering 
companies are established, I do 
not think there is much room 
for a small Brazilian company. 
A22-22 As long as we do not 
have a strategy involving 
establishment, I find an exit 
strategy irrelevant.  
A22-23 We do no longer 
consider the commodity valve 
market in Brazil as a feasible 
exploit. If we get a fee of 70 % 
on top of our already high 
prices, we will outcompete 
ourselves in any market. 
A22-24 I think any 
competitors to our subsea 
valves in Brazil lies far ahead in 
time. There are large costs 
related to product development, 
and it is time consuming as well, 
so it will take years before other 
actors enter the Brazilian market 
offering similar products. 
A22-25 
Selling valves for use in Brazil 
through the large engineering 
companies makes it just like any 
other sale. This simplifies the 
process, and we avoid 
complicating the process 
through having to consider all 
criteria related to other entry 
forms. 
A22-26 
When we started the Navigator 
project, we had a much broader 
set of possible strategies for 
handling the Brazilian market. 
However, after getting more 
knowledge of the market, and 
taking our resources into 
account, we landed on a strategy 
of focusing on our Norwegian 
customers established in Brazil. 
A22-27 
When we chose to focus on the Norwegian customers entities in 
Brazil, which after all covers 60-70 % of the market, the whole 
strategy became significantly easier. We did not have to consider 
distributors, agents, or an eventual establishment, making the 
strategy less resource and cost demanding than the original 
alternatives. 
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11.9 A-Categories: SafeClean 
RQ1 – SafeClean 
 
A13-01 We saw that we needed 
more legs to support us, that is 
why we entered the oil industry  
 A13-02 The main challenge 
for us has been to get into 
position to make a thorough 
product presentation. 
A13-03 There are many 
companies world-wide, but we 
have to admit that we know too 
little about the competitive 
environment outside Norway. 
A13-04 Part of our main 
challenge is that we are never 
going to have a high 
predictability on future 
assignment. Regular 
maintenance shutdowns are 
possible to predict, but 80 % of 
our work is non-shutdown 
operations. The maintenance 
intervals are also subject to 
external factors; a high oil price 
will make the companies 
postpone maintenance. 
A13-05 We have used Alex 
Osterwalder’s model to evaluate 
three different business models 
for market entry; a franchise, 
use of an agent and establishing 
a Brazilian entity. In a 
workshop, several employees 
have simulated the business 
models based on the currently 
available information. 
A13-06 The size of our wallets 
is another reason that we cannot 
take any decision with the 
current information. We cannot 
risk locking up 5-10 millions in a 
Brazilian expansion without a 
certain payback. 
A13-07 We try to uncover 
what is different between the 
Norwegian and Brazilian 
market. The customers’ 
challenges are exactly the same, 
but doing business down there 
is completely different. 
A13-08 It is important to 
evaluate our position in a 
partnership. If we have a too 
weak position, we risk being 
played over the side-line and 
losing a market. On the other 
hand, being too strongly 
represented increases the risk on 
our side as well. 
A13-09 The primary problem will 
be to get equipment through 
custom clearance – that is where 
things stop. If we have agreements 
with customers, and the equipment 
gets stuck in customs for two 
months, we will be out before we 
have really started. 
 A13-10 We are not exposed to 
cultural differences, corruption 
and bribes at home. Down there 
you will be exposed 
automatically, so you will have 
to think this through before you 
go. 
A13-11 We have discovered a 
large difference in terms of 
prices on products and services. 
We thought the price level 
would be lower than at home, 
but the opposite is the case. 
This is of course also related to 
the cost of doing business there, 
and ultimately to which business 
model we choose. 
A13-12 In Norway we have 
enjoyed loyal employees that 
have gained solid experience. A 
question in Brazil is whether the 
workforce will be equally loyal – 
an important factor with regards 
to the services we deliver. 
A13-13 We are very aware of 
the cultural differences, and 
have noticed some of the 
differences on the visits to 
Brazil. This is one of the 
challenges, everything is going 
great now in the sales phase, but 
the picture is guaranteed to 
change when we enter the 
operational phase. 
A13-14 There is a very positive 
atmosphere in the meetings we 
have had. Some of the danger 
lies just here, they are always 
positive, and you seldom get to 
hear negative feedback. 
A13-15 One of our biggest 
threats, a threat which we will 
try to deal with through the 
business model we choose, is 
unwanted technology leakage to 
partners or competitors. We are 
more worried about this in 
Brazil than in Norway. 
 A13-16 There are many 
elements of risk. We have been 
talking about leakage of 
technology, the economic 
impact, and then there is the 
possibility of making mistakes in 
Brazil – damaging reputation 
and that sort of things. There 
are many factors to evaluate. 
 A13-17 We use both internal 
and external sources to identify 
risk factors. The communication 
and commitment of Innovasjon 
Norge has been very positive; 
they offer a huge commitment 
and short response time. 
A13-18 It might sound wild, 
but the times where we get into 
position with the right persons, 
and get sufficient time to 
explain our concept, most often 
results in a test assignment. 
After a test assignment, we have 
a high resale factor through 
repeated assignments. If you 
break it down, the key to the 
whole sales process is getting in 
position to explain the effects of 
the concept. 
A13-19 The degree to which 
risk assessment is systematic 
does of course have something 
to do with resources, but it is 
also difficult to have a 
theoretical approach to this up 
front, Then you have to make 
up scenarios based on 
inadequate information. (…)We 
can always sit down and try to 
think about what will meet us, 
but we risk throwing it in the 
bin right afterwards 
A13-20 Entering British sector 
of the North Sea has been 
discussed within the 
organization. But it has only 
been loosely discussed, as we 
feel that we touch such a small 
part of the Norwegian market 
that we have to put focus there.   
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A13-21 If we were to enter 
another market in the North Sea 
instead of Brazil, I think we 
would have made the same 
considerations and gone 
through the same processes.  
But the distance is smaller, so I 
think it would have been easier 
to gain oversight of the market. 
Perhaps we could have made 
more rapid progress there.  
A13-22 We had not evaluated neither Brazil nor internationalization in general when Innovasjon 
Norge invited us to join the Navigator project. We were uncertain in the beginning - thinking that 
we still had much undone in the home marked – but decided to join based on a feeling that we could 
always pull out of the project. However, we have received much information during the project 
breaching barriers and mental barriers – so it’s really the process that makes us certain there is a 
potential that we want to spent time and resources on. 
RQ2 – SafeClean 
 
A23-01 The background for 
the second Brazil trip was a 
feeling that we lacked important 
information about our products’ 
attractiveness in the Brazilian 
market. This made it difficult to 
sort out the right strategies for 
market entry. It was not 
beneficial to use time and 
resources on planning before 
this question was answered. 
A23-02 Based on the 
information we have, we have 
made some drafts. We then 
have to get back to this as more 
information is available; make 
changes, adjustments until we 
reach a point where we can take 
the decision. 
A23-03 We have to be careful, 
and then you will get to a point 
where you have to make a 
strategic decision – but the 
foundation for such a choice is 
not solid enough. 
A23-04 We had thoughts 
when we started with this. Then 
the picture changes as you go 
along. In many ways we get 
more certain the further we go, 
but on the other hand we 
constantly get new information 
and there are many changes. 
A23-05 We work a twofold 
strategy on the importation 
problem. Through Innovasjon 
Norge we try to get in contact 
with agents or companies in the 
business of facilitating 
importation to Brazil. At home 
we contact actors that have 
experience from transport and 
logistics in the offshore industry 
–actors that are established in 
Brazil and known the system 
from their side. 
A23-06 We think working 
these two directions ought to 
make it possible to point to a 
practicable way through the 
custom clearance. Then we have 
to consolidate the information, 
and simulate a delivery. The 
simulation is likely to identify 
some fences that we have to 
evaluate further. 
A23-07 We try to increase the 
cultural consciousness of the 
firm, and also the corporate 
social responsibility awareness – 
especially concerning corruption 
and bribes. We are running a 
process there now, wanting to 
be up-front with regards to 
establishing routines and 
increase awareness concerning 
these problems. We believe this 
can have a preventive effect. 
A23-08 In a response to 
cultural differences, we have 
considered using Norwegian 
supervisors in a transition 
period, although the Brazilian’s 
will be running the operations in 
the long term. We have also 
though about doing it the other 
way around; bringing Brazilians 
with us on assignments in 
Norway. We are very conscious 
concerning this subject, then 
time will show if we were 
conscious enough. 
A23-09 We are very conscious 
about the limited negative 
feedback, and try to stimulate to 
questions to undercover 
underlying feelings. It is in these 
questions we feel there is a 
positive vibe towards the 
concept, and an interest. 
A23-10 We have not done any 
formal evaluation of risk – it 
might not be according to the 
textbooks – but you get a 
picture of it in the process. This 
said, we have to go through 
more formal processes to draw 
the risks. Up until now, we have 
not done any formal 
evaluations, except the 
continuous evaluations of 
individual factors.  
A23-11 You do a continuous 
evaluation of risk factors, 
discuss them and try to orient 
yourself – all the way comparing 
to the situation and home, and 
spotting differences. 
A23-12 The most important 
element when it comes to 
balance, or manage the risk is to 
gather as much information as 
possible. It is by no means 
insurmountable, but as it is new, 
it is important to get necessary 
information in order to 
understand how it works.  
 
 
 
 
 
Appendices 
xxi 
 
A23-13 We have considered 
patenting both chemicals and 
technology. However, if we had 
patented it, the technology 
would have been made visible to 
competitors. We think it would 
easy for a competitor to go 
around the patent by making 
small adjustments. 
A23-14 The largest competitor 
is the IKM. We know there are 
on the verge of establishing in 
Brazil. Although they do not 
have much presence there at 
present, we are certain they will 
put efforts into establishing in 
the market. However, they are a 
large company delivering more 
than chemical cleaning 
solutions; the chemical cleaning 
segment is likely not top 
priority. 
A23-15 We think we have a 
great advantage being a young 
company, staffed by persons 
that have no offshore 
experience to begin with but are 
recruited from local heavy 
industry with a solid safety 
philosophy. Operating offshore 
without offshore experience can 
be a strength as we are humble 
towards the offshore security 
regime. 
A23-16 The actors in the 
home market are well known. In 
Brazil, a preliminary 
investigation suggests that there 
are no actors in the market that 
can be compared to our 
solution. 
A23-17 A general agreement 
with Statoil will not affect our 
ability to handle a Brazilian 
expansion. If anything, it will 
lead to a greater predictability 
and an increased number of 
assignments. We believe the 
increase will be gradual. 
A23-18 What is a bit special 
concerning our efforts in Brazil 
is that we have chosen a strategy 
solely based on what is working 
at home; to get in position to 
perform an assignment. 
A23-19 Things we consider in 
the evaluation process include 
the cost structure, when we will 
get an income from the 
operations, how to build 
customer relations, which sale 
channels to use… - All this is 
constantly evaluated. 
A23-20 The importation 
regime is very different from 
what we are used to – very 
bureaucratic and rigid systems. 
The biggest showstopper seems 
to be the importation of input 
factors needed for an offshore 
pilot assignment. 
A23-21 Sorting out the waste 
disposal side of the process 
remains, there seems to be other 
regulations in place, but it 
should all be solvable. 
A23-22 While many regard 
local content with scepticism, 
we turn it around and believe it 
will give a competitive edge. At 
least it is a strength looking at it 
this way, and we will stimulate 
as much as possible to raise the 
local content. 
A23-23 In relation to 
macroeconomic conditions, we 
experience – and are told about 
– relatively stable conditions, 
and they have entered a phase 
of political stability. 
A23-24 An advantage is our 
focus towards production 
problems. We have solutions in 
relation to aspects that threaten 
the production, and money talks 
– also down there. 
A23-25 Risk in the expansion 
process is a crucial factor; we 
basically cannot afford to fail. It 
is vital to draw the total risk 
image, to plot it, and to evaluate 
each single element. 
A23-26 We have a goal is that 
in the next 6-12 months, we will 
do a pilot project in Brazil, 
where we bring all resources 
from Norway. Our hope is that 
the customer will be so 
interested in our services that it 
opens up for further expansion 
A23-27 Innovasjon Norge has an extensive network. They know 
who to go to, and then we can talk further with those contacts. It 
has been of great help.  
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11.10 A-Categories: Sperre 
RQ1 – Sperre 
 
A14-01 We do not want to dip 
into the markets of our clients. 
When they have bought a ROV 
from us, we are not going to 
take their jobs. So we only do 
ROV assignments on special 
occasions, or rent out a ROV to 
existing or new clients that want 
to see how things work before 
buying an own. 
A14-02 A drawback with being 
such a small firm is that we are 
not very good at standardizing 
the products, and that it is hard 
to keep oneself updated on 
technological trends – although 
we manage to do so. Things are 
happening very fast concerning 
TV and video, and you have to 
be updated to offer the best 
solutions to the customers.  
A14-03 We have delivered 
some ROVs to offshore area 
vessels, but we probably should 
make an effort to make 
ourselves more known. 
However, it boils down to how 
much resources we can direct 
to it [marketing]. 
A14-04 We also buy 
components from MacArtney, 
so we are both a supplier to 
them and a client for them. 
However, they also make 
winches and cameras, so it is 
also a competitor in some areas. 
A14-05 We could have stayed 
in Norway, selling two ROVs a 
year and surviving on this and 
maintenance, but we have 
higher ambitions. We realize we 
might be a competitor to the 
larger actors, but we try to hang 
in there. 
A14-06 The largest challenge 
operating or selling abroad must 
be to get equipment through 
customs clearance – with all the 
papers and commotion there. 
There is a lot to remember, what 
you should and should not do; 
and all these rules and regulations 
applicable in other countries. 
A14-07 If a Brazilian 
customer wants to service his 
ROV, we cannot ask him to 
send it to Norway for repairs. 
So we will need some kind of 
presence in Brazil to deal with 
this. 
 A14-08 A challenge entering 
the Brazilian market is to get a 
dialogue going with clients that 
might think our ROVs are a 
good choice – Petrobras and 
Statoil for instance. Because, as 
of now, we do not have a large 
network down there. 
A14-09 We realize that 
knowing the language is an 
advantage, being able to speak 
Portuguese ok. When I visited 
Brazil I did not know a single 
word, and you do not get far 
with that. 
A14-10 We are far too small to 
establish a sales office, or a 
subsidiary in Brazil. 
A14-11 We have not really 
identified any particular risks 
tied to the Brazilian expansion. 
In order to get the Brazilian 
content we can deliver the 
electronics, and they can weld 
and finish the assembly in 
Brazil - maybe even machine 
something. 
A14-12 We do not know what 
our competitors do in the 
Brazilian market. We have not 
managed to figure it out, 
although we have not used 
many resources on it.   
A14-13 We have to follow up 
MacArtney, back them up, we 
cannot just leave them all alone 
after signing an agreement. We 
have to consider it like a 
subsidiary down there, realizing 
that they need our support. 
A14-14 With the internet it is 
easy to search for an ROV 
supplier and send them a mail. 
We often get RFQs from 
countries like Iran, Iraq and 
China, and we make budgets 
before answering them to see if 
they are really interested. 
However, you end up doing a 
certain amount of offers to 
customers that you are not really 
expecting to hear back from.  
 A14-15 MacArtney has been 
in Brazil for about three years, 
but it was not straight forward 
for them – I think they 
stumbled a bit in the beginning. 
They hired the wrong manager, 
but I think the new one is 
better – I have met him. 
A14-16 To us risk would be to 
deliver faulty equipment, getting 
a bad reputation, but I cannot 
really remember any fatal faults. 
A14-17 They say that you have 
to have Brazilian content in 
Brazil, or pay full import fees – 
and that it is very expensive to 
get things into the country, 
meaning that you will have to 
charge double to have any 
profit. 
A14-18 You have to adjust to 
the Brazilians, they are more 
polite while we are more direct, 
there seems to be more hierarchy 
down there – everyone is not 
buddies with the boss – and they 
are not as punctual as we are. 
 
A14-19 We have been quite 
spoiled in our home market, 
always having a lot to do, so we 
do not have a specific business 
plan – although we 
subconsciously market 
ourselves at industry 
conventions and rely much on 
the word of mouth. 
 A14-20 We have not 
evaluated business risk up until 
now, but when we lose a 
tendering process we always ask 
why we did not succeed and put 
this into our quality system. 
A14-21 When we do routine assignments in the Norwegian market we have not specified any specific requirements with regards to 
risk, but in relation to foreign assignments we always perform a risk assessment prior to the job. 
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RQ2 – Sperre 
 
A24-01 We designed a new 
control system a couple of years 
ago, using the company 
Datarespons. We are able to do 
some C-programming ourselves, 
but on heavier programming 
tasks we have to outsource. 
A24-02 We have been selling 
to Russia. While many ask us 
how we dare to do it, and how 
we do it, we have not really 
experienced any problems there. 
A24-03 Concerning service in 
Brazil, we are planning to train 
MacArtney in Brazil to be 
equally good as the boys in our 
repair shop. Maybe bring them 
to Norway for training, so that 
they can be around our boys. 
A24-04 We hope that 
Innovasjon Norge can open 
some doors for us, in order to 
get the first contacts. And then 
we will also have to work more 
with MacArtney, to convince 
them to be our dealer down 
there. 
A24-05 It would be nice to 
figure out what our competitors 
think about Brazil. But it is 
really kind of like the 80s at 
home [the North Sea], so we 
have a good chance of 
succeeding if we get MacArtney 
interested in pushing our 
products. 
A24-06 If some of our 
equipment malfunctions we can 
be humble, saying it should not 
have happened and repair it. We 
put a lot of effort into 
documentation, and made a 
video film to illustrate the 
maintenance process – knowing 
that many people do not consult 
the manual before things go 
really wrong. 
A24-07 We have focused more 
on quality assurance lately; that 
we double check and routinely 
go over the equipment and 
components several times. 
A24-08 There is a certain 
distance in, but after you have 
become friends with a Brazilian 
– from what I have understood 
– you are really good friends. It 
might be harder to establish 
relations, but a female in the oil 
and gas industry is so rare that I 
think it is possible. 
A24-09 We have an open 
mind with regards to 
importation, we do not think it 
will be a huge problem. We just 
have to try and see how it goes, 
although I know there are 
special regulations in Brazil. We 
just have to cross the pitfalls 
when we get there, not taking 
the sorrows for granted. 
A24-10 I think we are 
dependent on finding a Brazilian 
partner, to really understand 
how the Brazilians are behaving 
– it is quite different how 
business is done there compared 
to at home. 
A24-11 Doing part of the 
production in Brazil should not 
be that hard. We can make the 
drawings, and they can do the 
machining. 
A24-12 We are not really 
worried about technology theft. 
The persons that want to make 
a ROV are able to, there are not 
that many secrets. 
A24-13 We cannot really say 
that the Brazilian navy chose us, 
because they did not actively 
choose us, but we can tell 
people that the Brazilian navy 
have our equipment on board. 
The navy holds a high status in 
Brazil; many Brazilians work in 
the navy. 
A24-14 The equipment 
includes live circuits, and while 
everything is done correctly 
from our side things can go 
wrong. Thinking towards the 
US, you could get sued. 
However, there are no alarm 
bells ringing considering any 
high-risk equipment or 
components. We have delivered 
70 ROV systems, so we have 
some experience. 
A24-15 When it gets to Brazil, 
I think we will succeed if we 
manage to get some sales and a 
good reputation. With regard to 
corruption, it seems like they 
have managed to come a long 
way. However, I think the laws 
down there are a bit more 
complicated than in Russia. 
A24-16 I have also heard 
stories about it going fine one 
time, but that equipment was 
stuck in the customs clearance 
for a long time the next time. 
There seem to be different 
interpretations of the law – and 
you do not really get to know 
why the equipment is held back. 
A24-17 You have a certain risk 
of failing, but we will manage to 
repair the equipment – although 
it might get very expensive if 
something is returned under 
guarantee and we have to take 
the bill. 
A24-18 We have not really 
thought about any exit-strategy, 
we have to get started first and 
we are so motivated now that 
we should, or we have to try to 
make it work. 
A24-19 We would never have 
been in the position we are in 
today with regard to Brazil had 
it not been for the request from 
Innovasjon Norge. IN has been 
an important door opener to us, 
and efforts like the Navigator 
program is very useful to 
smaller firms that cannot bear 
the cost of making such efforts 
alone 
A24-20 We pay a fee, for 
travels and for the consultant in 
addition to spending our own 
time and energy on the effort, 
but it would have been much 
more had it not been for 
Innovasjon Norge’s program. 
Sperre would never have done 
anything like this without the 
[Navigator] program 
A24-21 We do not plan to invest much in Brazil, but we hope to train MacArtney technicians at our facilities so that maintenance of 
our ROVs can be done in Brazil 
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11.11 Analysis of evaluated risk factors 
Risk factor 
Company  
Cybernetica Norske 
Ventiler 
SafeClean Sperre # firms  
Policy 
uncertainty 
A11-14 A12-06, A22-06, 
A22-23 
A23-22 A14-11, A14-17 4 
Macro-
economic 
uncertainties 
 A22-03, A22-14 
 
A23-23  2 
Cultural 
distance 
A11-18 A22-15, A22-25 A13-07, A13-13, 
A13-14, A23-07, 
A23-08, A23-09 
A14-18, A24-03, 
A24-08, A24-10  
4 
Administrative 
distance 
 A22-25 A13-09, A13-10, 
A23-20, A23-21 
A14-06, A14-17, 
A24-09 
A24-15, A24-16 
3 
Geographical 
distance 
 A12-05, A22-04, 
A22-25 
 A14-07, A14-13 2 
Economic 
distance 
 A22-25 A13-11  2 
Competitive 
uncertainties 
A11-10, A21-03, 
A21-06 
A12-11, A22-01, 
A22-02, A22-24 
 
A13-03, A23-01, 
A23-14, A23-16, 
A23-18, A23-24 
A14-04, A14-05, 
A14-12, A24-05 
4 
Input 
uncertainties 
  A13-09, A13-12, 
A23-05, A23-06, 
A23-20 
A14-06 2 
Product 
market 
uncertainty 
 A22-17, A22-19 A13-04, A23-01 A14-13 3 
Industry 
uncertainties 
 A12-03, A22-20, 
A22-21 
  1 
Technology 
uncertainties 
A11-03, A21-03, 
A21-04, A21-12, 
A21-13, A21-14  
A12-07 A13-15, A23-13 
 
A14-16, A24-03, 
A24-06, A24-07, 
A24-12, A24-14, 
A24-17 
 
4 
Income 
stream 
uncertainty 
A11-15, A11-16, 
A21-19, A21-20, 
A21-22 
A12-09, A22-12 A13-06  3 
Organizational 
slack 
A21-15, A21-18 A12-08, A12-09, 
A12-10, A22-12, 
A22-18, A22-26, 
A22-27  
A13-06, A23-25 A14-03, A14-10, 
A24-19 
4 
Newness, 
inexperience, 
size and 
foreignness 
A11-03, A11-07, 
A11-08, A21-22 
A12-04, A12-09, 
A12-14, A22-09, 
A22-26, A22-27 
A13-06, A13-08, 
A23-05, A23-15 
A14-02, A14-03 , 
A14-08, A14-10, 
A14-19, A24-19 
4 
Psychic 
distance 
A11-02, A11-18, 
A21-17 
A22-05 A13-07, A23-08 A14-18 4 
Product 
attractiveness 
uncertainty 
A11-03, A11-05, 
A11-09, A21-22, 
A21-23 
A22-17 A13-18, A23-24 A14-13 4 
# risk factors 
evaluated 
9 15 14 11  
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11.12 Article overview 
Risk research 
Author, topic, 
methodology 
Takeaways Intended use 
Acedo & Jones (2007) 
 
How entrepreneurial cognition 
influences the speed of 
internationalization 
 
Quantitative study of 216 
Spanish SMEs  
International orientation, and a higher tolerance for ambiguity, lower the perception 
of risk. Lower risk perception leads to faster internationalization. 3 ways of lowering 
risk perceptions in firms 
Support for Stages 
models’ claim that risk 
perception moderates 
speed of 
internationalization. 
Argumentation for the 
importance of risk 
perception 
Aven & Renn (2011) 
 
Risk management and 
governance 
 
Book on generic risk 
management 
Risk management describes the task to prevent, reduce or alter the consequences 
identified by the risk assessment through choosing appropriate actions. Complexity, 
uncertainty and ambiguity definitions. Risk assessment:  (1) Identification of relevant 
sources, (2) Cause and consequence analysis, (3) Risk description 
Background on risk 
management. The 
multidimensional 
concept of risk 
Baird & Thomas (1985) 
 
Presentation of a model of 
strategic risk taking   
 
Theory building 
Due to the nature of strategy, risk is embedded in most long range decisions. Wide 
definition of corporate strategic risk. Discusses risk perceptions among managers. 
Three aspects of risk handling are presented; identification, estimation, evaluation. 
Presentation of a  contingency model of risk taking is presented, with 
environmental, industrial, organizational, decision maker and problem variables 
Possible basis for 
further development of 
a model for risk 
evaluation. Variables 
affecting risk taking. 
Risk perceptions among 
managers. Wide risk 
definition  
Bromiley, Miller & Rau, 
2005 (book chapter in Hitt, 
Freeman  Harrison (2005)) 
 
Risk in strategic management 
research 
 
Risk research overview 
Researchers of risk in the field of strategic refer to other academic disciplines such 
as economics, finance, and psychology. It is problematic to measure risk relative to 
industry competitors (assumption of clear industry boundaries, allow only for intra-
industry comparison). Strategic risk is a multidimensional construct. Risk 
dimensions influence performance. Performance below aspirations appear to 
increase risk taking. Strong governance appears to mitigate managerial risk aversion. 
 
Challenges of 
measuring risk. The 
multidisciplinary nature 
of risk 
Deilos & Henisz (2003) 
 
Political hazards and the 
impact of experience – a stage 
model extension to include 
political differences 
 
Quantitative study of 3,857 
Japanese firms 
Critique against the stages model’s negligence towards political hazard. Experience 
in hazardous countries makes FDI in other hazardous countries more likely, 
although not as likely as experience in low-hazard countries makes entry into other 
low-hazard countries. The stages model of gradual commitment can be expanded to 
include political risk. Experience from manufacturing operations is more useful in 
hazardous countries, while distribution experience is more useful in low-hazard 
countries 
The role of political 
hazard. How increased 
experience can reduce 
the barriers to entry in 
risky markets. 
Di Gregorio (2004) 
 
Applying entrepreneurship 
theory to country risk 
 
Argumentative paper  
Critique of ineffective country-risk measures (lagging indicators, low predictability). 
International environments are inherently unpredictable. Uncertainty is a function of 
endogenous (project, organizational level) and exogenous (industry, competition, 
external environment) uncertainty. Importance of not forgetting upside risk – 
maximizing upside risk while minimizing downside risk. Risk mitigation strategies: 
(1) Avoidance, (2) Financial hedging, (3) Transfer. Transfer strategies are more 
appropriate and more commonly used when the nature of risk is more ambiguous 
and when information asymmetries exist. (4) Diversification. Entrepreneurial 
strategies that exploits uncertainty: (1) Arbitrage/prediction, (2) Real options, (4) 
Adaption. Outlines 8 strategies for risk minimization and discuss their users (SMEs 
vs. larger firms). 
Critique of country risk 
measures like The 
Economist’s. 
Upside/downside risk 
tradeoff. Strategies for 
risk reduction. 
Figueira-de-Lemos, 
Johanson & Vahlne (2011) 
 
Risk management in the 
Firm internationalization is a process of aligning the firm to the environment. Lack 
of foreign market knowledge is the main obstacle to international expansion. 
Internationalization must be seen as the process outcome of adjustment to changes 
within a firm and the firm’s environment. The Uppsala models risk formula does 
Risk formula and risk 
frontier model from the 
Uppsala model. 
Separation of 
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internationalization process: 
graphical Uppsala model 
 
Theory development 
not seem to have been noted by researchers - neither criticized nor used in the 
internationalization analyses. Although risk appears to be widely present in 
internationalization discussion, few studies strictly focus on risk management in the 
internationalization process. Risk is the product of uncertainty and resource 
commitment.  Separation between contingent uncertainty (reducible) and pure 
uncertainty (non-reducible)   
contingent and pure 
uncertainty. Balance 
between knowledge and 
resource-commitment.  
Forlani & Mullins (2000) 
 
Factors leading to perceiving 
ventures as risky, reasons for 
pursuing risky/non-risky new 
ventures 
 
Quantitative study with 78 
entrepreneurs from the fastest 
growing public U. S. 
companies 
Framework for understanding risk perception: (1) Risk perception (investment, 
outcome variations, potential loss), (2) Venture choice (risk perception, personality, 
context). Risk definition: reflects the degree of uncertainty and potential loss 
associated with the outcomes that may follow from a given behavior or set of 
behaviors. Differences in new venture choices were not only influenced by risk in 
anticipated outcomes, but also the entrepreneur’s perception of risk and their 
propensity to take risk. Entrepreneurs in study more likely to choose high hazard 
than low hazard ventures. However, they overwhelmingly chose ventures of low 
variability 
Proven hypotheses: (1) Greater variability in predicted outcomes => greater 
perceived risk. (2) Greater magnitude of proposed largest loss => greater perceived 
risk, (3) Greater variability in predicted outcomes => less likely to be selected for 
funding, (4) Greater risk propensity of entrepreneur => less perceived risk 
associated with a particular venture (5) Greater risk propensity of entrepreneur => 
more likely to select ventures of higher risk levels. 
Risk perception among 
managers. Factors 
influencing risk 
perception, and final 
choice. 
George, Wiklund, Zahra 
(2005) 
 
The role of ownership in the 
internationalization of SMEs 
 
Quantitative study. Telephone 
interviews (1997 & 2000) and 
mail surveys with 889 Swedish 
firms. 
SME reasoning concerning resources, international experience and 
internationalization efforts. Eclectic paradigm and agency theory used as 
internationalization theories. Factors influencing cost and perceived risk in 
internationalization efforts (scale & scope). Comparison of VCs against other 
institutional investors.Findings (faster with VC than inst.): 
(1) Higher level of CEO ownership negatively related to scale & scope, (2) Higher 
level of TMT ownership negatively related to scale and scope (3)Higher level of 
institutional/VC ownership positively related to scale (4) High CEO/TMT and 
institutional/VC ownership positively related to scale 
Influence of 
external/internal 
ownership. External 
investors can overcome 
the risk aversion of 
CEO and TMT. SME 
argumentation in order 
to show how these 
firms differ from 
MNCs. Risk of 
internationalization, 
factors influencing 
perceived risk. 
Harveston, Kedia, Davis 
(2000) 
 
Managerial impact on 
internationalization of firms 
 
Quantitative study with 60 BG 
and 146 gradual globalizing 
firms 
BG managers have more geocentric mindsets than gradual globalizing firms. BG 
managers have more international experience. BG managers have a higher risk 
tolerance 
Back-up for discussion 
of risk according to 
INV/BG and stages 
perspectives 
HBR Analytic Services 
Report (2011) 
 
Success factors of enterprise 
risk management 
 
Survey of 1419 HBR readers. 
In-depth interviews of sub-
sample 
Risk assessments need to be done prior to project kickoff, rather than at the end 
(linking risk to strategy-making). It can be hard to gain top level approval of 
resource consuming risk management activities, as it is hard to value in financial 
terms. Identifying, analyzing and managing risk should be an ongoing activity rather 
than a periodic “review” process. Risk management should be decentralized, 
pushing decision making authority further out into the field for better risk 
management. Challenges: managing rather than reporting  risk, Ensuring that decisions 
remain with the organization’s risk tolerance, Driving risk mitigation activities, 
Proactively identifying current and emerging risks. Risks can build on each other to 
create more serious problems than might be expected individually – sequential risk  
 
Best practices of risk 
management, definition 
of sequential risk term. 
Henisz & Zelner (2010) 
 
Limiting risks of entering 
emerging markets, focus on 
avoiding expropriation and 
using effective analytical tools  
 
HBR article, limited 
referencing 
Policy risk can seriously affect foreign investments. Policy risk is the risk that a 
government will discriminatorily change the laws, regulations, or contracts 
governing an investment – or will fail to enforce them – in a way that reduces an 
investor’s financial return. Legal contracts, insurance and trade in financial 
instruments usually offer little protection against policy risk. The project – and 
firm-specific nature of political risk renders conventional hedging strategies 
infeasible. Foreign investors must accept responsibility for directly managing risk 
themselves, using analytic tools based on modern communications technology, , 
risk professionals and game theory (and not country risk ratings) 
 
Analytical tools for risk 
identification and 
assessment than the 
norm of using business 
partners and supply 
chain partners, who are 
not trained in assessing 
risk. 
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Kahnemann, Lovallo (1993) 
 
A cognitive perspective on risk 
taking 
 
Literature review, proposes 
own view 
IInside vs. outside view of problems; the outside view should complement the 
inside view in order to get a less biased evaluation. Decision makers tend to deal 
with one choice at the time. This coupled with risk aversion and near 
proportionality of gains and losses makes the risk aversion unjustified and 
incoherent when stakes are small/moderate relative to assets. Organizations and 
managers makes too bold (overly optimistic) forecasts, and timid (risk averse) 
choices 
Risk aversion and 
optimistic forecasts 
dilemma. 
Laitinen (1992) 
 
Prediction of failure of newly 
started firms 
 
A failure prediction model 
tested on 20 failed and 20 
nonfailed small companies 
Mortality rates among newly founded firms are very high. A failure prediction 
model, consisting of 8 financial factors is presented – showing that failure to some 
extent can be predicted. The risk to fail can be reduced by using less debt as initial 
financing and ensuring that sufficient revenue streams are coming early 
Risks specific to newly 
started firms. Deals 
with the symptoms 
rather than the causes 
of failure. Limited 
usability: takes into 
account only financials 
Lovallo, Kahneman (2003) 
 
How decision makers tend to 
be over-optimistic and 
downplay the importance of 
unfavorable scenarios 
 
Article, unclear methodology 
Underlying factors causing over-optimism and decision bias (psychological and 
organizational) 
Introduction of an “outside-view” to complement the ordinary “inside-view” 
(introduction of a reference class) 
Might be an inspiration 
for critique against 
decision-making 
processes. However, 
the lack of references 
makes it difficult to 
apply directly. 
March, Shapira (1987) 
 
Managerial perspectives on 
risk 
 
Review of earlier studies 
Risk is viewed differently by managers than theoretical definitions, most show little 
inclination for reducing risk to a single quantifiable construct. The inclination to 
take risk depend on the context. Risk-taking is seen as a managerial expectation. 
Managers tend to avoid risk, or believe they can reduce risk. There is a danger of 
overlooking low probability, high impact events. Managerial decision-making is not 
holistic, normally one/two focus points are used. Risk is content dependent 
The managerial impact 
on risk identification 
and evaluation 
Mascarenhas (1982) 
 
Coping with uncertainty in 
international business (IB) 
 
Study of 10 MNCs, based on 
interviews,  and their methods 
for coping with uncertainty 
Environmental instability is affected by discontinuities in economic growth, energy 
supplies, currency exchange rates, government actions, technological breakthroughs, 
worker attitudes. Uncertainties in IB: foreign exchange risk, political risk, labor 
restrictions, different cultures, infrastructural problems. Methods to cope with 
business uncertainty: (1) Prediction, (2) Control, (3) Insurance, (4) Flexibility.  Model 
for dealing systematically with uncertainty: (1) identification of uncertainty sources, 
(2) assessment of impact ,(3) evaluation of uncertainty, (4) identification of 
protection methods, (5) assessment of protection methods, (6) selection of 
protection methods, (7) evaluation of uncertainty 
Further development of 
framework for dealing 
with uncertainty. 
Development of 
methods of dealing 
with uncertainty (risk 
mitigation) 
McNamara & Bromiley 
(1997) 
 
Decision-making in an 
organizational setting 
 
Qualitative study  
Argumentation for observing decisions in a real-life context, rather than through 
experiments. Importance of cognitive heuristics and organizational context. Factors 
influencing decision makers: (1) Organizational, (2) Socio-cognitive. Literature 
reference support for low-level performance encouraging risk taking. The role of 
routines as a repository for organizational knowledge. Increased degree of 
standardization over time. The primary organizational effect came from informal 
practices 
Method (real-life 
context). Factors 
influencing decision-
makers, support of 
performance link to 
risk-taking behavior. 
Role of routines, 
standardization and 
informal practices. 
Miller & Reuer (1996) 
 
Advocating the 
appropriateness of the term 
‘downside risk’ 
 
Theory building 
Downside risk conception – more managerially relevant than the variance concept. 
The suitability if downside risk from 3 perspectives – behavioral decision theory, 
finance theory, management theory 
Very relevant in the risk 
definition part. 
Miller (1992) 
 
A framework for risk 
management in international 
business 
 
Model presentation, literature 
references 
A firm's strategy deals with the alignment of the organization to its uncertain 
environment. Organizational strategic choices determine a firm's exposure to 
uncertain environmental and organizational components that impact firm 
performance. Exposure refers to the sensitivity of a firm or project's cash flows to 
changes in any of a number of interrelated uncertain variables. Risk definition that 
focus on unpredictability in corporate outcome variables (leaving out uncertainty in 
environmental variables). Presents 3 main sources of uncertainty: General 
environment, Industry, Firm specific variables. Separates between financial and 
strategic responses to risk/uncertainty (avoidance, control, cooperation, imitation, 
Model for risk 
classification, sources 
of risk, strategies for 
managing risk, idea of 
trade-off possibilities, 
the need to create an 
integrated  risk exposure 
profile 
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flexibility).  Risk factors are complexly linked to each other. There are therefore 
important trade-offs and opportunities, and hence a need for a holistic treatment. 
An exposure profile should be constructed, not all risk can be reduced 
Miller (1998) 
 
Financial exposure and risk 
management 
 
A multivariate approach to 
model corporate risk exposure 
Breaking the risk construct into distinct exposures to multiple environmental 
contingencies allows for more precise specification of the relations between risks 
and strategies 
Reductionist approach 
to risk analysis, splitting 
large analyses in smaller 
pieces. 
Miller (1993) 
 
Industry and country effect on 
managers’ perceptions of 
environmental uncertainty 
 
ANOVA test of uncertainty on 
497 South American managers 
Managers operating in the international business context confront a variety of 
uncertain environmental factors. Industry, rather than country, as the relevant level 
of analysis for risk assessment. Uncertainty refers to the unpredictability of 
environmental or organizational variables that have an impact on corporate 
performance, encompassing input market, product market, competitive and 
technological uncertainties. Firm specific uncertainties includes uncertainties 
regarding operations, research and development, and management and employee 
actions. Firms make real changes in strategies to reduce risk. An obstacle to 
empirical research on perceived environmental uncertainties is the lack of well-
established measurement instruments. Optimal risk management practices involve 
simultaneous consideration of the full spectrum of corporate exposures to 
environmental uncertainties. Country-level assessment need to be supplemented 
with firm-specific, or even investment-specific considerations 
The mgmt. teams 
shared uncertainty 
perceptions is 
influential. Managers 
associate uncertainty 
with distinct 
environmental 
components. Risk is 
project/firm specific 
Milliken (1987) 
 
Three types of uncertainty 
about the environment; state, 
effect and response 
 
Literature overview, theory 
building 
Presents 3 types of environmental uncertainty: state, effect and response uncertainty. 
Objective and perceived uncertainty is expected to differ, as perceptions vary as a 
function of individual attributes. An individual express uncertainty because he lack 
sufficient information to predict accurately or feels unable to discriminate between 
relevant data and irrelevant data.  
Treating uncertainty: 
understand , make 
sense of, respond to. 
identify, evaluate, 
mitigate. Distinct types 
of uncertainty 
 
Oviatt et al (2004) 
 
Risk management model for 
internationalization of new 
ventures 
 
Model presentations 
INV risk literature review. Present a risk model including: (1) General environment, 
(2) industry conditions, (3) venture entrepreneurs, (4) the venture. 
 
Risk model 
Palmer & Wiseman (1999) 
 
Managerial risk taking and 
organizational risk 
 
Structural equations modeling, 
data from 235 firms 
representing 64 industries 
Confusion over risks multiple meanings have hindered the field’s advancement. 
Defining and measuring the environment's influence is complex. Researchers of 
strategic management customarily assume that environments determine the 'playing 
field' on which rivals compete. Risk is disaggregated into two distinct components; 
managerial risk,  organizational risk (income stream uncertainty). Distinguishing 
between managerial choices and organizational outcomes helps answer questions 
about the role managers pay in creating firm performance. Some researchers argue 
that top managers choose strategies (and presumably risk) that align their 
organizations with environmental conditions, others argue that environmental 
factors (market structure, turbulence) directly influence organizational outcomes. 
The authors failed to detect a direct influence of environmental characteristics on 
organizational risk that was independent on managerial risk taking 
- challenges of risk 
research 
- Managerial risk 
mediated the influence 
of environment on 
organizational risk 
COSO (2004) (report written 
by PwC) 
 
Framework for enterprise risk 
management 
 
Report 
All entities face uncertainty, and the challenge for management is to determine how 
much uncertainty to accepts while striving to grow stakeholder value. Enterprise 
risk management: aligning risk appetite and strategy, - enhancing risk response 
decisions, reducing operational surprises and losses, identifying and managing 
multiple and cross-enterprise risks, seizing opportunities, improving deployment of 
capital. Components of enterprise risk management: (1) Internal environment (2) 
objective setting, (3) event identification, (4) event assessment (5) risk response; (6) 
control activities, (7) information and communication, (8) monitoring and 
modification.  The risk responses include avoiding, accepting, reducing or sharing 
risk – actions that align risks with the entity’s risk tolerances and risk appetite.  
- Risk model 
- Effective risk 
management is 
intended to increase 
shareholder value, -
balancing opportunity 
and risk 
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Roth (1991) 
 
Managerial decision-making 
characteristics regarding 1) 
risk-taking 2) openness in 
decision-making 3) group 
consensus 
 
Quantitative study, based on 
questionnaire sent to managers 
of 82 international business 
units 
The strategy of a business and its managerial decision-making arguments are linked 
because managerial decision-making characteristics are: 
a) fundamental to effective implementation of a particular strategy choice 
b) reflected directly in that choice (bounded rationality) 
c) a direct source of competitive advantage 
Managerial characteristics may become a source of competitive advantage. Bounded 
rationality result because complex decisions, such as strategic choices, are 
characterized by ambiguity, conflicting goals, and imperfect information. Strategic 
choices will in part reflect the “idiosyncrasies of decision makers” 
- influence of 
managerial 
characteristics on 
decision-making 
Shapira (1995) 
 
The role of risk in managerial 
decision making 
 
Study based on 
- Interviews with 50 executives 
- a questionnaire was designed 
based on the interviews, with 
results from 656 executives 
With certainty each action is known, leading to a particular outcome. With risk, each 
action leads to a few known outcomes, occurring with a specific probability. 
Uncertainty reflects that each action may lead to a set of consequences, of which the 
probabilities are unknown. The satisficing principle (Simon) “people search through 
a limited set of alternatives until they find a good enough alternative”. Managers 
view risk differently than the definition used in decision theory: (1) managers 
referred primarily to downside risk, (2) managers attended more to the magnitude of 
possible loss than to its probability, (3) a sharp distinction was made risk taking and 
gambling, (4) managers showed little desire to reduce risk to a single quantifiable 
construct. Risk is perceived as multidimensional. Organizations should take risks 
under conditions of success, but be very careful taking risk under conditions if stress 
and failure.  
- managerial risk 
perception is 
influential 
- managers do not seek 
to quantify risk 
Shrader (2001) 
 
When to collaborate in foreign 
markets relative to a 
transaction cost approach 
(bounded rationality, 
opportunism) 
 
Quantitative approach with 70 
firms with a joint total of 176 
foreign market entries 
Collaboration is performance enhancing when marketing activities are important, 
but should be avoided if technological advantage is key. Not all INVs collaborate on 
market entry. Outlines advantages of collaboration for INVS. Transaction costs 
does not seem to be evaluated in the market entry decision process 
- the possible 
advantages and pitfalls 
of collaboration 
- apparent low impact 
of transaction cost 
evaluation in the 
market entry 
Shrader, Oviatt and 
McDougall (2000) 
 
How international risk factors 
can be traded off against each 
other 
 
Quantitative study of 87 U.S 
firms with a joint total of 212 
foreign market entries 
It is possible to trade of the 3 most common risk factors against each other 
(location, entry commitment, revenue share).Outlines strategies for managing risk. 
Most influential factors on SME internationalization is the top management team, 
firm-level conditions and strategies, and industry conditions. Evaluation of pros and 
cons of entrepreneurial managers 
Risk factors, possibility 
of managing risk 
through trade-offs, risk 
management strategies, 
influential factors on 
SME 
internationalization. 
Taleb et al. (2009) 
 
Six mistakes often made by 
executives in risk management 
 
HBR article, no references 
Instead of trying to anticipate low-profitability, high-impact events, we should 
reduce our vulnerability to them. Six common misconceptions: (1)We think we can 
predict extreme events, (2) we are convinced that studying the past will help us 
manage risk, (3) we don’t listen to advice about what we shouldn’t do, (4) we assume 
that risk can be measured by standard deviation, (5) we don’t appreciate that what’s 
mathematically equivalent isn’t psychologically so, 6) we are taught that efficiency 
and maximizing shareholder value don’t tolerate redundancy. 
- Lesson for managers: 
prepare for the 
consequences of 
unexpected events 
Tversky & Kahneman (1992) 
 
Extension of prospect theory 
towards a cumulative 
presentation of uncertainty 
 
Model development with 
literature base 
Critique against expected utility theory. 5 choice phenomena (influences in the 
decision process). Tendency to overweight small probabilities. Tendency to 
underweight high probabilities. 
Managerial 
characteristics 
influencing decision 
making 
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Ward & Chapman (2001) 
 
Transforming risk 
management into uncertainty 
management 
 
Argumentative paper with 
literature references 
Transforming risk management to opportunity management induces an enhanced 
focus on opportunity management. Risk is associated to adversity, implying adverse 
effects on performance, thus it fails to consider the management of opportunities. 
Opportunities and threats can sometimes be treated separately, but are seldom 
independent. Uncertainty management encompasses more than threat/opportunity 
management. It implies exploring and understanding the origins of uncertainty 
before trying to manage it. Risk transfer as a mitigation strategy 
Risk definition, sources 
of uncertainty, the 
importance of not 
neglecting 
opportunities arising 
from uncertainty. 
- Importance of 
articulating subjective 
estimates  
- Mitigation strategy – 
reduction/modification. 
Weber & Hsee (1998) 
 
The influence of culture on 
risk perception and attitudes 
towards risk 
 
Quantitative study with sample 
groups from 4 countries 
Perception of risk, rather than attitudes towards risk, varies between cultures. 
Cushion hypothesis introduced as an explanation. Mathematical formulation of risk 
   ( )   ( )    ( ). WTP: Willigness to Pay, V: Value (expected value, R: 
Risk (variance), b: Risk-return tradeoff parameter. b>0. Risk seeking, b<0 risk 
averse 
Support on the 
importance of risk 
perception in the 
decision-making 
process. The attitudes 
towards risk might be 
similar, but perceptions 
of risk in various 
situations might 
influence choices. 
Experience might 
reduce the perceived 
degree of risk 
Werner et al (1996) 
 
International risk and 
perceived environmental 
uncertainty  
 
Testing Miller’s (1993) 
uncertainty measure based on 
a sample of internationally 
operating Netherland-based 
firms. 
How risk has been measured: 
(1) Political risk: management’s opinion of the attitude of the host government 
toward  the industry and toward foreign firms , management’s opinion of the 
volatility of the political, social and economic conditions in the host country, 
symptoms of instability; protests, riot; risk ratings (EIU, International Country risk 
guide) 
(2) Exchange rate risk: actual rates, changes in exchange rates (devaluation),  
(3) Demand uncertainty: annual production growth, rate of change in production 
(4) Management perception of demand 
- possible measures of 
political risk, exchange 
risk and demand 
uncertainty 
Zahra and, Garvis (2000) 
 
Entrepreneurship, firm 
performance and the 
moderating factor of 
environmental hostility 
 
Quantitative study of 149 
companies (response rate of 
26%). Three hypotheses 
tested. 
International Corporate Entrepreneurship (ICE) positively related with 
performance. The relationship is of diminishing returns (adverse U-shaped). 
Environmental hostility has a moderating effect on ICE. Sources of hostility. 1st 
mover advantage discussion (oil industry) 
Sources of hostility 
(risk) 
The disadvantage of 
not being 1st mover 
 
 
Internationalization theory 
Author, topic, 
methodology 
Takeaways Intended use 
Aspelund, Madsen & 
Moen (2007) 
 
A review of INV 
research from 1992-
2004 
 
Literature review 
The INV concept is the broadest concept proposed in the literature. Slow gradual 
internationalization challenged by autonomous, innovative and risk taking entrepreneurs 
allowed to make strategic choice – but some researchers find proof of an accelerated 
gradual process. Niche focus, lead markets – hiding from global players, preserving profit 
opportunities. Markets may be selected for opportunities of growth, but the sequences are 
decided based on the founders’ previous experience and network. The psychic distance 
concept may serve well on an average industry level, but individual firm factors might 
weight more in the market selection process. Low commitment modes to overcome 
resource constraints and handle risk make FDI unrealistic. Factors driving 
internationalization: Innovations’ time window of opportunity , mobility of competitive 
advantages tied to intangibles, insufficient domestic market size – A need perspective 
Internationalization 
process explanation. 
Support for INV concept 
as main concept. 
Accelerated gradual 
process explanation. 
Need perspective. 
Facilitators of 
internationalization. 
Niche focus in order to 
hide from global players. 
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Autio (2005) 
 
Discussing the impact 
of Oviatt & 
McDougall’s ‘towards a 
theory of INVs’ 
 
Literature review 
Tabulated comparison of the stages and BG perspective. Discusses the non-valid original 
assumptions of the Uppsala-model. Contrasting views of risk: (1) small risk is better than 
‘leapfrogging’ as firms are more likely to survive small mistakes than larger (2) early 
internationalization may not be an option, but a necessity to ensure growth due to short 
opportunity windows 
Comparison of the stages 
and BG perspective. 
Small risks may be 
preferable for some, 
while a risky 
internationalization 
process is a necessity for 
others 
Bell (1995) 
 
Challenging the 
propositions of stages 
theories 
 
Quantitative studies of 
firms in Finland, 
Ireland and Norway 
Support Uppsala’s prominent position, arguments of similarities between stages models. 
The psychic distance concept unable to provide an adequate explanation of initial market 
selection. Proprietary knowledge concerns an influencing factor in entry mode decisions 
for HT companies. Firm size and age not important determinants of internationalization 
decision. Firms do not go through a complex analysis of geographic, cultural and political 
factors when initiating export activities 
Support of Uppsala 
position, support of 
knowledge concerns 
influencing 
internationalization, 
support of simplified 
internationalization 
decision-process 
Bell, McNaughton, 
Young, Crick (2003) 
 
Creating an integrative 
model of small firm 
internationalization 
 
Literature review 
Born-again globals through critical incidents (most often a change in management, or 
client-followership). Tabulated comparison in internationalization behavior of 
traditionals, born globals and born-again globals Managerial implications for traditionals, 
born globals and born-again globals. Government export programs – goals & critique, 
challenges presented by born globals 
Born-again globals 
concept, comparison of 
internationalization 
behaviors, government 
export program 
discussion (policy 
implications) 
Crick & Jones (2000) 
 
The internationalization 
process of technology 
oriented SMEs 
 
Qualitative study of 10 
U.K. SMEs 
Model of important factors in the internationalization process. Non-exporters is not a 
general, homogenous category (as it is often used as). Important factors for SME 
internationalization: (1) Flexibility, (2) Responsiveness to change, (3) Innovativeness in 
business practice, (4) Technological capability. Managerial background 
(technical/business) affecting speed of internationalization. Internationalization usually 
planned rather than ad hoc – a need to balance resources against risk. Outside support – a 
substitute for managerial experience. Most firms adopt a risk-adverse strategy regarding 
commitment. Low psychic distance less important than global trends in technology 
markets and network relationships 
Influences on the 
internationalization 
process, support of 
downplaying psychic 
distance, risk balancing 
and risk-aversion to 
commitment 
Crick & Spence 
(2005) 
 
Strategy formulation in 
the internationalization 
process of high-tech 
SMEs 
 
Qualitative study – 12 
in-depth interviews 
HTSMEs may not have time to integrate prior knowledge and fully develop strategies 
before implementing them. In SMEs the entrepreneur or team’s characteristics drive 
organizational strategy. Support of the need for more than one theory. Emergent 
strategies may be initiated by opportunity windows with short time frames –> 
opportunistic strategies may bring more value than systematic 
Serendipity term (Temporal, relational, analytical components) some firms commenced 
expansion for serendipitous, unplanned reasons 
Main triggers for pursuing an international strategy: (1) Availability of contacts, (2) 
Development & use of resources, (3) Serendipitous encounters.  
Planned vs. unplanned 
strategy, 
serendipity/chance 
concept, the importance 
of a few persons in SMEs 
Knight & Cavusgil 
(2004) 
 
Explaining the 
organizational 
background if a born 
global firm 
 
Quantitative study of 
203 firms 
Most new firms characterized by scarce financial, human and tangible resources. 
Managers’ global focus and commitment makes firms start with a global market view and 
develop capabilities to achieve international goals at/near founding. Early 
internationalization driven by 2 trends: (1) Globalization of markets, (2) Technological 
advances 
Drivers of superior international performance: (1) global technological competence (2) 
unique products development (3) leveraging foreign distributor competences. Smaller, 
young firms are more flexible, less bureaucratic – unlearning embedded routines become 
more difficult as the firm ages 
New firm 
characterization, 
managerial influence on 
internationalization, 
trends driving early 
internationalization, 
characteristics of INVs 
Madsen & Servais 
(1997) 
 
Comparing the born 
global process to the 
stages perspective 
 
Literature review 
Defense of the Uppsala model. Changes in founder characteristics and market conditions 
make the “rings in the water” concept obsolete 
Factors attributing to the rise of BGs: (1) Market conditions, (2) Technological 
development, (3) Competences 
Input in the discussion of 
the early 
internationalization 
perspective 
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McAuley (2010) 
 
SME research 1999-
2009 
 
Literature review 
There is a lack of practitioner application to the findings of the reviewed articles. The 
sheer variety of SME activity, still means that a single and unified theory of SME 
internationalization remains an illusion 
Motivation for holistic 
theoretical approach (no 
single theory sufficient to 
describe int process) 
McDougall & Oviatt 
(1996) 
 
INVs – strategic 
change and 
performance 
 
Quantitative study of 
62 U.S. computer and 
communications 
manufacturing ventures 
Internationalization may be a prerequisite for competing in some industries. Strategic 
change necessary as the environment changes – this is easier accomplished in new 
ventures w/o organizational inertia. No direct relationship between % of international 
sales and ROI. Niche focus - highly focused firms with an intangible knowledge based 
competitive advantage. Patented or secret knowledge that needs little local adaption may 
be embedded in the product technology and transferred to multiple locations at low 
marginal cost 
Support of the need 
perspective, movability of 
knowledge-based 
products 
McDougall, Shane & 
Oviatt (1994) 
 
Explaining INVs and 
why traditional 
internationalization 
theories cannot explain 
their 
internationalization 
 
Comparison of theories 
and case studies 
INV definition. The formation process is not explained by existing theories from the field 
of international business. Founders of INVs are more alert to the possibilities of 
combining resources from different national markets because of the competencies that 
they have developed from their earlier activities. International entrepreneurs try to avoid 
domestic path-dependence. Under conditions of resource poverty, the internalization of 
transactions is limited and the INVs rely on hybrid structures for controlling many vital 
assets despite a threat of opportunism. Link to Eisenhardt: Random selection is neither 
necessary nor even preferable when one is extending theory 
INV definition, claim of 
stage theory misfit, INV 
founder characteristics, 
hybrid structure 
preference. Random 
selection argument for 
method chapter. 
Moen, Servais (2002) 
 
Export behavior of 
SMEs – questioning 
the concept of gradual 
development 
 
Quantitative study with 
surveys from Norway, 
Denmark, France 
Questions gradual development concept, challenging market knowledge’s importance due 
to globalization. Explanations for rapid internationalization – lead market criterion 
downplaying the importance of psychic distance. Finds no relationship between year of 
foundation and export intensity, global orientation, distribution, psychic or geographic 
market distance, or the number of market served. Firms exporting for a long time 
exported to a larger number of countries 
Critique of stages’ gradual 
development concept, 
lead market criterion 
Oviatt & McDougall 
(2005) 
 
A theory for INVs 
 
Literature review and 
theory-building 
INVs have existed for centuries. FDI not a requirement for INV classification. Large size 
may be both a cause and effect of multinational competitive advantage. Lists 4 INV 
characteristics. Resource scarcity leads to use of risky hybrid arrangements. Sources of 
foreign country transaction disadvantages. Need perspective of internationalization 
relative to protecting firm knowledge 
INV characteristics, 
resource scarcity 
influencing risk taking, 
sources of disadvantages, 
need perspective 
Rialp, Rialp & Knight 
(2005) 
 
Review of INV/BG 
research from 1993-
2003 
 
Literature review 
Use of ‘early internationals’ to cover BG and INV terms. A single theoretical framework 
for explaining early internationalization would be reductionist. Studies focusing on 
populations of HT firms in special sectors may provide a different and not fully 
comparable result with less context-dependent research. Support of multiple case studies. 
Lists 10 facilitating factors of internationalization. Lists 3 keys issues in the 
internationalization of a firm. Too little research has been devoted to the nature of 
managerial decision-making 
Early internationals term, 
support of multiple 
frameworks, factors 
influencing INV 
internationalization, 
support on managerial 
decision-making 
Zahra (2005) 
 
Reviewing the INV 
theory a decade later 
 
Literature review 
There are both advantages and disadvantages with being a new firm 
Drivers of internationalization: (1) Prior founder experiences (2) Recognition of business 
opportunities, (3) Level of an industry’s global integration. 3 common INV liabilities: (1) 
Newness, inexperience (2) Size (3) Foreignness. Critique against Oviatt and McDougall 
for overlooking the role if the institutional environment and economic geography. Not all 
learning is functional and beneficial as it might introduce rigidity as managers develop 
preferred ways of handling challenges 
Support for evaluating 
the risk of the 
environment, support for 
internationalization 
drivers, risk/liabilities of 
INVs, firm age 
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